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The main objective of this thesis is to analyse and critically consider whether 
the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 as amended by the 1972 
Protocol; the Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971; and the 
United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances of 1988 are flexible enough to develop new and 
innovative strategies to tackle the World Drug Problem, considering that 
there are countries establishing new internal policies and strategies that are 
considered by the International Narcotic Control Board (INCB) and several 
other States as illegal. This will be done through an evaluation of the current 
International Drug Control Regime as well as by evaluating the practice and 
positions of such States. To understand the new positions emerging inside 
the current drug control regime, particular attention will be given to changing 
State views after the United Nations General Assembly Special Session of 
2016 (UNGASS 2016). 
This thesis will start with an historical analysis of the evolution of the 
International Drug Control Regime, in order to understand how it was built 
and what are the historical motivations that make this regime to be 
considered "repressive" by some States. The next chapter will address the 
theoretical framework necessary for this investigation. Specifically, it will 
consider international regimes, how they are constructed and modified by 
the relevant States or International Organizations. This will be 
complemented by an analysis of the different international instruments 
related to addressing the World Drug Problem, such as the Three 
International Drug Control Conventions.  
The following chapters will address specific case studies that demonstrate 
how this international debate is affecting national policies and, directly and 
indirectly, the possibilities for effective international cooperation. The 
research will address, in particular, the withdrawal and re-accession of 
Bolivia to the Single Convention of 1961, the Portuguese strategies aimed 
at addressing its national drug problem in a very innovative way without 
going out of the framework of the three conventions, as well as the new 
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strategies regarding legalization of cannabis for recreational purposes 
implemented by Canada, Uruguay and some states of the United States.  
The thesis will seek to answer the research question whether the regime is 
flexible enough to accommodate new interests and positions from States 
advocating for a change in international strategies aimed at addressing the 
World Drug Problem. How far can such States Parties act flexibly within the 
current regime? Or is it necessary to break, totally or partially, with the 
current regime to create innovative ways to address this global issue? By 
answering these questions, this Thesis will seek to demonstrate that the 
International Drug Control Regime based on the three conventions is 
flexible enough to accommodate the different interests of the Member 
States. Therefore, those strategies that seek to go beyond the limits of the 
regime and the conventions, such as the legalization of the use of narcotics 



























Glossary of terms 
 
 2009 Political Declaration: 2009 Political Declaration and Plan of 
Action on International Cooperation towards an Integrated and 
Balanced Strategy to Counter the World Drug Problem  
 2014 Ministerial Statement: 2014 Joint Ministerial Statement of 
the High-Level Review by the Commission on Narcotic Drugs of the 
Implementation by Member States of the 2009 Political Declaration  
 CCPCJ: Commission for the Prevention of Crime and Criminal 
Justice  
 CND: Commission on Narcotic Drugs 
 DEA: Drug Enforcement Administration  
 ECOSOC: Economic and Social Council  
 EU: European Union  
 IDCR: International Drug Control Regime  
 INCB: International Narcotic Control Board  
 UNCAC: United Nations Convention against Corruption  
 UNGASS 2016: United Nations General Assembly Special Session 
of 2016  
 UNODC: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime  
 UNTOC: United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime  
 USA: United States of America 
 WEOG: Group of Eastern European States and Others  
 WDP: World Drug Problem  
 WHO: World Health Organization  
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Personal Note of the Author 
During all the time that I have had the opportunity to serve my country as a 
diplomatic official, I have rarely encountered such an interesting but 
complex issue as that of international cooperation to address the World 
Drug Problem. Undoubtedly, being the official responsible of the Permanent 
Mission of Peru in Vienna in charge of the issues of the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime has given me many opportunities and 
advantages for this investigation, but at the same time it has presented 
serious problems for me. The diplomat's job often involves defending the 
interests of your country despite having different personal positions. And 
many times, the defence of such interests must be so strong that you end 
up convincing yourself that this is the way things should be, despite having 
different personal positions. It can also happen that the defence made by 
other diplomats is so convincing that you question your own thinking as well 
as that of your country. 
With regard to the subject of this investigation, the problems described in 
the previous paragraph have also been present. I have felt the need to write 
this research being as objective as possible, even though day by day I 
receive different instructions from my capital and hear very convincing 
arguments from other colleagues that made me rethink many times what 
has been expressed in this thesis. In the same way, I had to make an 
important effort to, at the time of writing, disassociate myself from my daily 
work, in such a way that I can have a more objective and "outside" vision. I 
must say that doing this required more effort than I thought, but I trust that I 
achieved it. However, having the possibility to have daily contact with such 
different positions, opinions and interests has given me the opportunity to 
develop a more critical capacity, and, despite the effort required, I believe 
that I have managed to understand the different arguments presented by 
the different States and International Organizations with a vision of an 
"outsider". 
I must admit that I never imagined myself working in the multilateral sphere, 
much less being responsible for working on issues related to drugs and 
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crime, which are of special importance for my country. But this is probably 
one of the great advantages and challenges of the diplomatic career: being 
able to adapt to new situations, both personal and work related, and be 
willing to always have a mind eager to learn new things. I think these are 
some of the skills that I have been able to obtain in recent years and I hope 
they have enriched the present investigation. 
One of the main inspirations I had when deciding to carry out this research 
was the fact of having assumed my current responsibilities in the middle of 
the negotiations of the Outcome Document of the UNGASS 2016. I 
remember that many questions that today are fundamental for the present 
essay emerged during that time. Why was it necessary to carry out 
UNGASS 2016 if, when it was convened, there were still 5 years left to fulfil 
the objectives agreed in the 2009 Political Declaration on International 
Cooperation towards an Integrated and Balanced Strategy to Counter the 
World Drug Problem? Why was there a certain number of States 
questioning the 2009 objectives?  Why did they want to make it so different? 
Are the 2009 and 2016 documents so different from each other? Naturally, 
these questions were left in the background during the negotiation of the 
document resulting from UNGASS 2016, mainly because at that time I was 
a new official with clear instructions on what I should do. However, this 
research has allowed me to look at these questions from a new perspective 
and, although it does not help much, to realize that I could have done things 
differently as a delegate in the United Nations in Vienna. Maybe, these 
lessons will help me in the future. 
Bearing this in mind, and due to my position as Peruvian Diplomat, some of 
the information used for this thesis, especially in chapter 5, has been 
acquired through my day to day work, which includes negotiations and 
conversations with other colleagues from different missions. Therefore, in 
some cases, it has not been proper or possible to make references to 
particular documents, and I have tried to reflect the general sense of the 
above mentioned meetings. 
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There is no doubt that I will continue to defend my country's position 
regarding how to address the World Drug Problem, as well as in any 
situation in which I need to do so. However, the development of the present 
investigation has shown me that it is not enough to obey the instructions 
coming from my capital. It is necessary to be able to objectively present all 
existing positions, as well as the opportunities that lie behind them. I 
consider that for a long time I devoted myself exclusively to seek arguments 
to convince my capital that the position we have always defended is the 
correct one. However, I observe that I am developing the capacity to provide 
added value to the reports, strategies and policies that I have been 



















1. Introduction  
 
Together we must honour the unanimous commitments 
made to reduce drug abuse, illicit trafficking and the harm 
that drug cause, and to ensure that our approach promotes 
equality, human rights, sustainable development, and 
greater peace and security1 
 
The message given by the Secretary General of the United Nations in 2017, 
unfortunately, does not reflect at present the total actions of the international 
community regarding how to address and counter the World Drug Problem 
(WDP), considering there isn’t an actual consensus on which agreements 
should be applicable and honoured. Indeed, many agreements and 
commitments regarding how to tackle, or address, the WDP have been 
adopted on this matter since the beginning of the 20th century, some of them 
imposed by the great powers because of commercial, economic and even 
“moral” reasons, and others agreed at multilateral conferences with the 
participation of large numbers of Member States of the United Nations 
system. All this process led to the approval of the Single Convention of 
19612, which sought to unify all the other agreements that had been 
achieved in the past, especially those regarding the cultivation of opium, 
adding coca leaf and the cannabis plant. After the entry into force of this 
Convention, the current International Drug Control Regime (IDCR) began to 
take shape, and various additional documents, both hard and soft law 
instruments, in the form of conventions, resolutions and political statements 
started to complement it. However, as it has been said, today there is no 
unanimous agreement between which of these agreements and 
commitments should be respected, which are no longer relevant, which 
should be reviewed, and which should only be accepted in part. 
 
Illicit drug trafficking is a very complex and global-scale criminal 
phenomenon, although its impact is seen locally both on the streets and in 
                                                          
1 Antonio Guterres. (Message delivered by the United Nations General Secretary Antonio 
Guterres on the International Day against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking, New York, 26 June 
2017) <https://www.unodc.org/listenfirst/en/WDD/sg-statement-2017.html> accessed 6 July 
2018 
2 William McAllister, Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century´ (Routledge 2000) 185-211 
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homes. It is absolutely necessary that national and international policies to 
address the WDP take into account this transnational character3, the global 
context in which it operates, its expansion networks, as well as the tools 
provided by the international legal system to combat it. 
 
Considering the complexity of the problem, we find for example, and from a 
fundamentally economic point of view, the case of micro-marketing, through 
which people seek to solve social problems such as the "unemployed 
mother" who needs to work in one way or another to satisfy primary needs. 
In this sense, it is evident that for some States the problem of illicit drug 
trafficking is often linked to a development problem due to lack of 
opportunities, although it could also be argued that micro commercialists 
are often people who may need incomes precisely to continue consuming, 
which refers to a health aspect that has to be addressed, or simply young 
adventurers who see in the sale of drugs the possibility of knowing a 
different life, bringing us to the problem of education4. 
 
Continuing with a fundamentally economic analysis, it is worth mentioning 
the large criminal organizations, which are those that really benefit 
substantially from this illicit business5. These organizations are directly 
responsible for the crimes derived from the illicit drug trafficking, such as 
asset laundering, corruption, human trafficking, environmental crimes, 
among others, and many times they take advantage of the needs of the 
people who are below in the criminal chain to identify possible helpers6. But 
these organizations, as has happened for a long time, for example in the 
case of Colombia, have also acted as economic agents for the benefit of 
poor populations, providing them with resources and even services that they 
lacked due to the absence of the State. In that sense, illicit drug trafficking, 
                                                          
3 Alan Dupont, ´Transnational Crime, Drugs, and Security in East Asia´ (1999) 39(3) Asian Survey 
433. 
4 Angus Bancroft, Drugs, intoxication and society (Polity Press 2009) 
5 Margaret Beare, Critical reflections on transnational organized crime, money laundering and 
corruption (University of Toronto Press Incorporated 2003) 145-159 
6 Matthew Jenner, ´Drug Trafficking as a Transnational Crime´ in Philip Reichel and Jay Albanese 




mainly in remote areas of Latin America, Asia and Africa, has become one 
of the main economic activities that, although it continues to benefit mostly 
the large criminal organizations, has had a positive impact on the 
development of the population7. 
 
Another aspect to consider is the one related to security. This is based not 
only on the large criminal organizations and their link to the illicit drug 
trafficking and related crimes, but also on the fact that drugs are often used 
to finance terrorist groups. Following Michael Braun, it can be said that the 
links between illicit drug trafficking and terrorists’ organizations has been 
identified and tackled for many years.8  
 
There often is a nexus between terrorism and organized 
crime, including drug trafficking. Links between terrorist 
organizations and drug traffickers take many forms, ranging 
from facilitation -- protection, transportation, and taxation -- 
to direct trafficking by the terrorist organization itself in order 
to finance its activities. Traffickers and terrorists have similar 
logistical needs in terms of material and the covert movement 
of goods, people and money9. 
 
The WDP has also been widely recognized as a constant source of 
impairment of the rights of individuals and societies in crucial areas such as 
health and safety10. The abuse of these substances can cause imbalances 
in the behaviour and in the normal activities of people within their social 
environments, affecting their capacity for decision taking and self-
determination. The daily activities of drug addicts, in the levels concerning 
                                                          
7 Jon Lee Anderson, ´The Afterlife of Pablo Escobar´. (The New Yorker 5 March 2018). 
<https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/03/05/the-afterlife-of-pablo-escobar > accessed 
23 November 2018 
The case of Pablo Escobar is probably one of the most enigmatic in this regard. During his life he 
was nicknamed "the Robin Hood Paisa" (paisa is the name given to the inhabitants of Medellin), 
for the "benefits" he gave to the communities most in need. 
8 Michael Braun, ´Drug Trafficking and Middle Eastern Terrorist Groups: A Growing Nexus´. (The 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy July 25 2008) 
<https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/drug-trafficking-and-middle-eastern-
terrorist-groups-a-growing-nexus> accessed 18 June 2018 
9 Rand Beers and Francis Taylor, ´Narco-Terror: The Worldwide Connection between Drugs and 
Terror.´ (U.S. Department of State 13 March 2002) <https://2001-
2009.state.gov/p/inl/rls/rm/8743.htm> accessed 17 December 2017 




the family, work, school, sports, social, among others, are also affected.11 
That means, drug addicts do not only harm themselves but also their social 
environment, leading in serious and extreme situations to violence. 
 
The harmful effects of drugs to society has been widely described by 
academia, international organizations, civil society, state actors, among 
others.  
 
Many of the costs of drug addiction go beyond the user. (…) 
Most crimes related to drugs involve theft of personal 
property—primarily, burglary and shoplifting—and, less 
commonly, assault and robbery (often mugging). Estimates 
are that a heroin addict must steal three to five times the 
actual cost of drugs to maintain the habit, or roughly 
$2000,000 per year12.  
 
Bearing this in mind, there is an effect not only in the livelihood of the people 
but also in their economy. Thus, it is understandable that a high involvement 
from the States is necessary to address these effects, especially when the 
criminal activities caused by drugs have a direct relation with organized 
crime organizations and other types of crimes such as human exploitation 
and human trafficking, terrorism, environmental crimes, among others.  
 
It should be taken into consideration that, as a global phenomenon, the 
WDP goes beyond any state limit13, being a phenomenon of destabilizing 
nature. The criminal chain includes producers, traffickers and consumers, 
each of them with its own share of fault. As it was said by Willy Stevens, 
“the illegal narcotics industry is the largest and most perverse multinational 
in the world. It has a turnover of around 400 billion dollars, that is, 8% of 
                                                          
11Ross Coomber, Karen McElrath, Fiona Measham and Karenza Moore. ´Key Concepts in Drugs 
and Society´ (SAGE 2013) 
12 Glen Hanson, Peter Venturelli and Annette Fleckenstein. Drugs and Society. (12 edn, Jones & 
Bartlett Learning 2015) 
13 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, ´The Globalization of Crime: a Transnational 
Organized Crime Threat Assesment´. (UNODC, 2010) <https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-
and-analysis/tocta/TOCTA_Report_2010_low_res.pdf> accessed 11 January 2017  
5 
 
world trade. It far exceeds the oil industry, for the defence of whose interests 
there is no doubt at times in unleashing wars”14.  
 
States, considering the global dimension the WDP, have created an 
international regime to address it in a collaborative way; a regime that is 
currently based in the principle of common and shared responsibility, which 
will be explained later in more detail. The current IDCR did not develop 
overnight. It is the result of an enormous evolution that can be tracked many 
centuries ago, although it can be argued that the Opium Wars represent a 
notable milestone for the regime States apply currently.15 It is worth noting 
how narcotic drugs were considered for many years as a very lucrative legal 
business that was even promoted by the Governments of the States that 
nowadays are leading the international cooperation to address the WDP 
“recognizing that addiction to narcotic drugs constitutes a serious evil for the 
individual and is fraught with social and economic danger to mankind” and 
“conscious of their duty to prevent and combat this evil”16. 
 
The reasons why States decided to switch from a regime that allowed 
narcotic drugs trafficking for recreational purposes into a regime that has 
been characterized by many as punitive (and for some unduly repressive) 
against all the chain of what nowadays is illicit drug trafficking will be further 
developed in the historical review chapter of this research. Nevertheless, it 
is worth mentioning at this point that “moral issues” played a very important 
role for this change. All the way back to the opium wars, we see that China 
tried to forbid opium trade because of “moral issues”, considering its harmful 
effect to users. Many years later, and because of the pressure of the church, 
cocaine consumption, which was very popular around wealthy people in 
developed States, even United States, was also forbidden17.     
 
                                                          
14 Willy Stevens, Desafíos para América Latina  (Aguilar Editorial 1999) 361. (Authors own 
translation) Undoubtedly, the figures indicated have grown substantially in the last 20 years.  
15 This idea will be further developed in the Historical Review Chapter of this research. 
16 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, as amended by the 1972 Protocol (adopted 25 
March 1961) 1.  
17 Paul Gootenberg, Cocaine: Global Histories. (Routledge, 1999) 25 
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As it will be addressed on a later stage, “morality” has been a key issue in 
the construction, development and change of the international drug control 
regime.  Nowadays, certain States have begun to argue that the current 
regime is, in a certain way, immoral, considering that it focuses more on 
prosecuting the people involved in the criminal chain of drugs rather than 
on reinserting them into the society, especially the micro-traffickers and 
addicts, which, according to them, would be the right and moral thing to 
do.18 
 
It has also been recognized on many occasions that illicit drug trafficking, 
associated with organized international crime, has an enormous capacity to 
update and modernize itself19. For example, in the case of the Americas, 
Bruce Bagley has found many reasons why this change keeps happening, 
like  
“the increasing globalization of drug consumption; the limited 
victories and unintended consequences of the U.S.-led ‘War 
on Drugs’; the proliferation of cultivation areas and of drug 
smuggling routes; the dispersion and fragmentation of 
organized criminal groups; the failure of political reform and 
state-building efforts; the inadequacies U.S. domestic drug 
and crime control policies; the ineffectiveness of regional and 
international drug control policies; and the growing support 
for legalization debate20.  
In that sense, States have been arguing in the framework of the 
Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND), the leading United Nations entity for 
international cooperation to tackle the WDP, and in many different forums, 
that the national and international strategies to fight against this crime 
                                                          
18 Pablo de Greiff (ed). ´Drugs and the Limits of Liberalism. Moral and Legal Issues. (Cornell 
University Press 1999) 
19 Felipe Calderón. ´Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime´.(Harvard International Review 8 
September 2015) <http://hir.harvard.edu/article/?a=11786> accessed 23 March 2018 
20 Bruce Bagley, ´The evolution of drug trafficking and organized crime in Latin America´ (2013) 71 
SPP 99, 100-123 
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should have the same capacity for evolution and modernization21. Former 
President of Colombia Juan Manuel Santos, on April 2018, requested the 
international community to “open their eyes and to recognize that if they 
continue doing the same, the same results are going to be achieved: more 
people in jail, more deaths, and stronger organized criminal groups22”.  
In order to address these multidimensional aspects that have been 
described above, Member States from the United Nations system agreed 
on three international instruments that for many years were recognized as 
the cornerstone of the IDCR: the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 
1961 as amended by the 1972 Protocol; the Convention on Psychotropic 
Substances of 1971; and the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic 
in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988. These three 
instruments have given life to organizations, such as the International 
Narcotics Control Board (INCB) and related documents such as the 2009 
Political Declaration and Plan of Action on International Cooperation 
towards an Integrated and Balanced Strategy to Counter the World Drug 
Problem (2009 Political Declaration); the 2014 Joint Ministerial Statement 
of the High-Level Review by the Commission on Narcotic Drugs of the 
Implementation by Member States of the 2009 Political Declaration (2014 
Ministerial Statement) and the United Nations General Assembly Special 
Session on the World Drug Problem Outcome Document entitled “Our joint 
commitment to effectively addressing and countering the World Drug 
Problem” (UNGASS 2016 Outcome Document).23  
The three conventions have modelled the IDCR over the past six decades, 
until their status as the cornerstone of the regime has been challenged in 
the last 10 years by countries that argue that these documents are 
insufficient to address all aspects of the WDP. Therefore, they argue that it 
                                                          
21 Paoli Greenfield. ´If supply-oriented drug policy is broken, can harm reduction help fix it? 
Melding disciplines and methods to advance international drug-control policy´. 23(2) IJDP 6 
22 El Espectador ´Santos insiste en la necesidad de replantear la guerra contra las drogas´. (El 
Espectador Bogota, 24 April 2018) <https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/politica/santos-
insiste-en-la-necesidad-de-replantear-la-guerra-contra-las-drogas-articulo-751866> accessed 7 
November 2018. (Author´s own translation) 
23 United Nations General Assembly ´International cooperation to address and counter the world 
drug problem´ (22 Jan 2019) UN Doc A/RES/73/192 
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is necessary not to focus only in the three conventions but to expand the 
main reference documents, including, for example, the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the UN Charter, considering that these 
documents might be useful to address topics concerning the WDP not fully 
covered in the three conventions, such as human rights and health related 
issues. In the same line, the countries arguing that the three conventions 
are not enough to address all aspects of the WDP would like to put aside 
commitments adopted before UNGASS 2016, which, according to them, 
was able to strengthen and broaden the international response towards the 
drug problem in issues that are not even fully covered in the drug 
conventions or documents such as the 2009 Political Declaration.  
It is understandable that there are States that question not only the morality 
of the current regime but also whether international instruments that have 
been in existence for more than 60 years continue to provide a sufficient 
and necessary legal framework to address the WDP. The countries leading 
these efforts against the current international Drug Control System are 
Mexico, Canada and Uruguay. In the particular case of Canada and 
Uruguay, these countries are not only advocating for the necessity of 
reviewing the current regime but have already broke with it, considering they 
have legalized cannabis for recreational purposes24. Colombia was part of 
these group of States when this research began. Nevertheless, and after 
the last presidential elections that were won by Iván Duque Márquez, 
Colombia went back to defending traditional strategies and to apply harder 
law enforcement strategies. The European Union (EU), with some 
exceptions, is having a more balanced approach and advocates for the 
implementation of the UNGASS 2016 Outcome Document, while 
recognizing the value of previous commitments. Finally, the countries 
defending the current international drug control system are the ones of the 
Asian Group, the African Group, as well as those from Eastern Europe and 
some from the Latin American and the Caribbean Group. The United States 
                                                          
24 International Narcotics Control Board, ´INCB Report 2018´ (International Narcotics Control 
Board, 2019) < https://www.incb.org/incb/en/publications/annual-reports/annual-report-




of America (USA) is still committed to the implementation of the three 
conventions25, although some states such as California, Washington, 
Colorado, Main, Nevada, among others, do allow Cannabis for recreational 
purposes, which is still prohibited on a federal level.   
This search for change within the IDCR is not limited only to the documents 
agreed upon by all States, but also to changes that involve the international 
organizations in charge of drug issues. Since the creation of the CND, the 
Member States of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) have 
agreed that the aforementioned commission would be the leading institution 
in the field of international cooperation to address the WDP26. The 
international community also recognized that there are other agencies that 
should support international efforts to fight against drugs, such as the World 
Health Organization (WHO), UN-AIDS, the Human Rights Council, among 
others. However, what has been seen in recent years is an attempt by 
countries seeking to change the international drug regime to prevent 
Vienna, headquarters of the CND, from continuing to be the main forum 
where this issue is discussed. “The Vienna consensus is considered a 
hurdle to progress on human rights because it mutes criticism of States 
practices that violate human rights”27.  These States have increasingly 
promoted the role of the Human Rights Council28 and the WHO, putting it 
almost on par with the CND, arguing that the human rights, health and social 
aspects of the WDR are as important as the political issues covered by the 
commission and, thus, these institutions should have a bigger say in the 
establishment of international strategies. This has caused a strong 
response from the States that, while recognizing the importance of inter-
institutional cooperation, still consider that Vienna and the CND must 
                                                          
25 United States Mission to the United Nations, Global Call to Action on the World Drug Problem 
(24 September  2018) <https://usun.state.gov/remarks/8629> accessed 26 February 2019 
26 United Nations General Assembly ´ Our joint commitment to effectively addressing and 
countering the world drug problem ´ (19 April 2016) UN Doc A/RES/ S-30/1 
27 Neil Boister, ´Waltzing on the Vienna Consensus on Drug Control: Tensions in the International 
System for the Control of Drugs´ (2016) 29(2) LJIL 389 
28 Human Rights Council ´ Contribution to the Implementation of the Joint Commitment to 
Effectively Addressing and Countering the World Drug Problem with Regard to Human Rights´ (23 
March 2018) HRC doc A/HRC/37/L.41 
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exercise leadership in what corresponds to addressing the global problem 
of drugs, fundamentally as a matter of coordination. 
As it has been mentioned, the group of countries fighting for a change in the 
regime wish to broaden the debate in thematic terms bringing more UN 
organizations on board, but they also wish to find forums where they can 
have more support from other Member States. The strategy promoted by 
this group of countries has been successful, for example, among the small 
island States in the Caribbean, which for the most part are not represented 
in Vienna. In this sense, managing to take the debate to spaces like New 
York and Geneva, there is the possibility of increasing voices of support on 
the need to review the current regime. 
 
1.1 Literature review 
The history of drugs and the approach to the WDP are subjects that have 
been recurrently addressed in diplomatic debate, popular writings and 
academic literature. Additionally, a large part of the official material in this 
regard can be obtained directly from United Nations publications such as 
the World Drug Report29. However, during the realization of this thesis, it 
has been clear that in recent years there has been an interesting change in 
relation to the publications on the WDP, and that many NGOs have led this 
change, focusing on what can be described as new ways to address the 
WDP with a special focus on human rights and public health. 
One of the distinctions that can be made in terms of literature is that which 
presents concrete analyses of events and policies, such as those dedicated 
to policies considered "repressive", or those that are limited to presenting 
specific data. Among the latter, it is worth mentioning "The War on Drugs: 
An International Encyclopaedia", a compilation of data by Ron Chepesiuk 
that deals with a great diversity of aspects such as names, dates and events 
representative of the history of the fight against drugs30. In the same way, 
                                                          
29 United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime, ´World Drug Report 2018´. (UNODC, 2018) 
<https://www.unodc.org/wdr2018/> accessed 1 February 2019  
30   Ron Chepesiuk. The War on Drugs: An International Encyclopedia. (ABC-CLIO 1999). 
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this publication has made it possible to expand issues through the revision 
of more extensive and specific works.   
Lots of the existing literature regarding this topic explains the history of the 
War on Drugs and the different consequences this has had tackling the 
WDP. For example, Frank Sanello31 and Julia Lovell32, among many others, 
provide very interesting information on how the relation between countries 
has always had a very important influence of the International Drug Policies, 
starting in the Opium Wars, which is one of the starting points of this 
research, bearing in mind that Opium Wars is one of the first scenarios 
where drug policies played an important role in the configuration of an 
international system33. There are many other researches that provide an 
historical overview on how drug traffickers have managed to adapt 
themselves to the different policies, and how theoretically punitive and law 
enforcement strategies had a minor effect addressing this problem. For 
example, Penny Green shows that many times the people on whom the law 
is applied most harshly and effectively are those who are below the criminal 
chain, which would show that punitive policies are aimed at creating a kind 
of illusion in relation to the success of said measures.34   
It is relevant to notice that there are many specialized articles and research 
works stating that the War on Drugs, as well as the traditional International 
Drug Policies, have failed35. Dirk Chase, in “Ending the War on Drugs: a 
solution for America”36, believes that the War on Drugs has brought more 
violence, and that the ones who suffer the most from this violence are not 
the heads of the illegal organization but minor players in this problem. This 
book is especially interesting given that it is written from a republican 
perspective, with Republicans in the United States being the most 
                                                          
31 Frank Sanello and Travis Hans, Opium Wars: The addiction of One Empire and the Corruption of 
Another. (Sourcebooks, 2002) 
32 Julia Lovell. The Opium War: Drugs, Dreams, and the Making of Modern China. (Overlook Press 
2011) 
33 Yangwen Zheng, The Social Life of Opium in China. (Cambridge University Press 2005) 
34 Pemnny Green, Drugs, Trafficking and Criminal Policy: The Scapegoat Strategy (Waterside 
Press 1998) 
35 Paula Mallea, The War on Drugs: A failed experiment. (Dundurn 2014) 
36 Dirk Chase, Ending the War on Drugs: a solution for America. (Bridge Works 1998) 
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conservative in terms of drug policies. However, Chase argues that 
traditional policies have failed, and proposes a controlled legalization of 
consumption. In the same line, authors such as Lisa Moore and Amy 
Elkavich37; Letizia Paoli, Victoria Greenfield and Peter Reuter38; Christopher 
Coyne and Abigail Hall39; among many others, argue that the War on Drugs 
has caused many more damages than successes, and that there is a need 
to rethink in a complete and comprehensive way the strategies to address 
the WDP.  
On the other hand, it is more difficult to find articles or research works 
defending the validity of the traditional International Drug Policies and the 
current regime. Although there are national studies from countries 
defending these policies that are going to be very useful for this research40, 
as well as documents from UNODC, which show the success from these 
policies, there appears to be a consensus among scholars about the failure 
of these policies41. This difference between academic, journalistic and State 
publications is reflected even when in theory they seek to defend similar 
positions. For example, while the States that defend the document resulting 
from UNGASS 2016 and critics of the current regime point out that 2016 
marked an unprecedented milestone in tackling the WDP, several NGOs 
and members of the academia pointed out their disappointment that the 
UNGASS 2016 did not go as far as they have expected in terms of the 
                                                          
37 Lisa Moore and Amy Elkavich, ´Who's Using and Who's Doing Time: Incarceration, the War on 
Drugs, and Public Health´. (2016) 98(5) AJPH 176    
38 Letizia Paoli, Victoria Greenfield and Peter Reuter. ´Change is Possible: The History of the IDCR 
and Implications for Future Policymaking´. (2012) 47(8-9) SUM 923. 
39 Christopher Coyne and Abigail Hall, ´Four Decades and Counting: The Continued Failure of the 
War on Drugs´. (Cato Institute, 12 April 2017) <https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-
analysis/four-decades-counting-continued-failure-war-drugs> accessed 23 April 2018 
40 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the Peruvian National Commission on Life And 
Development without Drugs (DEVIDA), ´Desempeño Comercial de las Empresas Promovidas por 
el Desarrollo Alternativo Perú. (UNODC and DEVIDA, 2012) 
<https://www.unodc.org/documents/peruandecuador/noticias/Noticias2013/Julio/Presentacion
_FINAL_FT_Empresas_2013_2606.pdf> accessed 12 March 2017 
41 Marjorie Ester Dias and  Divane de Vargas. ´Harm Reduction: an alternative to the failure of the 
War on Drugs´. (2015)  20(1) Cogitare Enfermagem 205 
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variation in drug control strategies42, indicating that an even greater human 
rights approach was necessary43.  
What is interesting about the existing literature and information on this topic 
is that, considering that UNGASS 20016 was held less than three years ago, 
many journalists have been writing about this process and many scholars 
have been expressing their views about what could be expected from this 
process, although there has not been enough time to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the recommendations approved that year44. During the last 
session of the CND, as well as during the UNGASS 2016, several Side 
Events were organized where experts could exchange point of view about 
the success or not of the International Drug Policies, as well as about the 
need or not of building a new consensus. 
The analysis of international documents and agreements will be a very 
important source for this research, considering that these are been 
challenged by several actors. Are the three International Drug Conventions 
flexible enough to support changes in the traditional International Drug 
Policies? Will there be a need to review these international instruments? 
These are only some of the answers that the above-mentioned documents 
could provide for the purposes of this research. 
As has already been pointed out, there is plenty specialized literature on the 
WDP, although most of it agrees in criticizing the "War on Drugs". In the 
same way, this work has been able to identify relevant publications related 
to the theory of international relations, such as those dedicated to the theory 
of international regimes45 and international treaties46, which is the central 
theoretical aspect of this research. 
                                                          
42 John Collins, ´Losing UNGASS? Lessons from civil society, past and present (2017)  17(2) DAT 88 
43 Alexander Henderson, ´The Outcome of UNGASS 2016: Perpetuating Failure´ Michigan State 
University College of Law (April 2016) <https://www.msuilr.org/msuilr-legalforum-
blogs/?tag=Alex+Henderson> accessed 28 February 2018 
44 UNGASS 2016 Outcome Document contains seven thematic chapters regarding how to address 
the WDP. Unlike previous documents, it focuses more on aspects related to human rights and 
addressing the public health aspect of the WDP. 
45 Stephen Krasner, International Regimes. (Cornell University Press 1983) 




In general terms, most of the specialized literature and data provided by the 
United Nations and other relevant international agencies agree on one 
thing: the international community is just as far from winning the War on 
Drugs as it was 50 years ago47. However, just indicating that the War on 
Drugs, as well as those strategies directed to an effective application of the 
law, are the real problem, is no accurate, especially because other 
strategies that go beyond the framework of the three conventions are not 
being successful. In various works related to the WDP, it is said that 
“comprehensive" strategies and policies should be established. But what 
does this really mean? 
This is one of the questions that brings us closer to the objective of this 
investigation. The current international debate, as has been pointed out, 
focuses on the strategies to be followed by the international community to 
successfully address the WDP, mainly after 201948. This debate focuses on 
the struggle between the "traditional" strategies versus "innovative" 
strategies; whether if it is necessary to maintain the 2009 objectives or if the 
International Community should only focus on the 2016 operational 
recommendations; and if it is necessary to maintain the current regime, 
modify it or break it.   
This research does not intend to provide a solution to the WDP. However, 
it seeks to demonstrate that the current international regime offers sufficient 
flexibility to try to implement sufficiently innovative strategies that can 
address a clearly different reality than the one 50 or 60 years ago. In short, 
                                                          
47 United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime, ´World Drug Report 2018´. (UNODC, 2018) 
<https://www.unodc.org/wdr2018/> accessed 1 February 2019 
The UNODC World Drug Report 2018 shows that both consumption and production have either 
maintained or increased in the last decades. These data has been consistent during the last years, 
although, as established in the report, there are some strategies in different countries that have 
proven to be successful, such as decriminalization of consumption in Portugal or Alternative 
Development Programs in Peru. It should also be noted that, according to the report, the so-called 
"innovative" strategies that often escape the framework of the three conventions are also 
responsible for maintaining and increasing the problem, which is demonstrated by the massive 
increase in illicit coca leaf crops in Colombia. 
48 2019 was established as the “target date” in the 2009 Political Declaration in order to fulfill 5 
objectives regarding demand reduction, supply reduction and international cooperation. The 
international community has been discussing if these objectives will remain valid after this target 
date, considering that they have not been achieved. 
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it is not about focusing on the effective application of the law, on the fight 
against drug production or on the subject of public health. It is about 
applying all these strategies in a joint and coordinated manner, through 
efficient international cooperation. And this is where the comprehensive 
nature of the fight against drugs is based.  
  
1.2 Objectives and Hypothesis 
The main objective of this thesis is to analyse and critically consider whether 
the Three International Drug Control Conventions are flexible enough to 
develop new and innovative strategies to tackle the WDP, considering that 
there are countries establishing new internal policies and strategies that are 
considered by the INCB and several other States as illegal.49 This will be 
done through an evaluation of the current International Drug Control Regime 
as well as by evaluating the practice and positions of such States. To 
understand the new positions emerging inside the current drug control 
regime, particular attention will be given to changing State views after the 
UNGASS 2016. This will help to determine if the regime, as it was 
understood during the last decades, is flexible enough in order to 
accommodate the new interests and positions from States advocating for a 
change in the international strategies aimed to address the WDP, or if 
States have actually exhausted every possibility provided by the Three 
International Drug Control Conventions and other related documents and, 
thus, it is necessary to break, totally or partially, with the current regime in 
order to create innovative ways to address this global issue. 
 
This thesis recognizes that the year 2016 marked a break within the regime 
for some States, International Organizations and Civil Society, considering 
that, in theory and per them, the punishment-based approach was 
abandoned, and a more "humane" view of the WDP was adopted. If the 
aforementioned breakthrough really happened at UNGASS in 2016, it would 
make sense to assume that the objectives set out in the 2009 Political 
                                                          
49 The specific roles of INCB, CND and UNODC will be described in chapter 4.  
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Declaration, which are based on traditional strategies of supply control, 
demand control and international cooperation, should have lost their validity. 
This idea, however, is still rejected by most States, considering the 
statements that have been delivered during the 2017, 2018 and 2019 
regular sessions of the CND50. 
 
The Political Declaration of 2009 and its Action Plan established the year 
2019 as the target date for the fulfilment of the objectives established in the 
document. Bearing this in mind, there are two clearly differentiated positions 
around the future of this document. On the one hand, there are States that 
indicate that the UNGASS 2016 Outcome Document overcame all other 
documents, and therefore should be the only instrument of reference. On 
the other hand, there are States that consider that no document approved 
by the international community indicates that the 2009 goals will no longer 
be valid and, therefore, the 2009 and 2016 documents are complementary 
and mutually reinforcing and should be given equally importance. 
 
Currently, the international community is involved in the discussion 
regarding what the future of the international drug regime will be towards 
the next decade, as well as which documents will be the ones that should 
be implemented. For the purposes of this research, and although this idea 
will be developed in greater detail later, it is worth mentioning that this thesis 
starts from the basis that, in effect, there is no justification to indicate that 
the Political Declaration of 2009 should lose validity. If this were the case, 
there would be a need to negotiate a new political commitment to guide the 
work of the international community on cooperation to combat the WDP, 
because even the UNGASS 2016 outcome document reaffirms the 2009 
Political Declaration. However, the only consensus that exists today is that 
the Member States do not want to engage in a new negotiation on a policy 
document for the future.  
 
                                                          
50 These differences in perception among the different Member States will be explained in 
greater detail in later chapters of this thesis. 
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The current IDCR is the result of the development of the interests of some 
States that were imposed at the end to the ones that did not have a huge 
say when the regime was created. Nevertheless, and considering the last 
international developments that have significantly change the relation 
between States and other global actors such as globalization, international 
commerce and the evolution if the international law, all States have interests 
in establishing successful strategies to deal with the WDP. Bearing this in 
mind and considering that States are struggling between each other about 
the future of the regime, all sides are trying to bring more States and actors 
on board their positions, regardless of its relative international importance.  
 
The main hypothesis of this research is that the current regime based in the 
Three International Drug Control Conventions is flexible enough in order to 
accommodate new and innovative strategies to address the WDP and, thus, 
there is no need for a major change. It would be inaccurate to say that the 
current regime is perfect and that it will surely be enough to “win the War on 
Drugs”. After more than 60 years following this regime and noting that the 
international community is no closer to win the war than Richard Nixon was 
in the seventies, it is clear that something is failing.  
 
This brings us to one of the specific research questions of this thesis, which 
is whether it is not the regime what is preventing States to efficiently address 
the WDP but the way in which States are implementing its provisions. The 
answer to this question is a major determinant of the regimes ongoing and 
future effectiveness. As it has already been mentioned, the international 
community, concerned about the impact of drugs on public health, 
established a regime aimed at prohibiting a series of substances and to 
establish concrete measures to eliminate their production, distribution and 
consumption. The preamble to the 1961 unique convention speaks of a 
concern for the physical and moral health of humanity. It should be noted 
that at this time the illicit drug trafficking economy began to grow 
exponentially. As happened during the era of prohibition in the United 
States, there are those who point out that prohibiting the free traffic and 
consumption of psychotropic substances put the business in the hands of 
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criminal organizations51, and has created enormous illegal funds that 
stimulate corruption and armed conflicts throughout the world. States apply 
strategies to address problems based on specific contexts. If these contexts 
and situations change, the strategies may also vary. In this sense, based 
on the principle that the three conventions grant enough flexibility to adapt 
to the new realities, there is the possibility that, as has been said, the regime 
is not the problem, but the way in which the States are addressing the 




In order to achieve the objectives and goals expressed, this research will 
include 8 chapters after this introduction. In the first place, and as already 
indicated, chapter 2 will include an historical analysis of the international 
drug regime, to understand how it was built and what are the historical 
motivations that make this regime to be considered "repressive" by some 
States. Specifically, it will begin with a brief analysis of the opium wars, 
considering that it is one of the first and main international contexts that 
were caused by drug control issues and that had a global effect with 
repercussions that lasted many years after the wars ended.   
Another reason why it is relevant to analyse the opium wars is that it is the 
beginning of a "moral" debate on what the behaviour of States should be in 
relation to consumption and trade of narcotics. One of the fundamental 
causes that gave rise to the opium wars was the fact that China sought to 
prevent the trade of this good by referring to the the health problems and 
moral decadence that opium caused. On the other hand, the United 
Kingdom, France and, later, the Russian Empire and the United States 
sought to liberalize the opium trade due to the large profits that this 
economic activity represented. This moral debate regarding the approach 
to the WDP continues to this day, and the moral issue is one of the main 
arguments to question the current drug policies. 
                                                          
51 Mary Evans F, Eric Helland and Jonathan Klick, ´The Developmental Effect of States Alcohol 
prohibitions at the turn of the twentieth century´.(2016)   54(2) Economic Inquiry 762  
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Once the historical context of the international drug control regime is 
established, chapter 3 will address the theoretical framework necessary for 
this investigation. Specifically, it will be useful to establish what should be 
understood as international regimes, how these are constructed, vary, are 
modified or finished by the States or international Organizations, among 
others. In general terms and considering the existing discrepancies 
regarding the approach to the WDP, it is especially important to understand 
why it is that States decide to establish international regimes to deal with 
specific issues, giving, to some extent, part of their freedom to establish the 
strategies and policies that they wish most freely. Once this theoretical 
framework is established, it will be determined how it should be applied to 
the international narcotics control regime based on the 3 international 
conventions as its cornerstone. 
Also, chapter 3 will address other fundamental definitions to understand the 
current IDCR such as the principle of common and shared responsibility. 
Later, it will establish the main differences between the legal instruments 
belonging to the regime that can be categorized into "soft law" and "hard 
law". 
Chapter 4 will go deeper into the analysis of the different international 
instruments related to addressing the WDP. The three principal international 
conventions will be a fundamental aspect of this analysis, given that it is 
necessary to be able to establish, based on a thorough reading of these 
documents, if they effectively provide sufficient flexibility to apply innovative 
strategies, or if they really are already outdated.  
Chapter 5 will deal more specifically with the current situation of the 
international drug control regime, presenting in a more detailed manner the 
different international positions that exist regarding how to deal with this 
matter. This chapter results in the logical sequence of the historical review, 
given that it is important to understand why there is currently a problem in 
terms of reaching consensus on the most effective way to address the WDP.  
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 will address specific case studies that demonstrate how 
this international debate is affecting national policies and, directly and 
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indirectly, the possibilities of effective international cooperation. Chapter 6 
will focus on one of the most emblematic cases of recent years in relation 
to the IDCR, which was the withdrawal and re-accession of Bolivia to the 
Single Convention of 1961. This case will clearly show how the Bolivian 
State found an unconventional way of being able to make a reservation to 
the aforementioned convention, in order to remain within the international 
regime, without violating international commitments, but at the same time 
being able to respond to their national interests. Although the international 
community was involved in a complex debate to determine if what was done 
by Bolivia or could not be considered "legitimate" given the nature of the 
regime, the country finally managed to accommodate the international 
regime to their wishes.  
Chapter 7 will address one of the most iconic examples in terms of 
establishing effective and innovative strategies, which is the case of 
Portugal. That country, at the end of the 1990s, broke many international 
schemes and paradigms in relation to what was considered necessary to 
effectively address the WDP. In fact, the strategies of Portugal, which were 
based on the decriminalization of the consumption of narcotics, among 
others, were so innovative that it was not clear at the time if they were inside 
the framework of the Three International Drug Control Conventions. The 
INCB, for many years, indicated that the decriminalization of consumption 
was not allowed within the conventions. However, this conclusion was 
based on a specific reading. In chapter 6 different approaches will be 
observed regarding the different ways in which the conventions can be 
interpreted. This will show that the conventions were and continue to be 
sufficiently flexible, it being necessary for the Organizations part of the 
regime and for the Member States to adapt to this flexibility. 
After establishing the most important aspects of the Portuguese strategy 
and how this is an example of the flexibility of the three conventions, a 
completely opposite case will be studied in chapter 8, which represents a 
clear break with the international drug control regime: the legalization of 
consumption of drugs, mainly marijuana, for recreational purposes. 
Specifically, general aspects of the new policies implemented by Canada, 
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Uruguay and some states of the United States on legalization or, as 
Uruguay calls it, the "control of the sale" of cannabis will be analysed. This 
will allow to demonstrate that there is indeed a clear attempt by a certain 
number of countries to break with the IDCR. There is no doubt, especially 
within the CND and particularly with regard to the INCB, that the legalization 
of cannabis for recreational purposes is completely prohibited within the 
framework of the three conventions, there being no space to carry out a 
different reading as if it happened in the case of Portuguese strategies, 
especially because marijuana is included in the different lists of controlled 
substances.  
 
A final concluding chapter, chapter 9, will reflect on the apparent 
inconsistencies identified. There is flexibility inside the regime, but it must 
always have a limit. In this case, the legalization of drugs for recreational 
purposes is clearly a limit of the current regime, and the application of 
strategies of this type, to maintain the international order, would have to go 

























2. Historical Review 
 
The debate regarding how to tackle the WDP is far from being something 
new, although in the last years it has increased due to the emergence of 
new positions, ideas and strategies. Countries have always tried to achieve 
a consensus, through either negotiations or imposition. The Three 
International Drug Control Conventions are still the best mandatory 
consensus that has been agreed on this topic, and all the consequential 
agreements, political declarations and plan of actions have been based on 
these international instruments. Nevertheless, the question has always 
been how to implement these conventions, and how flexible they are to 
elaborate new strategies to tackle the WDP. 
 
But the history of drugs and how to tackle the WDP is very complex and 
generates many questions that need to be solved before understanding the 
processes that are taking place nowadays. For instance, when did the WDP 
became a problem? Drugs and narcotics have been used and have been 
legal longer than they have been subject of control of the international 
community. How and why was the international framework against drugs 
created? The Three International Drug Control Conventions are the 
minimum consensus that countries could achieve after they noticed that it 
was necessary to combine efforts to tackle the problem. How was the 
current policy against the WDP established? The War on Drugs, established 
in the seventies, is based in the international drug control conventions, but 
focuses mostly in some parts of these international instruments. The 
following chapter will seek to answer some of these questions to understand 
the development of the history of drugs and the combat against drugs.  
 
 
2.1 The Opium Wars 
It might seem a little bit arbitrary to start this historical review with the Opium 
Wars, considering that the history of drugs could be traced far beyond these 
events. Nevertheless, it is one of the first moments where there is a real 
interaction between States on an international level regarding the legal 
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framework for drug trafficking. Although this conflict was more about trade 
and economic issues rather than drug control policies, it established what 
was going to be not only the relation between China and the rest of the world 
for decades but also the “boom” of opium consumption worldwide. 
 
2.1.1 First Opium War 
The Opium Wars were two military conflicts between China and Great 
Britain that involved both countries in 1839-1842 and 1856. There are many 
reasons to explain the beginning of this conflict, but the most important ones 
were the economic impact for Great Britain and China of opium trade and 
the social impact of the Chinese people becoming addicted to opium52. 
When the trade route between China and Europe was established, 
Europeans were very attracted to the exotic goods produced by China such 
as silk and tea, while Chinese people were not as interested in the European 
goods. This situation, especially in a world dominated by mercantile rules, 
was very inconvenient for countries such as Great Britain, because the trade 
balance was completely unfavorable for Europe. It was necessary to find a 
popular good that could be sold in China to solve this situation, and the 
British found out that opium could be the solution. In the 19th century, the 
British were producing opium in India, and the British East India Company 
made a fortune selling opium to intermediaries who would sell the narcotic 
in the Chinese market. Julia Lovell explains this situation in a very 
passionate but accurate way. She states that  
“in the early nineteenth century, unscrupulous British traders 
began forcing enormous quantities of Indian opium on 
Chinese consumers. When the Chinese government 
declared war on opium, to avert the moral, physical and 
financial disaster threatened by the empire´s growing drug 
habit, British warships bullied China out of tens of millions of 
dollars, and its economic and political independence”53.   
                                                          
52 Frank Sanello and Travis Hans, Opium Wars: The addiction of One Empire and the Corruption of 
Another. (Sourcebooks, 2002) 




It is not clear if the Chinese really declared a war on opium, at least in the 
way President Richard Nixon did in the seventies. Although there was a 
huge debate in China in the first three decades of the 19th century about the 
legalization of opium, at the end this possibility was always rejected by the 
emperor. So, when the amount of opium that Great Britain was introducing 
into China increased, they tried to forbid the import of the narcotic into China 
and decided to use violence to do so. But the debate between the Chinese 
and the British regarding why the opium trade should be forbidden is what 
interests this research. Opium smoking, at that time, was not allowed in 
Great Britain, because of its harmful consequences for the society. But what 
happened abroad was a completely different story, and the economic 
interests, one more time, were at the end more important than the harmful 
consequences of drugs. This situation is very well explained in the letter 
sent by Lin Zexu, High Imperial Commissioner appointed by the Chinese 
Emperor to deal with the opium trade problem, to Queen Victoria. In his 
letter, he said that 
“during the commercial intercourse which has existed so 
long, among the numerous foreign merchants resorting 
hither, are wheat and tares, good and bad; and of these latter 
are some, who, by means of introducing opium by stealth, 
have seduced our Chinese people, and caused every 
province of the land to overflow with that poison… Every 
native of the Inner Land who sells opium, as also all who 
smoke it, are alike adjudged to death. Were we then to go 
back and take up the crimes of the foreigners, who, by selling 
it for many years have induced dreadful calamity and robbed 
us of enormous wealth, and punish them with equal 
severity… We presume that you, the sovereign of your 
honorable nation, on pouring out your heart before the altar 
of eternal justice, cannot but command all foreigners with the 
deepest respect to reverence our laws! If we only lay clearly 
before your eyes, what is profitable and what is destructive, 
you will then know that the statutes of the heavenly dynasty 
cannot but be obeyed with fear and trembling! We have 
heard that in your own country opium is prohibited with the 
utmost strictness and severity: —this is a strong proof that 
you know full well how hurtful it is to mankind. Since then you 
do not permit it to injure your own country, you ought not to 
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have the injurious drug transferred to another country, and 
above all others, how much less to the Inner Land! Of the 
products, which China exports to your foreign countries, 
there is not one which is not beneficial to mankind in some 
shape or other54. 
It must be noted that it was one of the first times that the Chinese used 
officially the argument of morality and the importance of reducing harm 
among the society to try to stop drug trade and use. In fact, this is an 
argument that was going to appear several times in the upcoming decades, 
for instance in the United States in the beginning of the 20th century, and it 
is also an argument that countries keep using in the 21st century to try to 
maintain the current international drug control strategies. In addition, the 
Chinese Commissioner was using an argument that might have been more 
effective nowadays, considering the possibility of “shaming and framing” 
other countries decisions in the international system. But in a time when 
“hard power” and political realism was the principle that ruled international 
relations55, and considering that Great Britain configured its Empire on the 
benefits of trade and political and geographical domination, the arguments 
presented to Queen Victoria were not enough to justify the actions taken by 
the Chinese Government to tackle the illegal opium trade. “When free trade 
triumphed, opium smoking became a pathological problem. When free trade 
failed, gunboat diplomacy was applied”56.  
Without waiting for an official answer from the British government, probably 
because there is no official record that the letter was ever received by the 
Queen of England, the Chinese decided to impose their laws in a way that 
finally led to disaster. While China was only punishing local traders, even 
with the death sentences (which curiously is still one of the most important 
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aspects of the drug policies countries cannot agree with), the British did not 
care much. But when the trade of Opium was officially banned; the 
commercial exchange with Great Britain was limited to the port of Canton 
until the traders agreed to stop trading with opium (a policy that went against 
the interests of British traders who were not involved with opium); the 
“precursors” and goods of the foreign traders were confiscated; and 
especially after the opium loads of British ships were destroyed without any 
compensation; the Government had to interfere in order to protect its 
interests and the ones from their nationals.  
It is not part of the purpose of this research to make a review of every single 
battle and event that occurred during the first opium war, but it is relevant to 
notice how in the first half of the nineteenth century the same interests that 
might concern Government nowadays were already a part of the 
international drug control debate: health and social interests, the type of 
punishment to drug related offenders, economic and commercial interests, 
the relevance of the role played by the private sector, etc. Probably the only 
thing missing was Civil Society as we understand it nowadays, although 
there was incipient public debate regarding the moral consequences of 
opium consumption among the society.  
However, what interests the purpose of this research is that, as history has 
demonstrated several times, every time there is a prohibition of something 
extremely popular among the society, black markets flourish. One of the 
most important rules of economics is that when there is a huge demand of 
a good, there will be an offer. In addition, there were several people willing 
to risk going against the severe Chinese laws to continue profiting from the 
opium trade. This situation is a huge part of the current international drug 
control debate: demand control against supply control. Producer countries, 
mostly developing States, argue that while first world countries keep the 
consume high of the drugs they produce, the problem will not be solved. At 
the same time first world countries use a huge amount of resources in order 
cooperate with developing countries to fight against producers. Others, still 
a minority, argue that there must be a control of the offer rather than a 
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prohibition, to eliminate illegal markets. Obviously, during the first half of the 
nineteenth century, there were no official talks among States regarding the 
importance of establishing international control policies. The letter sent to 
Queen Victoria by Commissioner Lin is probably the closest example we 
can find on that. However, as it has already been established, in a system 
ruled by political realism, the strongest army was the best way to impose 
States interests, or, with other words, forcing what was going to be the 
consensus on the matter.  
The first opium war culminated with the Treaty of Nanjing, through which 
the representatives of the British Empire and the ruling Chinese dynasty 
established 13 articles of obligatory compliance. Among the main 
obligations China had to assume was to pay both war and commercial 
reparations to the British Empire, to free all the prisoners of war and give 
amnesty to the Chinese citizens who had supported the British cause. For 
their part, the British fundamentally undertook to withdraw their military 
presence once the first payments were made.  
However, and considering that the Nanking treaty was considered too 
general, China and the British Empire subsequently subscribed the treaty of 
the Bogue in 184357, which sought to establish more specific elements on 
trade regulations between the two countries. Elements such as the 
possibility that the British could acquire property in Chinese ports 
revolutionized the bilateral relationship and reconfigured the opening of 
China to the world, which had been limited. However, neither this treaty nor 
Nanking's managed to close all pending issues between the British and the 
Chinese, mainly regarding the opium trade, which left unresolved situations 
that led to a new military confrontation.58 
Undoubtedly, the most relevant event of the end of the first Opium War was 
the perpetual cession of the island of Hong Kong, which shows, in general 
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terms, why the Opium Wars make up a large part of the system international 
during the next two centuries. 
2.1.2 Second Opium War 
The second Opium War started in 1856 and ended up in 1858 with the 
signature of the Treaty of Tientsin59. The trigger of the conflict is known as 
the "arrow incident", which consisted in the boarding by Chinese authorities 
of the ship "Arrow", which was being accused of piracy and contraband. 
Although the ship was originally owned by Chinese owners, it had been 
registered in the port of Hong Kong, which, as already mentioned, passed 
into British control after the first opium war. Although the Arrow was manned 
by Chinese citizens and that the owners had the same nationality, the 
English justification was that the ship was under British flag, which meant 
an insult on the part of the Chinese Government for which they refused to 
apologize. 
However, and per what Yunqiu Zhang pointed out, the factors that led to 
this war included issues of control over Guangzhou, disputes over British 
diplomatic representation in the Chinese capital and over the revision of the 
Treaty of Nanjing (1842), (…) and the murder of a French Catholic 
missionary. Fundamentally, however, it was the differences between China 
and the West in their perceptions of international relations that underlay the 
outbreak of the war 60  
Although the motives that gave rise to the war are diverse, the assassination 
of a French missionary, which became known as the "Auguste Chapdelaine 
incident", caused the French to go on to support the British militarily. 
Additionally, there were various attempts to incorporate Russia and the 
United States into the alliance against China, considering that these 
countries had important economic interests in relation to the Opium trade. 
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However, even though Russia and the United States trusted in the defeat 
of China, they did not participate in the conflict in military terms. 
The second war of the opium was based fundamentally on the control of 
Guangzhou, city to which the British would have access to the stipulated by 
the Treaty of Nanjing, but in which in practice they could not be established 
due to the rejection of the local population. It is noteworthy that, militarily, 
the invasion and bombing of Guangzhou did not obtain greater resistance 
from China, a country that at that time was immersed in internal military 
conflicts. 
As indicated above, it is not the objective of this investigation to make a 
recount of the most important military campaigns of the opium wars, but to 
understand what their consequences were regarding future international 
discussions on how to approach the issue of trafficking and consumption of 
drugs. The second opium war ends partly with the agreements of Tianjin, 
which, with the participation of the British Empire, France, the United States 
and the Russian Empire, sought to force China to open to the world. Among 
the main consequences of the Tianjin agreements are the opening of new 
Chinese ports for international trade, the opening of diplomatic legations of 
foreign powers in Beijing, which was closed to foreigners, and especially, 
the legalization of the Opium trade. Subsequently, there were militant 
conflicts framed in the non-compliance by China of commitments related to 
these agreements, which already escape from what specifically concerns 
the drug trade. 
It is very interesting to note that the moral debate over drug trade and 
consumption intensifies during the opium wars. It could be argued that the 
moral and public health motives for which China sought to suppress the 
opium trade could have been excuses for diminishing the foreign presence 
in its territory. However, the moral and public health issue was not only 
argued by China, but also by British missionaries who had noticed the 
harmful effect on the population. 
The debate in favour or against the Opium War centred on 
the question of whether the opium trade itself was immoral. 
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(…) In this context, the British opium merchants and their 
supporters emphasized that the Chinese had tolerated the 
opium trade for years. Their attempt to finally suppress it was 
therefore portrayed as a treacherous and hypocritical act, 
showing the degraded nature of the Chinese culture as such. 
(…) At the same time, missionary influence meant that the 
morality of the opium trade was increasingly discussed, even 
before the crisis in 1839. Walter Medhurst decried the 
destructive effects of the drug on the Chinese population. He 
drew his information from his experience in Southeast Asia 
and one trip up to the China coast and vividly described the 
harm inflicted by Opium on the Chinese61.  
During the nineteenth century, however, it is difficult to imagine that an 
empire like the British based its decisions on international policy based on 
"moral" reasons, especially when its population was not morally affected. 
Additionally, it was necessary to protect its opium traders as well as the 
investments made. Clearly, improving relations with China was not a priority 
for the British Government, although it was not a priority for China, a country 
that in most cases preferred to remain as isolated as possible from Western 
influence. However, the opium trade was not the only economic opportunity 
in Chinese territory. 
In A.S. Thelwall´s publication, we can see evangelical zeal 
combined with the interests of those merchants unhappy with 
the competition in the China trade through the opium 
smugglers. He described the destructive effects of the drug 
strongly. The main thrust of his publication was to reach a 
parliamentary decision against the British opium trade, 
arguing that this decision would open China for the trade with 
other British goods62.  
While in military terms the opium wars culminated with the victory of the 
British over the Chinese, which brought a commercial opening never seen 
before between the Western world and Asia, as well as a territorial 
reconfiguration that would have consequences until the end of the 20th 
century considering the status of Taiwan, what is relevant to the present 
research is that the moral debate regarding policies that should be applied 
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to address the issue of drugs started63. During the coming years, the moral 
issue would increase its relevance, so much so that it was included in the 
text of the three international conventions on the control of narcotic drugs. 
In that sense, it is necessary to continue to reconstruct in a general way 
the history of drugs in the international context until the establishment of 
the current regime. 
 
2.2 Drug consumption as an international problem  
After the end of the opium wars, the international debate in relation to drugs 
and narcotics was focused on how to regulate their trade and trafficking. In 
short, the first great battle about trying to control consumption was lost. 
However, during the nineteenth century, the moral question about drug 
consumption was once again present in the national and international 
debate, led mainly by changes in the domestic situation in the United States 
and Europe.  
People have been using drugs since they started to understand that plants 
could be used for different motives, such as ceremonial, recreational, 
medical, among others. Incas in the Andes used coca leaves as an ancient 
“Red Bull”64, even though they did not have the knowledge to produce 
cocaine. In the same line, it is well recorded that the ancient Chinese used 
cannabis for medical purposes far before it was popularized by the 
“Rastafari culture”65. In the case of the United States, during the colonial 
time and even after independence, the use of some drugs for recreational 
purposes was legal and very popular all around the country66. On the one 
hand, Sigmund Freud stated that cocaine was a very good option as 
anaesthetic and stimulant, while cocaine was offered in specialized shops 
in the United Stated due to its high demand among the society, and it is 
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believed that even former President Ulysses Grant used cocaine to live 
longer while he was writing his memoirs. 67 On the other hand, several 
companies started selling very popular products that contained either 
cocaine or coca leaf, such as the Coca Cola Company. Another product 
which enjoyed high demand not only in the United States but also in Europe, 
including members of different royal houses, was Vin Mariani, which 
consisted of a mixture of wine and cocaine.68 
If drugs were a big part of the lifestyle in the 19th century, when did it actually 
became a problem that had to be treated on an international level? The first 
motives were not necessarily socioeconomic or related to health but were 
“moral”, especially in the beginnings of the 20th century. As Morgan Wayne 
said, “personal actions that seemed to affect social institutions or stability 
faced the test of popular opinion. What people did as individuals now 
affected others in ways undreamed of only a generation before. A powerful 
urge to purify American life thus accompanied reforms in business and 
politics. This involved struggles against prostitution, alcohol and drugs as 
much as it did efforts to improve the lot of women, children and the poor”. It 
is very interesting to notice that the idea to associate the importance to fight 
against the Word Drug Problem with moral issues is still included in the legal 
framework of the international cooperation against drugs. The Single 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, as amended by the 1972 Protocol, 
recognizes in its preamble “that addiction to narcotic drugs constitutes a 
serious evil for the individual and is fraught with social and economic danger 
to mankind”69. 
It was only after society started noting the effects of drug addiction that 
“politicians, religious leaders, pharmacists, doctors, and journalists spoke 
out for tighter controls on drug use”70 This is also because various theories 
began to appear that indicated that drugs were a cause of decadence. The 
clear example of this situation continued to be China, which in previous 
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centuries had shone with great splendour and that at the end of the 19th 
century was subject by the Western powers. Likewise, the use of opium and, 
later, of other narcotics, began to be associated with poverty, even though 
certain products with cocaine content continued to be commercialized 
among the upper classes. However, there was a difference between the one 
who consumed narcotics for recreational purposes, mainly the upper class, 
and those who became addicted to stimulants, who were considered weak 
people. 
But even this moral debate had its flaws, since what could be negative for 
some was not necessarily for others. Just as the moral question began to 
take on increasing importance, economic and commercial issues did not 
cease to be so. In other words, telling the East India Company to stop 
trading opium for moral reasons would be like telling the Colombian cartels 
today to stop doing so. A clear example was the establishment by the United 
Kingdom of The Royal Commission on Opium, which was created precisely 
by the increasing pressure in London to ban the opium trade. However, in 
1895 the commission determined the following: 
As the result of a searching inquiry, and upon a deliberate 
review of the copious evidence submitted to us, we feel 
bound to express our conviction that the movement in 
England in favor of active interference on the part of the 
Imperial Parliament for the suppression of the opium habit in 
India, has proceeded from an exaggerated impression as to 
the nature and extent of the evil to be controlled. The gloomy 
descriptions presented to British audiences of extensive 
moral and physical degradation by opium, have not been 
accepted by witnesses representing the people of India, nor 
by those most responsible for the government of the 
country71. 
Despite these facts, what is relevant for this research is to point out 
how the international debate in relation to drugs began to focus on 
different aspects and on the need to regulate them in some way. These 
debates began to shape the first agreements and binding documents 
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that would later derive into the Three International Drug Control 
Conventions. 
 
2.3 The building of the current International Drug Control Regime 
As it has been stated before, the current IDCR is based on the Three 
International Drug Control Conventions, which constitute its cornerstone. 
And to emphasize that it is “the current regime” is not random, considering, 
as it was shown during the historical review, that States have implemented 
many regimes since they first attempted to control drug trafficking. Although 
the International Community is constantly developing new documents and 
strategies to deal with this problem, it is safe to say that, in most cases and 
both in the national and international level, they are based in the three 
conventions.  
Based on the idea of the evolution of the drug control regimes, the current 
one, although still preferred and defended by most of Member States, is not 
fixed and immutable. States tried during the 18th and 19th centuries to 
regulate the trafficking more than they tried to forbid it. However, when did 
they start talking more about control and, thus, creating the current regime? 
As we have seen, during the 19th century consumption of cocaine and 
opioids in general was legal. Per Letizia Paoli, Victoria A. Greenfield and 
Peter Reuter, this was mostly because there was a “limited range of opiates 
that were technologically available”. 72 But when the Chinese market started 
to grow, and new uses and substances for the opioids where discovered not 
only for medical purposes but specially for recreational ones, the concern 
about the health problems raised.  This, together with the political and 
“moral concerns” that have already been presented, forced States to create 
more national and international regulations and prohibitions.  
This regulations and prohibitions match with a decrease of the international 
market at least until 1960, time during an increasingly prohibitionist regime 
raised mostly because of the pressure of western countries. The 
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International Opium Commission is probably the first step towards the 
creation of the current regime. The Commission, proposed by the United 
States, was convened in 1909 in Shanghai with the participation of the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire, China, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, 
Japan, The Netherlands, Persia, Portugal, Russia, and Siam It is very 
interesting to notice that one of their first agreements was a fundamental 
guideline to decision-making process of the drug control regime in the 
upcoming future: every agreement had to be taken by consensus. As 
Hamilton Wright stated about the commission, “its organization, its rules of 
procedure, the spirit in which it attacked its problem, avoided a majority and 
minority report, and declared unanimously, establish a precedent for the 
guidance of all future Commissions of Inquiry.” 73. The commission, although 
did not intend to establish a binding agreement, decided, among others, two 
mayor points that are an essential part of today’s regime: that it was 
necessary to suppress gradually the smoking of opium, while recognizing 
that every state had the right of using opiates for medical purposes.  
The meeting in Shanghai was the cornerstone for the first international 
binding instrument for drug control: The Hague International Opium 
Convention of 1912.74 Although most of the ideas discussed in Shanghai 
were included in this convention, there was no clear mechanism regarding 
how the provisions of the treaty were going to be implemented. 
Nevertheless, one of the most innovative aspects of this convention was 
that, in addition to narcotics that were already under international discussion 
such as morphine and opium, the convention attempted also to regulate two 
substances that, although were not necessarily new, were becoming a 
problem: heroin and cocaine. This fact was fought by Germany, country 
where cocaine was first produced by German chemist Albert Niemann, who 
was the first one to isolate and extract the “psychoactive ingredient from 
coca leaves. He named the raw, purified ingredient cocaine and earned his 
doctorate degree by writing about its properties”75. Germany was hoping to 
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delay the control of cocaine as much as possible, so it was agreed that 
universal ratification of the treaty was needed before entering force.  
However, the United States continued to promote its policies both nationally 
and internationally. In internal matters, the "Harrison Act" was established, 
which obliged every person who sold drugs to be licensed and keep a record 
of all the drugs that were sold, which led to a stricter control regime for the 
drugs that were directed to medical use76.  
All States that took part in the meeting of the Opium Commission signed the 
treaty of The Hague. Nevertheless, in 1915, it had been ratified only by 
China, the Netherlands and the United States. Because of the condition of 
universality defended by Germany, which established that the Treaty was 
going to enter into force only after the Government of the Netherlands, as 
depositary of the treaty, notified that all existing powers had signed and 
ratified the treaty, it is possible that the convention might have never entered 
into force.77 However, after the end of World War One, and mostly because 
of pressure by the United States and Great Britain, almost 60 countries 
signed and ratified the treaty after having been included in the peace 
treaties.78 Although the treaty was the first international binding instrument 
on the matter of drug control, it is important to notice that it called upon more 
about the establishment of national control policies and regulations rather 
than to an international coordinated action. For example, the production of 
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opium was not forbidden, but it was established that opium could not be 
exported to countries that prohibited it.  
The establishment of the League of Nations in 1919 was also a milestone 
for the IDCR, considering it became the organization in charge of the drug 
control, a function that would later be inherited by the United Nations 
through the ECOSOC and the CND. Although the United States was not 
part of the League of Nations, its influence regarding the WDP remained 
very strong, and this country continued promoting agreements on the 
international level. 
One of the most important aspects that must be mentioned is that the regime 
that was created in the first part of the 20th century focused indeed more on 
supply, and not even supply reduction but only supply control. For example, 
the International Opium Convention of 1925 approved in Geneva 
established, an import-certification system to limit the quantity of drugs each 
country could legally import. In the same line, the Geneva 1931 Limitation 
Convention restricted, among others, the manufacture of opiates and other 
drugs to the amounts necessary to meet medical and scientific needs: 
countries would provide estimates of need and a new agency would monitor 
them.79.80 The people currently advocating for the need to change the 
current IDCR argue that the regime cannot focus only in supply reduction 
and that it should be not as punitive as it is. But although the international 
instruments that have just been presented were the cornerstone of the 
current IDCR, it would be unfair to state that it was the only source. 
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2.3.1 The establishment of the Three International Drug Control 
Conventions 
The international documents that were approved in the first half of the 20th 
century, driven mainly by the United States and largely adopted by China, 
almost as a kind of vindication of the policies that promoted since the 
eighteenth century and that gave rise to wars of opium, began the 
construction of a more restrictive regime, overcoming the economic and 
commercial interests of the powers that had been dedicated to the opium 
trade and had obtained great benefits from this activity. 
Opiate consumption had been falling in the United States before 1914, 
reflecting state-level restrictions, changes in the beliefs of medical 
practitioners about the dangers of opiates, and growing media and public 
concerns about the spread of nonmedical addiction that involved younger 
and poorer males81. However, there is no clarity as to whether this decrease 
is due to the restrictive policies applied in the United States. This decrease 
in the consumption of narcotics, mainly opium, also occurred in different 
countries of the world, such as China and Great Britain. Specifically, Great 
Britain banned the consumption of opium in 1942 in all its colonies in Asia, 
except for India which, as already mentioned, continued to represent an 
important market for British trade and there was a very strong lobby to 
prevent this market to close. In 1950, France ended the legal distribution of 
opium in its colony in Indochina in 1950, while other countries in Asia such 
as Indonesia and Thailand banned opium consumption in the 50s as well. 
These policies did not mean that the supply of opium disappeared. As 
expected, the ban led to the flowering of illegal opium markets, which began 
to be persecuted very hard. 
Within this framework, there was a perception that restrictive policies were 
working, although there are those who point out, like David Courtwright, that 
the decrease in consumption and commercialization was not due to 
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restrictive policies but to a change in the conception of the use of opium 
both in the people who used it and in the doctors who prescribed it82.  
As mentioned, the post-war period brought with it a boom in international 
instruments considered "restrictive". Several agreements had already 
entered into force after the first World War because they were included in 
the peace treaties. But after the second World War, these agreements were 
implemented in a very hard way. For example, the Communist Party's rise 
in China also led to a worsening of the anti-drug policies, many of which 
continue in the Asian country until the present day83. The opium suppression 
campaign that started in China under the Communist Party command 
reached approximately 80,000 arrests of drug traffickers of which 30,000 
were sent to prison and 880 were sentenced to death. In addition, users 
received forced rehabilitation treatments84. 
It is difficult to determine exactly when the current IDCR was born. However, 
the end of the Second World War marked a new milestone in this respect 
with the establishment of the United Nations and the creation of ECOSOC, 
both events that took place in 1945.  
“ECOSOC, one of the six main organs of the United Nations 
established by the UN Charter, is the principal body for 
coordination, policy review, policy dialogue and 
recommendations on economic, social and environmental 
issues, as well as for implementation of the internationally 
agreed development goals. ECOSOC serves as the central 
mechanism for the activities of the United Nations system 
and its specialized agencies, and supervises the subsidiary 
and expert bodies in the economic, social and environmental 
fields” 85. 
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Subsequently, the ECOSOC established the CND in 1946, with the 
objective of supervising the application of international drug control treaties. 
In accordance with the resolution that gave life to the CND, the ECOSOC 
established the commission “in order to provide machinery whereby full 
effect may be given to the international conventions relating to narcotic 
drugs, and to provide for continuous review of and progress in the 
international control of such drugs86.  
The specific functions of the CND in relation to the current IDCR based on 
the three conventions will be analysed in greater depth in subsequent 
chapters. However, it is particularly important to note that the CND was 
established before the Single Convention of 1961, which based its actions 
on previous agreements, many of them negotiated even 30 years before the 
establishment of the CND. In short, the establishment of the CND can be 
understood as a consequence of the previous regime and a cause of the 
current regime. 
After the creation of the CND, the first major step that the international 
community took to try to control the trade and cultivation of narcotics, mainly 
opium, was the United Nations Opium Conference in 1953. However, it is 
difficult to say whether it was successful, considering that only 35 States 
were represented and 8 attended as observers. The fundamental objective 
of this conference was, as the then Secretary General of the United Nations, 
Dag Hammarskjöld, pointed out, "to try to solve the problem of drug 
addiction and to strengthen present controls which are incomplete as 
regards opium and poppy straw”. However, this conference was not 
convened on the margins of the CND, even though it responded to a 
resolution of the ECOSOC. 
Notwithstanding the initiative initiated in 1953, this agreement never came 
into force. In 1961, the General Assembly of the United Nations approved 
the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, which owes its name to the fact 
that it replaced all agreements reached previously, especially regarding 
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opium. However, the Single Convention went for the first time further from 
the opium focus and included regulations to control also other plants used 
as raw material for the manufacture of narcotics such as coca leaf and 
cannabis.  
The exact scope of the 1961 Single Convention will be addressed in later 
chapters of this investigation. However, it should be noted that this 
Convention was and continues to be probably one of the most restrictive of 
those that make up the current IDCR. Likewise, this was the convention that 
gave birth to the INCB, an institution that, as will be explained in more detail 
later, was born to serve as the "watchdog" of the IDCR. The Single 
Convention of 1961 was subsequently amended in 1972, among others, to 
align it with the novelties introduced in the 1971 convention. The scope of 
the amendmentincluded the possibility of using alternative or 
complementary measures to the imprisonment. It also strengthened the role 
of INCB in the fight against the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs. 
The negotiation of the 1971 convention, curiously, included positions 
completely different from those presented to negotiate the 1961 single 
convention. As has been seen during the historical review of this 
investigation, the regime of strict control of cannabis, opium and coca leaf 
was promoted by the developed countries that wanted to establish greater 
security measures on the crops that were found mainly in the developing 
countries. However, the 1971 convention faced strong lobbying from 
pharmaceutical companies in developed countries, which feared that 
control measures on substances that had not been included in the 1961 
convention would result in economic losses. 
One group included mostly developed nations with powerful 
pharmaceutical industries and active psychotropic markets; this 
was essentially the manufacturing group. The other group 
consisted of developing States, supported by the socialist 
countries, with few psychotropic manufacturing facilities; this was 
the “organic group.” At the 1971 negotiations, however, the 
positions of the two groups were completely reversed. The 
manufacturing group adopted the traditional arguments of the 
organic group: weak controls, national as opposed to international 
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controls, and national sovereignty taking precedence over any 
supranational UN body. The rationale for these positions was that 
strict controls would be difficult to enforce and would cause 
financial loss. The organic group, on the other hand, pushed hard 
for strict controls like those it had been forced to accept in the 
Single Convention87.  
In this sense, and considering what is contained in the 1971 and 1961 
conventions, the regime does not allow the cultivation of plants that can be 
subsequently used to manufacture drugs for recreational purposes, while 
only controls the psychoactive substances produced in laboratories 
Finally, the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs 
and Psychotropic Substances of 1988 culminates with the consolidation of 
the current IDCR. As its name clearly indicates, the primary objective of this 
document was to serve as a legal instrument to suppress the illicit traffic in 
narcotic drugs worldwide. Although the two previous conventions also 
covered the subject of illicit trafficking, the 1988 convention deepens this 
issue, giving greater force to the States to continue with what was called the 
"War on Drugs". The War on Drugs through international law became legal 
if not current though the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Drugs, done in Vienna in December 
198888. 
This convention continued the same line as that approved in 1971 and the 
protocol of amendment to the 1961 convention in relation to allowing 
alternatives or additions to imprisonment around drug-related offenses. And 
in this lies a fundamental part of the essence of the flexibility of the three 
conventions, given that these grant possibilities to the States on what 
penalties to apply. The fact that many States have decided to apply 
restrictive measures that led them to fight the "War on Drugs", does not 
imply that the conventions do not grant other possibilities to the States. 
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2.4 The War on Drugs 
Even before President Richard Nixon declared the “War on Drugs” in the 
seventies, establishing the strategy that was going to be followed and, in 
some way, accepted worldwide until some States and non-State actors 
started claiming that the war was lost, the IDCR was characterized, 
fundamentally during the 20th century, by the application of harsh policies 
against illicit drug trafficking at all levels. In that sense, when President 
Nixon pointed out in 1971 that drug abuse was the number one enemy of 
the United States and undertook the so-called "War on Drugs," it can be 
said that he established a terminology for a process that had already been 
developing many years ago, although it was radicalized from that moment. 
President Nixon thought that the policies against drugs and especially drug 
cartels had to be stronger than ever, considering the amount of United 
States Citizens that started consuming narcotics such as heroin, cocaine 
and marihuana89. Therefore, through international cooperation and 
economic aid, he imposed his point of view. However, even though the 
policies established by Nixon called upon a strong response against illegal 
drug trafficking, the Drug Abuse and Treatment Act of 1992 included the 
importance of balancing the law enforcement strategies with prevention, 
education, treatment and rehabilitation programs90. Although it is true that 
the amount of money and resources given to these areas has not been as 
nearly as considerable as the resources directed to law enforcement, it must 
be noticed that the importance to approach both issues was, once more, 
established, as it is also established in the Three International Drug Control 
Conventions and consequential agreements. Therefore, once more we see 
that the debate was focused on how to correctly implement the policies that 
had already been established several times. 
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Illegal Drug Trafficking, production and Drug Cartels have demonstrated to 
be very adaptable to new circumstances and challenges, so President 
Nixon tried to adapt the strategies to tackle the WDP to these new 
circumstances. The only way this can happen is if the legal international 
framework is flexible enough to give States enough tools to develop 
innovative ways to tackle the problem. This is a principle that probably was 
not considered in Nixon’s policies. He did have some successes when he 
started his War on Drugs, especially against Colombian cartels and the 
opium production in the Asian Golden Triangle, which was very important 
as raw material to produce heroin. The Nixon administration started to work 
very closely with the Colombian Government to fight against the cartels, 
and, in the case of Asia, the US Government invested in convincing farmers 
to change to alternative crops, which was a first step to the Alternative 
Development Programs that were going to be implemented in the future. 
But this did not last long, and while the though Nixon strategies remained 
the same, the illegal drug production diversified and found new markets and 
products91.    
The War on Drugs, both in the United States and internationally, was based 
mainly on the adoption of very strict laws prohibiting the use of drugs. It 
sought to attack the abuse of narcotics giving priority to the law enforcers 
interventions. In short, it could be determined that for a long time the War 
on Drugs viewed the addict as part of the criminal chain, not as a victim, 
contrary to the vision we have today92. It is necessary to point out that this 
vision is consistent with the provisions of the three international 
conventions, especially the 1961 convention. However, although the 
aforementioned documents allow the addict to be criminalized, they do not 
oblige. 
At the international level, the war against drugs was not only promoted but 
sought to be imposed. A clear case of this was the invasion of Panama by 
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the United States Army in 1989, which aimed to overthrow and capture 
General Manuel Antonio Noriega, the de facto ruler of that country, who was 
required by the US justice system to be charged with the crime of drug 
trafficking. 
The War on Drugs has not been fought in the same way in all countries. 
Although the Western Hemisphere was aligned with the policies of the 
United States in relation to the establishment of repressive measures, 
especially since 1970, the same amount of resources was not invested in 
all countries, nor was the level of third-party interventions reached. The case 
of Panama that has been mentioned, of course, is extreme, and could even 
be debated if the issue of drugs only served as an excuse for the United 
States to invade a country that is geopolitically necessary for their interests, 
mainly due to the control of the Panama Canal.  
Likewise, even the European countries that traditionally supported the 
policies of the United States more began to question such strategies in the 
1990s, as in the case of the Netherlands and Portugal. They, like other 
European countries, began to tolerate consumption with greater flexibility, 
without getting to legalize it at the beginning, given that this step was taken 
by Portugal almost at the end of the 90s, becoming a pioneer country in that 
sense as it will be analysed in later chapters. 
Interestingly, the countries that for the longest time maintained and even 
keep maintaining the War on Drugs at levels like those of Nixon in the 70s 
are the countries of Asia and to a lesser extent of Africa, not to mention 
Russia. For example, the case of the Philippines, through the policies of 
President Duterte, are the most emblematic. The case of the Philippines, 
although it will not be analysed in depth in the present investigation, is a 
clear example of policies framed in the "War on Drugs" that go beyond the 
scope of the three international conventions, given that although it could be 
said that they are characterized by law enforcement and a fight against 
production and consumption, they have been tainted by human rights 




2.4.1 The result of the War on Drugs 
As it has been observed, the war against drugs was the consequence not 
only of what was established in the three international drug trafficking 
conventions but also of the evolution of the fight against drugs since just 
before the beginning of the 20th century. There was a consensus on the 
"immorality" of drugs and all the evil that was done to the human being. 
There was a huge stigma in relation to the drug addict who, while he could 
be cured, was not the priority. The priority was the eradication of supply at 
all levels, from production to trafficking. And it was considered in many 
situations that penalizing the purchase and consumption would help by 
logical consequence to reduce the supply. Today there are many who 
clearly point out that this strategy has failed at almost every level. 
Regarding the outcome of this War on Drugs, the data provided by UNODC 
each year are quite clear: the international community continues to be equal 
to or farther from winning this war than it was in the 60s, 70s and 80s, 
decades in which the Three International Drug Control Conventions were 
established. Illicit trafficking of opium and cannabis crops has remained 
stable and, in many countries, has grown. The number of people who use 
drugs for recreational purposes has also been maintained, while there is a 
clear increase among consumers of the so-called "new psychoactive 
substances". In short, the problem has not only disappeared, but has 
evolved into new forms that require new responses from States and relevant 
international organizations. It is true that the strategies applied by the 
different States have had specific successes, such as the reduction of illicit 
crops in Thailand and Peru through the application of "alternative 
development" programs. However, in holistic terms, the War on Drugs has 
not been successful in achieving its main objective: to achieve a society free 
of drug abuse. 
The outcome of this War on Drugs should not be analysed only in relation 
to production and supply, but to the impact it has had on the drug 
dependent. In the first place, it is worth mentioning that the main users of 
drugs are, fundamentally, the most vulnerable people in society, especially 
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the poorest segments. As Liza Ayuso points out, drugs and poverty have an 
inseparable connection. Drugs can lead some to poverty, lift others out of 
poverty (clearly referring to traffickers and cartels) and make many forget 
their poverty93. In that sense, among many academics there is the notion 
that the War on Drugs, as well as the restrictive and punitive policies that 
derive from it, have marginalized citizens of the poorer social classes, and 
that said marginalization has increased the use of drugs. and drug abuse. 
Another issue that needs to be mentioned in relation to the results of the 
War on Drugs is did not focus enough on the objective to guarantee access 
to controlled substances for medical and scientific purposes. International 
conventions allow the production of both coca leaf, cannabis and opium for 
medical or scientific purposes. Likewise, they establish control mechanisms 
for psychoactive and psychotropic substances produced in pharmaceutical 
companies94. However, IDCR has focused so much on controlling 
production that it has not invested enough resources to guarantee access 
to controlled substances for medical purposes, mainly in developing 
countries. The control systems implemented by the INCB and, in general, 
by the producing States, as well as the restrictive prices of these products, 
have prevented the control systems from fulfilling the function for which they 
were created: preventing the diversion of controlled substances. The current 
system, in one way or another, has promoted that only people with sufficient 
resources can access substances necessary for the treatment of diseases, 
often obtaining them directly from third countries since in theirs these are 
not available. Especially the importance of improving access to palliative 
pain opioids is a topic that INCB and UNODC mention each year in their 
respective reports. 
The pursuit of a militarized and enforcement-led global 
‘War on Drugs’ strategy has produced enormous 
negative outcomes and collateral damage. These 
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include mass incarceration in the US, highly repressive 
policies in Asia, vast corruption and political 
destabilization in Afghanistan and West Africa, immense 
violence in Latin America, an HIV epidemic in Russia, an 
acute global shortage of pain medication and the 
propagation of systematic human rights abuses around 
the world. 
The strategy has failed based on its own terms. Evidence 
shows that drug prices have been declining while purity 
has been increasing. This has been despite drastic 
increases in global enforcement spending. Continuing to 
spend vast resources on punitive enforcement-led 
policies, generally at the expense of proven public health 
policies, can no longer be justified95. 
However, one aspect that could be considered essential to understand the 
different approaches that exist in relation to the "War on Drugs" is that there 
is no international consensus regarding what this means. The War on Drugs 
has long been associated with violence and the application of punitive 
measures. However, the objective of this War on Drugs, finally, should be 
the same that has been established in the Political Declaration of 2009 and 
the resulting document of UNGASS 2016: to achieve a society free of drug 
abuse. 
If we consider that "winning the War on Drugs" implies having a society free 
of drug abuse, which does not mean the same than drug-free society, then 
it is possible to continue fighting this war through different strategies that do 
not necessarily imply violence in all cases. In that sense, it is possible to say 
that the War on Drugs has not been lost but that a rethinking of the 
strategies is necessary. Going a step further, it could be said that States 
such as Portugal, as will be seen in later chapters, are winning their own 
"War on Drugs". However, from the moment that certain States, those who 
defend the need to change the IDCR, give up their efforts of achieving a 
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society free of drug abuse, regardless of whether the strategies used are 
violent or not, the war is lost. 
Many of the current international positions in relation to IDCR, which will be 
analysed in the upcoming chapters, revolve precisely around this idea. As 
noted during the negotiation of the document resulting from UNGASS 2016, 
there is a position among States, that question the current regime, which 
believes that achieving a society free of drug abuse is a utopia and that the 
international regime should be dedicated to address the adverse 
consequences and effects of the use of drugs through the so-called "harm 
reduction". Although the idea of a society free of drug abuse was finally 
included in the document resulting from UNGASS 2016, clearly it is no 
longer an objective shared by all international actors, so that, effectively, it 



















3. Theoretical Framework 
It is necessary to differentiate between different possible changes in 
international regimes. Some changes can be adjusted to the flexibility of the 
regime, while others can cause a rupture in it. This is directly related to what 
we can call "core aspects" of the regime. In that sense, the flexibility of the 
regime, by nature, has to have limits, and once this limit is crossed, a rupture 
occurs. 
The flexibility of the regime is determined by the fundamental principles and 
norms that are at the core of the international regime, around which the 
expectations of the actors converge and that determine which practices will 
be considered legitimate and acceptable. If the practice is consistent with 
the fundamental core of principles and norms, then it can be considered 
within acceptable limits. If, on the contrary, a practice does not completely 
follow the main principles and norms but there is space for reinterpretation, 
it could be said that States are making use of the margins of flexibility of the 
international regime. 
Deviations in the regime can be tolerated or objected by the institutions 
responsible for monitoring compliance with the regime, but States can justify 
their location within the margins of flexibility based on arguments related to 
ambiguity, capacity and adaptation to changing conditions. In this sense, 
three types of policies and practices can be identified: 1) those that comply 
with the acceptable level, whose adherence to the core is out of the question 
(in the case of the IDCR, INCB and CND would be the entities in charge of 
determining what is acceptable inside the regime); 2) those that deviate 
from the regime, whose degree of adherence to the core is questioned but 
that move within the generally accepted margins of flexibility of the regime; 
and 3) policies and practices that do not comply with this fundamental core, 
which go beyond the regime's limits of flexibility and which, therefore, are 
not acceptable96. 
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The case studies that will be addressed in chapters 6, 7 and 8 of this thesis 
cover precisely these differences between the policies that can be adopted 
by States and how they affect the regime. Chapter 6 will explore the 
withdrawal and re-accession of Bolivia, with a reservation, to the 1961 
Convention. As several Member States indicated, that reservation was 
against the spirit and core of the treaty, so it should not have been accepted 
because it was causing a rupture inside the regime. Nevertheless, for the 
majority of States that did not questioned the Bolivian reservation, it could 
be said that, at least for them, it moved inside the flexibility of the regime. 
Chapter 7 will show how INCB considered that the Portuguese actions also 
caused a break in the regime, but subsequent reinterpretations of the 
Member States understood that the Portuguese strategy although deviated 
in some way from the basic principles of the regime, if it could be accepted 
within the margins of flexibility. Finally, chapter 8 will present obvious cases 
of policies that have been causing a break in the regime, given that 
legalizing cannabis for medicinal use, as Uruguay, Canada and some 
States of the United States have done, directly threatens the core of the 
regime. 
 
3.1 Conceptualization of international regime 
Illicit drug trafficking and how to tackle it has been dealt by international 
actors through agreements and decisions taken by countries, both on an 
individual and collective way. In addition, different international 
organizations have used many resources to develop different ways to help 
States to fight the War on Drugs. To understand the current IDCR, it is 
important to understand what an international regime is. Stephen Krasner 
defines regimes as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and 
decision-making procedures around which actors´ expectations converge in 
a given area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, 
causation and rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms 
of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions of proscriptions for 
actions. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making 
52 
 
and implementing collective choice”97.  Another very useful definition that is 
also used by Krasner is the one from Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye. 
They define regimes as “sets of governing arrangements that include 
networks of rules, norms and procedures that regularize behaviour and 
control its effects”98. 
Following these two definitions, it could be understood that international 
actors, specifically States, agreed to establish an IDCR to coordinate a 
response against the problem based on the common belief that international 
cooperation would be the best way to fight a problem that doesn´t believe 
in borders. It was important for States to avoid the possible costs of non-
coordinated actions. Therefore, through the instauration of an IDCR, States 
established ways of cooperation but also limitations to their freedom of 
acting against the problem in any way they wished, thus adapting their 
behaviour to the regime they agreed on. 
This brings us to the principle that an international regime can have 
mandatory rules accepted and implemented by all States. However, it can 
also have rules and norms that are theoretically accepted by all parties but 
are not effectively implemented. This is directly linked to the Decision-
Making Process of the regime, which could involve the participation of all 
States parties of the regime following an established set of rules or could 
just be a way to legitimize what States have already done on a national 
basis. International regimes are not always the same, thus, they are not 
equally strong and important. The core of the strength of an international 
regime can be found on the power of their decision-making bodies and 
international institutions that are part of the regime and, sometimes, have 
even been created by it to establish rules and norms that are going to be 
followed by all States.  
Bearing this in mind, Jack Donnelly defines international regimes as "norms 
and decision- making procedures accepted by international actors to 
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regulate an issue99” focusing on the decision-making procedures,100 and 
believes that there are four different types of international regimes 
accordingly to one of the following four ways of creating norms. Therefore, 
the decision-making bodies and international institutions may have: 
1. Authoritative international norms: binding international standards, 
generally accepted as such by States.  
2. International standards with self-selected national exemptions: 
generally binding rules that nonetheless permit individual States to 
"opt out," in part. (For example, States may choose not to ratify a 
treaty or to ratify with reservations.)  
3. International guidelines: international standards that are not binding 
but are nonetheless widely commended by States. Guidelines may 
range from strong, explicit, detailed rules to vague statements of 
amorphous collective aspirations. 
4. National standards: the absence of substantive international 
norms101 
However, a regime can be defined not only accordingly to its capacity to 
create norms but also on how it interacts with the State Parties to make 
these norms effective. Thus, a regime can enforce the norms it created, to 
help States implement these norms or just to promote their international 
acceptance. The strength of a regime is directly linked to its capacity not 
only to enforce the norms but also to monitor their implementation among 
States.  
Of course, there are some limitations to the theories that have just been 
presented. As it is generally accepted, one of the international system 
characteristics is anarchy. Moreover, in practical and/or normative terms, 
States are not equally obliged to follow the same rules at the same time and 
level. There is no universally accepted way to force States to fulfil their 
international obligations, and although sanctions such as the ones approved 
by the Security Council or the possibility of losing international cooperation 
have sometimes been proved effective, the history of international relations 
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show several cases where States have not complied with international 
obligations with impunity. There are two ways to understand this fact: either 
the international regimes are too weak to prevail and to enforce their rules 
and norms, or the role of the countries inside the regime is different 
considering the leverage they might have accordingly to their soft or hard 
power. 
 
3.2 Regime changes  
It is understandable to believe that regimes evolve through time. However, 
the change of a regime through its natural evolution is different from 
changes that might be promoted by specific groups of States. Following 
Stephan Haggard and Beth Simmons, it can be said that “regimes often 
contain rules which govern or specify their own transformation, but to 
explain regime change per se is to explain why States would agree to modify 
the codified rights and rules that regulate their behaviour”102. 
These authors consider that there are four characteristics of a regime that 
might change: its strength, organizational form, scope, and allocational 
mode. In terms of strength, they refer to the degree of compliance of States 
to the norms of the regime, and the capacity of the regime to enforce these 
norms. Likely, the "strength" is one of the factors of change within the 
regimes that has been studied the most from the point of view of 
international relations, given the interest of many to understand the reasons 
why a regime decays and disappears. Changes in the organizational form 
can be mostly understood as variations in the administrative apparatus, the 
system to collect and share information, the structure of the decision-making 
bodies, etc. Changes in the scope are mostly those referred to the range of 
issues the regime covers. Finally, changes in the “allocational mode” refers 
directly to variations in the resource allocation system. 
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There are different theoretical approaches to regime development and 
change. However, these theories can be classified in two groups. On the 
one hand, the first group of theories believes that foreign policy is directly 
related to domestic structures and processes103. Thus, changes in 
international regimes are promoted by countries from variations of their own 
domestic and national situations. On the other hand, the second group of 
theories focus on changes through the evolution of ideologies, values and 
knowledge regarding how to achieve specific goals. 104 
 
3.2.1 Theoretical approaches to regime change and variance 
Continuing with the information provided by Stephen Haggard and Beth 
Simmons, the theories about changes and developments in international 
regimes can be catalogued into 4 groups: structural, game-theoretical, 
functional, and cognitive. As the mentioned authors point out, these theories 
are not mutually exclusive, and many of the processes of variations within 
the regimes can be understood by applying more than one theory. “Yet 
these approaches often speak past one another-in part because of 
fundamental differences in their underlying assumptions, in part because 
they address different dimensions of regime change and variance”105.  The 
first big difference between these different groups of theories is that, while 
the structural, game-theoretical, and functional ones focus on the States 
and their interaction, the cognitivists focus more on the evolution of the 
actors, the ideologies and consensual knowledge106. 
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3.2.1.1 Regime Changes through Structural Theories 
Structural theories focus more on international conditions and on the 
international framework as the main agents of change and influence in the 
regimes. In short, and quoting the most basic ideas of Kenneth Waltz, it is 
the structures that define the behaviour of States107. Therefore, one main 
principle is the one of the hegemonic stability, where the stability of the 
regime is directly linked to the stability of the super-powers, that can also be 
called hegemons.  
Structuralist theories, to understand the formation, maintenance and 
evolution of international regimes, often focus on the hegemonic power as 
a determining factor. Structural explanations, particularly including the 
theory of hegemonic stability, attempt to show how international conditions 
define the possibilities for cooperation. Structuralists argue that we cannot 
infer national policies from intentions because structures tend to mold state 
behaviour toward a common quality of outcomes even though the efforts 
and aims of agents and agencies vary108. In that sense, a weakening of the 
power of hegemony, or a variation in it, for example, through changes in its 
internal policy, will affect the stability of the regime. 
Two aspects can be detached from this idea. The first, defended by 
Keohane and Nye109, indicates that the most powerful will dominate the 
weakest, establishing the conditions under which the regime will be 
governed. The second one indicates that the hegemonic power benefits 
from an orderly regime and, therefore, is willing to deliver a series of 
benefits, for example, those that allow the maintenance of the regime, in 
exchange for benefits that, in terms of quantification, could be less than the 
costs. In that sense, in certain regimes there are States, mostly minor 
powers or developing States, that benefit from the regime, although it has 
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been imposed to some extent. Bearing that in mind, it can also be pointed 
out that it is the weaker States that benefit from the hegemonic power110.  
Structuralism serves in theoretical terms more to understand correlations 
than to explain processes. Undoubtedly, structuralist theories have more 
aspects than those that have been explained in the present summary. 
However, a structural approach is not enough to understand the changes 
that certain States seek to make within the current IDCR. In the first place, 
there is no correlation between hegemonic powers or the weakening of a 
hegemonic power that is promoting changes within the regime. In general 
terms, although the IDCR was established by the great powers during the 
twentieth century, the changes that are being promoted are not explained 
due to a weakening of these powers. With that in mind, let's look at how 
another theoretical approach could be giving or promoting changes within 
the regime111.  
In the case of the IDCR, a structuralist approach can serve to understand 
the relationships that have been forming between the States based on 
changes that are being promoted within the regime. As already noted, there 
is a growing number of States that are appealing to have an approach based 
on human rights and public health when addressing the WDP. This change 
within the vision of the States is generating minor changes within the 
regime. However, in hegemonic terms, there is not yet a hegemon or a great 
power propitiating these changes within the regime. Russia and China, for 
example, defend the most punitive traditional policies, while the United 
States, at least at the federal level, has not signalled its intention to support 
a change in the international strategy. In that sense, there is no 
destabilization of the regime based on changes within a hegemon. 
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3.2.1.2 Regime changes through the Strategic and game-theoretic 
approaches 
The school of the Strategic and game theoretic approach is useful to explain 
part of the emergence of the current IDCR, but it could be found insufficient 
to analyse the reasons why the regime can change. Game theory is based 
on the importance of cooperation between different parties in search of the 
greatest possible benefit. In that sense, used in the theory of international 
relations, it focuses primarily on cooperation between States. However, it 
should be noted that international cooperation can occur outside a regime. 
Therefore, in some cases this approach helps to understand the emergence 
of regimes since cooperation is a step prior to the establishment of a regime, 
but it doesn’t in all cases end up forming one. A game-theoretic analysis 
requires answers to three basic questions: (1) who are the actors? (2) what 
are the options they perceive to have in the situation? (3) what are the 
payoffs (or utilities) that the actors attribute to each possible outcome?112 
Through the Strategic and game-theoretic approache, we understand that 
States fulfil their obligations either in a cooperative system or within a 
regime, if this has been formed, aware that this situation presents them a 
greater benefit than the one it would get by acting alone. However, this 
theory does not delve much into the circumstances that cause the regime 
to change. It could be considered, for example, that a "sub game" is formed 
within the "game" that gave rise to the regime. This postulate could help us 
understand the current change that has been promoted within the IDCR. In 
the beginning, and as indicated in the introduction of this research, the 
States considered that through cooperation it would be more effective to 
tackle the WDP, thereby establishing the current regime. However, there is 
a group of States that are playing a separate "game", through which, by 
cooperating among themselves, they seek to introduce changes in the 
regime. In that sense, the Strategic and game-theoretic approach leads to 
the need to understand the national and international conditions of the 
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regime, in such a way that it can be understood why the States decide to 
break with the "game". 
 
3.2.1.3 Regime changes through Functional theories 
The proper test of a functional theory is understanding the regime’s 
effectiveness113. It tends to explain that actors' behaviour, while constructing 
or modelling a regime, is guided by the idea that benefits will be provided 
uniquely, or at least more efficiently, through the establishment of the 
regime. Another main point is the concept of reputational concerns 
connected to the existence of rules. Functional theories, although they also 
focus on the interaction between the actors (States and International 
Organizations), do so from a different point of view. The functionalists seek 
to explain how the regime affects the interaction among its members, 
considering the regime as an institution with established rules114. If the 
scheme is beneficial for the members, then this will encourage them to 
comply with the established obligations. In that sense, for functionalism it is 
important to know what the possible consequences of the regime are, to 
understand what its possible future is. 
Regarding possible changes within the regime, per this theoretical school, 
these occur when the regime stops working for all or some of its members. 
Similarly, one regime can give rise to another when cooperation 
mechanisms change or expand, almost as an unintended consequence. 
However, this leads to one of the main criticisms that are made to 
functionalism, since it fails to determine why the regimes arise in some 
areas where States cooperate and not in others. At the same time, they do 
not explain why some regimes become more complex and not others, for 
example, through the establishment of international organizations. Going 
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one step further, it could be said that functionalism does not make a clear 
difference between regime and international organization.  
“The problem with conventional functional explanations of 
cooperation (…) is that they fail to take into account that 
actors (…) usually face several possibilities for cooperating 
which cannot easily be distinguished in terms of efficiency 
and self-interest. Therefore, most problematic social 
situations are underdetermined from a purely interest-
oriented perspective: the variables employed by rationalists 
(i.e. efficiency and self-interest) do not suffice to explain the 
outcome.”115 
Functional theories focus primarily on the impact that the regime has on the 
behaviour of States and on how common interests that give rise to the 
regime are identified. However, the regimes, for example the IDCR, are also 
scenarios of confrontation and power struggle, an aspect in which 
functionalism does not go into much depth. Notwithstanding the foregoing, 
from a functionalism perspective it can be observed that there are States 
favouring changes within the IDCR because they consider that it does not 
longer benefit them as they thought it would at the time of establishing it. 
Starting from the argument that the current IDCR has not managed to solve 
the WDP, it is assumed that it has failed, that it did not achieve what it was 
predicted to do, and therefore needs changes. 
The issue of the effectiveness of the regime and how this is related to 
possible changes is probably one of the most important factors of the 
current IDCR situation. A striking case is that of those countries that have 
begun policies aimed at the legalization of cannabis for recreational 
purposes, or that have already legalized this type of narcotic drugs. While 
this thesis will devote an entire chapter to this new reality, it is appropriate 
to mention that the effectiveness of the regime in many ways has been 
questioned by States such as Canada and Uruguay, which, in flagrant 
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violation of the IDCR based on the three conventions, have decided to 
modify its domestic legislation to allow the recreational use of cannabis. 
Similar situation has happened in states of the United States, although at 
the federal level the use of cannabis for non-medical or scientific purposes 
is still prohibited. 
 
3.2.1.4 Regime changes through cognitive theories 
Finally, we find that the cognitive theories focus more on the ideology, 
values, believes and knowledge available of the main players of the different 
countries to explain regime changes. The core cognitive insight is that 
cooperation cannot be completely explained without reference to ideology, 
the values of actors, the beliefs they hold about the interdependence of 
issues, and the knowledge available to them about how they can realize 
specific goals116.  All this information is what helps to describe and 
understand international cooperation.  
It is useful to distinguish two strands within the cognitivist 
school of thought in regime analysis: ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ 
cognitivism. Weak (or minimalist) cognitivists focus on the 
role of causal beliefs in regime formation and change. (…) If 
weak cognitivists stress the intellectual underpinnings of 
international institutions, strong (or maximalist) cognitivists—
who also go by the names ‘reflectivists’ and 
‘constructivists’—emphasize the social character of 
international relations117. 
Following Haggard and Simmons, it could be said that the above mentioned 
three theories believe that cooperation operates within an issue or area 
relatively unambiguously. Nevertheless, the cognitive school believes that 
issues and areas are always ambiguous. Cognitive approaches are 
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therefore particularly important in explaining the substantive content of 
regime rules and why they evolve. By elevating the importance of actor 
learning, cognitive theories have a dynamic other theoretical approaches 
lack118.   
What is indicated by the cognitive school is useful to understand part of the 
changes that are being promoted within the IDCR. In the first place, one of 
the main arguments is precisely that during the more than 50 years that the 
current regime has been implemented, the international community should 
have learned that the strategies that have been applied do not work. In this 
regard, several countries of the EU, as well as Canada, have indicated that 
the recent scientific evidence demonstrates the need to rethink the 
strategies implemented to give greater priority to the public health and social 
aspects of WDP. However, one of the main problems presented by this so-
called "scientific evidence" is that it often comes from sources that are not 
particularly impartial. The evidence and knowledge that affects the 
decisions of the actors is diverse and often contradictory. In that sense, it 
should be the UNODC and the INCB the institutions that provide information 
as impartial as possible, even though many times their investigations are 
financed by States that seek a specific result119. 
On the other hand, the ideological aspect that cognitive theories seek to 
develop is also very present in the current IDCR. Countries with 
authoritarian ideologies seek to promote more restrictive approaches, while 
countries with more liberal government systems focus on progressive 
strategies. An example of the impact of ideology on a given actor that will 
be analysed in more depth in future chapters is the case of Bolivia. After 
Evo Morales, leader of the coca leaf farmers, assumed the presidency of 
this andean country, he promoted changes that determined the withdrawal 
of Bolivia from the Single Convention, just to return to it with a reserve that 
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would allow his country to produce coca leaf without violating its 
international commitments. 
As indicated above, and as is customary in international relations, a single 
theoretical approach is insufficient to understand the process of changes 
and modifications in international regimes. Many times, the motivations of 
the actors are due to aspects that need a multi-theoretical approach to be 
understood. The case of the changes that are being promoted within the 
IDCR is not an exception. There are different reasons why some States 
seek to establish changes in the regime, which include ideologies, changing 
realities, new situations, perception that the regime has stopped working, 
among many others. This reality in which many aspects of the different 
theories challenge each other will be analysed later in greater detail in the 
study cases that are part of this investigation. 
 
3.3 Regime based on “soft” and “hard law”. 
One of the main conflicts in which the IDCR is nowadays involved is that 
which confronts "soft law" with "hard law". In general terms, and although 
there are different definitions of these two terms, there is a general 
agreement between different scholars that "hard law" is based on 
documents that are legally binding, while soft law is based on declarations, 
resolutions, and documents that, in theory, are not mandatory for States. 
Quoting Alan Boyle, the main characteristics of soft law are that it is not 
binding, because it consists of general norms or principles, not rules”, and 
“is not readily enforceable through binding dispute resolution”120. 
However, there are certain theoretical disagreements. For example, from a 
point of view of positivism, the concept of "soft law" would have no meaning, 
since positivists believe thatthe term "law" necessarily implies the term 
"binding"121. Therefore, non-binding documents are not law. On the other 
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hand, international realism would argue that almost all international law 
would come to be "soft law", since there are no centralized entities capable 
of compelling compliance on the international level. Therefore, international 
law will be binding only if States, mainly the more powerful ones, want it to 
be. Finally, the constructivists point out that what really matters are not the 
categories of "soft" or "hard" law when generating the norms, but the real 
impact they have on the behaviour of the States and international 
organizations. Constructivist scholars, in contrast, focus less on the binding 
nature of law at the enactment stage, and more on the effectiveness of law 
at the implementation stage, addressing the gap between the law-in-the-
books and the law-in-action.122 Although the theoretical approaches are 
different when talking about "soft" and "hard law", in practice, it could be 
said that none of these theories prevails, but that a mixture occurs 
depending on the moment, the context and the documents concerned. 
International actors such as States and organizations do create many 
different documents to regulate their behaviour, and they give these 
documents different categories and relevance. It is a well-known fact that 
international organizations, formal ones like the United Nations as much as 
informal ones like the G8, more and more frequently adopt rules which their 
drafters do not consider to be “legally binding”, although they otherwise 
have all the textual characteristics of binding international treaties or binding 
resolutions of international organizations.”123  
In the case of the current IDCR, this difference is not clear. The regime is 
based on documents that might seem characteristic of "hard law", such as 
the Three International Drug Control Conventions, although it is difficult to 
establish if they are enforceable or not.  
Here the contrast is between a treaty subject to compulsory 
adjudication in cases of dispute, such as the 1982 UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, and a treaty or other 
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instrument under which disputes can be referred unilaterally 
only to non-binding conciliation or a non-binding compliance 
procedure, such as the Montreal Protocol to the Convention 
on the Ozone Layer. These examples represent only some 
of the gradations on a spectrum of possibilities, which shade 
ultimately into dispute avoidance, but in this category, it is the 
character of the dispute resolution process which determines 
whether we have hard or soft law124. 
Theoretically, the States are obliged to comply with the provisions of the 
three conventions, and the INCB is the entity in charge of indicating whether 
the States comply with their international obligations. Nevertheless, INCB 
and the international community, besides framing and shaming, do not have 
the possibility of enforcing compliance when States apply strategies outside 
the framework of the three conventions, as it is happening with countries 
such as Canada and Uruguay that are legalizing cannabis for recreational 
purposes. 
On the other hand, documents such as the Political Declaration of 2009, its 
Plan of Action, the resulting document of the UNGASS 2016, and the 
different resolutions of the CND, are documents that are based on the "soft 
law", and although there is a theoretical commitment on the part of the 
States to comply with what is established in those documents, there is no 
follow-up mechanism that really obliges them to do so. Similarly, neither 
other Member State nor the INCB itself can blame them for not following the 
provisions of the "soft law" documents, considering that there is no 
mechanism whatsoever that really obliges States to achieve those 
objectives. 
Despite this situation, the "soft law" has mechanisms to preserve itself as 
valid and in a certain way binding within the international system. An 
example of this is what Alan Boyle calls "soft enforcement", referring to  
                                                          




non-binding conciliation before an independent third party, or 
to some form of non-compliance procedure involving other 
parties to the treaty. In both situations there is an attempt to 
find an agreed solution, rather than to engage in adversarial 
litigation or claims for reparation. Soft enforcement 
characteristically evades issues of responsibility for breach 
and relies on a combination of inducements or the possibility 
of termination or suspension of treaty rights to secure 
compliance. 
In the case of the IDCR, the most iconic case of "soft enforcement" could 
be considered the so-called "Article 14" to which the INCB refers whenever 
it wishes to draw the attention of the States in cases of non-compliance with 
the three conventions. 
Over the years, the Board has invoked article 14 of the 1961 
Convention and/or article 19 of the 1971 Convention with 
respect to a limited number of States. The Board's objective 
has been to encourage compliance with those Conventions 
when other means have failed. In 2000, the Board invoked 
article 14 of the 1961 Convention as amended by the 1972 
Protocol with respect to Afghanistan, in view of the widespread 
illicit cultivation of opium poppy in that country. Afghanistan is 
currently the only State for which action is being taken 
pursuant to article 14 of the 1961 Convention as amended by 
the 1972 Protocol. 
Article 14 of the 1961 Convention (and that Convention as 
amended by the 1972 Protocol) and article 19 of the 1971 
Convention set out measures that the Board may take to 
ensure the execution of the provisions of those Conventions. 
Such measures, which consist of increasingly severe steps, 
are taken into consideration when the Board has reason to 
believe that the aims of the Conventions are being seriously 
endangered by the failure of a State to carry out their 
provisions. The States concerned are not named until the 
Board decides to bring the situation to the attention of the 
parties, the Economic and Social Council and the Commission 
on Narcotic Drugs (as in the case of Afghanistan). Apart from 
Afghanistan, the States concerned have taken sufficient 
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remedial measures so that the Board was able to terminate 
action taken under those articles vis-à-vis those States.125 
 
 
This is definitely the main tool on which the INCB is based in order to force 
States to comply with their obligations under the three conventions. 
Independently of the fact that it has not been used widely, and that finally 
the application of article 14 does not have considerable effects on the rights 
of States Parties to three conventions, it should be noted that, since the 
creation of the INCB,  States have sought to avoid INCB to aplly article 14 
to them, which demonstrates their relative effectiveness. 
Although it could be considered that "soft law" is much less important than 
"hard law" (if we challenge realism and believe that "hard law" exists), it has 
been used on different occasions as a mechanism of pressure towards a 
certain group of States. If really the "soft law" does not have any importance, 
the interested countries would not defend so fervently their different 
positions while negotiating soft law instruments. For instance, at the 
Conference of States Parties to the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption (UNCAC), which took place in 2017, Peru, Norway and Chile 
presented a resolution against corruption that involved "large amounts of 
assets". During this negotiation, the Delegation of Lichtenstein, which has 
often been characterized by not participating, was represented up to 5 
expert delegates, seeking to safeguard the interests of their country.126 
The importance of "soft law" lies also in the fact that it can be used as a 
source for other types of international rights and they could be a first step to 
the conclusion of multilateral treaties. An iconic case is pointed out by Mark 
Pollack and Gregory Shaffer127. At the end of the 1990s, Brazil established 
a series of patent laws to guarantee access to retroviral for the most 
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vulnerable people suffering from HIV. This situation, which went against the 
interests of the pharmaceutical companies of the United States, generated 
a great rejection by the North American country, which presented a series 
of complaints before the World Trade Organization (WTO). However, Brazil 
used "soft law" instruments to put pressure on the United States, making it 
possible for 52 Member States to endorse in the Human Rights Council its 
policy to combat HIV. At the same time, the Human Rights Council approved 
a resolution presented by Brazil in 2001 in which access to retroviral drugs 
was established as a human right. Despite the ironclad opposition on the 
part of the United States to the approval of the mentioned resolution, finally 
this one was approved, and the United States put in indefinite suspension 
its claim before the WTO. 
Both “hard” as well as “soft law” instruments are an essential part of the 
IDCR. But how "hard" is the "hard law" in the current IDCR? In principle, it 
would seem to depend on the relative power of States. Currently, three 
countries have begun to challenge the core documents of the regime by 
legalizing cannabis for recreational purposes. Absolutely nothing has 
happened that forces these States to amend their course. And it is very 
interesting to have both Uruguay and Canada in this group of countries, 
considering that their relative power in realistic terms is very different. 
However, and as will be seen in greater detail in chapter 8 of this 
investigation, beyond the "blaming" and "framing" carried out by the INCB, 
nothing has happened in terms of sanctions for violating international 
commitments. In that sense, the current strength of the regime does not lie 
in the traditional definitions of "soft" or "hard" law, but in the real interest of 
States in complying with the provisions of the regime. 
 
3.4 Principle of Common and Shared Responsibility 
On many occasions, the international community has agreed “to engage in 
effective cooperation and practical action aimed at addressing the World 
Drug Problem based on the principle of common and shared responsibility 
and reaffirmed that Member States should strengthen their mechanisms for 
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cooperation and coordination in order to achieve results in countering the 
World Drug Problem more effectively”128. But what does common and 
shared responsibility regarding the WDP really mean and why should it have 
more meaning than ever?  
 
This principle is not only applied to the drug control regime. To address a 
global problem through the idea of common and shared responsibility allows 
States and Organizations to cooperate on a multilateral level by establishing 
common goals to address a common problem, goals that need to be 
reached through a coordinated action. Consequently, the principle of 
common and shared responsibility commits parties to strengthening their 
cooperation not only to pursue their own interests but also to take into 
account the interests of others and to assist those parties that need help.129 
 
The concept as it is applied today has been evolving for many years. In the 
eighties, the international community spoke about collective responsibility 
in drug control, which recognized that it was the responsibility of all States 
to get involved in the War on Drugs whether they were considered part of 
the problem or not. In the nineties, States started to speak about shared 
responsibility and began to differentiate the problems States were 
responsible for.  
 
It should be noted that the establishment of the principle of common and 
shared responsibility was mainly the initiative of the producer countries, 
since they pointed out that the developed countries were the main 
responsible for the demand for drugs, although the strategies and 
interventions focused mainly on the aspects of production, pointing to the 
producing countries as the main responsible for the problem. In this sense, 
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and considering that illicit drug trafficking is an illegal economic activity that 
obeys the rules of supply and demand, the principle of common and shared 
responsibility is the cornerstone of the cooperation that takes place in the 
matter of drugs, through which the developed States have committed 
themselves to cooperate in terms of reducing production and supply in third 
countries as well as reducing demand in their own territories130. 
 
In the absence of the principle of common and shared responsibility 
regarding the approach to the WDP, all the discussion that is taking place 
today about possible changes in the regime would be meaningless, given 
that each State would be in the freedom to apply the strategies it wished.  
 
Despite everything presented on common and shared responsibility, and 
although no one doubts that this concept is nowadays a fundamental part 
of the IDCR, one aspect is extremely striking: none of the Three 
International Drug Control Conventions, cornerstone of the regime, reflects 
the principle of common and shared responsibility. 
 
The preamble section of the 1988 Convention recognizes that the 
"eradication of illicit traffic is a collective responsibility of the States and that, 
to that end, coordinated action within the framework of international co-
operation is necessary", but this was established before the concept of 
common and shared responsibility was created, thus, it served as a source 
for the concept.   
  
It is noteworthy that a concept that is not included in any of the three 
conventions on drugs plays such an important role in the international 
regime. The main arguments against the current regime indicate that it does 
not have the capacity to modernize or adapt to a reality as changing as the 
presented by the WDP. However, the regime has been able to adapt to a 
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changing reality and to a new way of understanding international 
cooperation aimed at addressing the WDP. The three conventions do not 
establish specific measures under which States must address the problem 
of drugs. They only provide guidelines and general parameters to which all 
Member States committed to. Nowadays, the principle of common and 
shared responsibility is recognized in every single drug control document 
negotiated by States as part of the international regime, simply because the 
three conventions do not prevent States of doing so. As long as new 
concepts, ideas and strategies do not go against what is established in the 
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4. Analysis of the main international instruments on drugs 
The Parties, 
Concerned with the health and welfare of mankind, 
Recognizing that the medical use of narcotic drugs continues 
to be indispensable for the relief of pain and suffering and that 
adequate provision must be made to ensure the availability of 
narcotic drugs for such purposes, 
Recognizing that addiction to narcotic drugs constitutes a 
serious evil for the individual and is fraught with social and 
economic danger to mankind, 
Conscious of their duty to prevent and combat this evil132, 
What was established in the initial part of the single 1961 convention 
demonstrates to some extent the direction that Member States wanted to 
follow when establishing the current IDCR. In the first place, we can observe 
a concern for the welfare of humanity, which is philanthropically very 
interesting. Subsequently, they recognize the importance of narcotic drugs 
for medical purposes, which is also a basis, at least theoretically, of what is 
now the IDCR. However, the use of the word "evil" in the following 
paragraphs has caused a great confrontation at present, given that there is 
a perception among States that seek to change the current international 
regime that understanding drug addiction as an "evil" stigmatizes to the 
user, when in fact it should be considered a disease. 
 
4.1 International Drug Control Regime based on the three conventions  
Based on the theories that have been presented, and as it has already been 
said, the current IDCR is based on the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 
of 1961 as amended by the 1972 Protocol, the Convention on Psychotropic 
Substances of 1971 and the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic 
in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988. One of the most 
important facts of the Single Convention of 1961 is that it replaced many 
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other instruments that were agreed by States, especially those concerning 
opium regulations. It should be noted that this section of this research will 
deal in a general way with the scope of the three international conventions 
and the international organizations that are based on them.  
One of the main principles of the current IDCR is the principle of “common 
and shared responsibility”, considering that “every country has 
responsibilities to other countries and as members of an international 
community they must comply with a minimum set of rules that facilitate 
international relations133”. In general terms, it can be said that the main 
objective of the current regime is to forbid any use of drugs that is no related 
to scientific and medical purposes, as it is clearly established in the Single 
Convention of 1961. 
Nevertheless, and considering the current debate regarding the “possible 
need” of making changes in the regime, States that consider that the three 
above mentioned conventions are obsolete have started to introduce the 
terminology “and other relevant international documents” in CND and UN 
General Assembly resolutions while speaking about the cornerstone of the 
IDCR. The main reason behind this is that, per their argument, there are 
some strategies and new policies they wish to implement that are not 
recognized in the three conventions. Thus, by establishing that other 
“relevant international documents”, such as the International Declaration on 
Human Rights, are also part of the cornerstone of the regime, theoretically 
they would be allowed to go beyond the three conventions. 
However, and leaving this debate aside for a moment, the current IDCR is 
probably one of the strongest there is among the international community. 
It has strong decision-making bodies that seek to base their decisions on 
consensus among all States,134   being the most important ones the CND, 
the ECOSOC and, above all of them, the General Assembly of the United 
Nations. Moreover, the same as all the resolutions that do not come from 
                                                          
133 Francisco Thoumi, ´The IDCR’s straight jacket: are there any policy options?´ (2010) 13(1) TIOC 
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134 Although consensus is not a rule in the IDCR, it has been the basis for all the decisions made 
on drug related issues since the meetings of the Opium Commission in 2009. 
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the UN Security Council, the CND, ECOSOC and General Assembly 
decisions are as binding as the States really want them to be. Bearing this 
in mind, States have introduced in the current IDCR several organizations 
and institutions that seek to enforce and promote the compliance of States 
of the different norms and rules.    
The CND has been recognized in all relevant documents as the institution 
with the leading role regarding the way to address the International WDP, 
being in charge of developing and formulating anti-drug policies. CND 
Member States are elected by the ECOSOC and report directly to this 
council, which, at the same time, reports directly to the General 
Assembly135. The main Institution aimed to help the Decision-Making Bodies 
to enforce and promote the international norms is the United Nations Office 
on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). This office based in Vienna not only works 
as the Secretariat form the CND and other commissions under the 
ECOSOC but is also in charge of managing the technical assistance 
provided to different countries on how to tackle the WDP. This is precisely 
one of the most important ways through which the regime must promote the 
compliance of the international norms: the technical cooperation. All the 
technical assistance provided by UNODC follows the principles established 
by the CND accordingly to the Three International Drug Control 
Conventions, and this cooperation will never go beyond its scope. States 
wishing to establish and try strategies not included in the regime will not only 
be in non-compliance with their international obligations but will also not 
receive any assistance to do so.  
For instance, the new strategy implemented by Uruguay of controlling the 
commerce of cannabis, which is going to be explained on a later stage, is 
not receiving any official assistance of UNODC but is being monitored 
constantly.  
                                                          
135 The way the regime has been working during the last decades is that ECOSOC and General 
Assembly only endorsed all decisions made by the CND. Nevertheless, during the last years, 
countries seeking to make changes in the current IDCR have been trying to bring part of the 
decision-making process directly to the UN General Assembly, considering that not all States of the 
International Community are represented in Vienna where the CND is based and that, because of 
that, they might get more support.  
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The monitoring aspect of the regime brings us to the INCB, which is called, 
in a very accurate way by Letizia Paoli, Victoria A. Greenfield and Peter 
Reuter, the “watchdog136” of the regime. In a very simple way, the INCB is 
in charge of monitoring and overseeing the Parties’ compliance with the 
conventions. It was created by the Single Convention of 1961 and it is one 
of the strongest defenders of the current IDCR, considering the enormous 
leverage INCB has while interacting with States. This strong defence of the 
regime is constantly shown in INCB Annual Reports. For instance, in the 
2016 edition, INCB stated that  
“At the special session of the General Assembly, the 
international community reaffirmed the pivotal role of the 
conventions and reiterated its commitment to their 
implementation. However, some actors will continue to talk 
about a need to “modernize” the treaties and their provisions; 
INCB is of the view that the international drug control system 
continues to provide a modern and flexible structure that can 
meet the world’s drug control needs of today and 
tomorrow.”137  
INCB is not able to punish States for non-compliance. As David Bewley 
mentioned, “the INCB, as the body responsible for overseeing the operation 
of the treaties, has no formal power to enforce the implementation of the 
Convention provisions. Nor has the Board the formal power to punish 
parties for non-compliance”138. Nevertheless, through their annual reports 
and the ones from UNODC, it has acquired an interesting tradition of 
shaming and framing.  
 
 
                                                          
136 Letizia Paoli, Victoria Greenfield and Peter Reuter. ´Change is Possible: The History of the IDCR 
and Implications for Future Policymaking´. (2012) 47(8-9) SUM 923 
137 International Narcotics Control Board, ´INCB Report 2016. (International Narcotics Control 
Board, 2016) 
<https://www.incb.org/documents/Publications/AnnualReports/AR2016/English/AR2016_E_ebo
ok.pdf> accessed 22 November 2017 
138 David Bewley-Taylor, ´Challenging the UN drug control conventions: problems and 
possibilities´ (2013)  14(2) IJDP 171 
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4.1.1 Role of the CND, INCB and UNODC 
The strengthening of the inter-agency coordination system of the United 
Nations to comprehensively address the WDP is something that Member 
States have been promoting in recent years, to provide greater relevance to 
institutions such as UN-AIDS, the WHO and the Human Rights Council. 
However, and without detracting from the importance of all these 
organizations in the matter of drugs, the CND has been pointed out in 
several occasions as the main entity in charge of dealing with all matters 
related to drugs at the international level, with the direct support of UNODC 
and, naturally, of the INCB. These three institutions are, for now, those that 
control almost the entire functioning of the regime, despite the fact that, as 
will be explained, there are States that seek to increase the importance of 
those institutions that ensure compliance with human rights and with rights 
related to the public health aspects of drugs. 
 
4.1.1.1 CND  
The CND is the main body responsible for formulating policies of the UN 
drug control system. It is composed by 53 Member States, which are chosen 
by ECOSOC to ensure a geographically equitable representation. 
Nevertheless, other countries can attend as "observers". The CND meets in 
Vienna annually in March, during its regular session, and for intersessional 
meetings when required. In the CND, Member States debate the world drug 
situation, and adopt resolutions on related issues. The CND is also the body 
that makes final decisions on the proposals made by the World Health 
Organization to classify, declassify or reclassify a substance. 
Although the CND was created before the three conventions, these 
instruments provided the Commission with new functions, making it function 
almost like a Conference of the Parties. In 1991, the General Assembly 
expanded the mandate of the Commission to serve as the governing body 
of the UNODC and to approve the budget of the United Nations Program 
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Fund for the International Drug Control, which represents more than 90% of 
the resources available to the United Nations for the control of drugs139. 
 
4.1.1.2 INCB 
The INCB, as noted above, is an independent and quasi-judicial body 
constituted by experts that was established under the Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs of 1961. The INCB is composed of 13 members  elected by 
ECOSOC, to serve a five-year term. Ten of them are chosen from a list of 
candidates proposed by Governments. The remaining three are chosen 
from a list of candidates proposed by the WHO for their medical or 
pharmacological experience. The members of the Board must be persons 
who, by their competence, impartiality and disinterestedness, inspire 
general confidence. Once appointed, the members of the Board exercise 
their functions impartially and in a personal capacity, with total 
independence from the governments. Broadly speaking, INCB deals with 
the following:  
1. As regards the licit manufacture of, trade in and use of 
drugs, INCB endeavors, in cooperation with Governments, to 
ensure that adequate supplies of drugs are available for 
medical and scientific uses and that the diversion of drugs 
from licit sources to illicit channels does not occur. INCB also 
monitors Governments' control over chemicals used in the 
illicit manufacture of drugs and assists them in preventing the 
diversion of those chemicals into the illicit traffic; 
2. As regards the illicit manufacture of, trafficking in and use 
of drugs, INCB identifies weaknesses in national and 
international control systems and contributes to correcting 
such situations. INCB is also responsible for assessing 
chemicals used in the illicit manufacture of drugs, in order to 
determine whether they should be placed under international 
control.  
                                                          
139 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, ´Comisión de Estupefacientes´. (UNODC, 2013) 





In the discharge of its responsibilities, INCB:  
1. Administers a system of estimates for narcotic drugs and 
a voluntary assessment system for psychotropic substances 
and monitors licit activities involving drugs through a 
statistical returns system, with a view to assisting 
Governments in achieving, inter alia, a balance between 
supply and demand; 
2. Monitors and promotes measures taken by Governments 
to prevent the diversion of substances frequently used in the 
illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic 
substances and assesses such substances to determine 
whether there is a need for changes in the scope of control 
of Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention; 
3. Analyses information provided by Governments, United 
Nations bodies, specialized agencies or other competent 
international organizations, with a view to ensuring that the 
provisions of the international drug control treaties are 
adequately carried out by Governments, and recommends 
remedial measures; 
4. Maintains a permanent dialogue with Governments to 
assist them in complying with their obligations under the 
international drug control treaties and, to that end, 
recommends, where appropriate, technical or financial 
assistance to be provided.  
INCB is called upon to ask for explanations in the event of 
apparent violations of the treaties, to propose appropriate 
remedial measures to Governments that are not fully 
applying the provisions of the treaties or are encountering 
difficulties in applying them and, where necessary, to assist 
Governments in overcoming such difficulties. If, however, 
INCB notes that the measures necessary to remedy a 
serious situation have not been taken, it may call the matter 
to the attention of the parties concerned, the Commission on 
Narcotic Drugs and the Economic and Social Council. As a 
last resort, the treaties empower INCB to recommend to 
parties that they stop importing drugs from a defaulting 
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country, exporting drugs to it or both. In all cases, INCB acts 
in close cooperation with Governments140. 
 
4.1.1.3 UNODC 
UNODC is the agency of the United Nations that aims to fight against drugs 
and transnational organized crime. This objective is carried out through 
three primary functions: research; persuasion to governments to adopt laws 
against crime and drugs as well as treaties; and technical assistance. It 
should be noted that the UNODC also functions as the Secretariat of the 
CND, the Commission for the Prevention of Crime and Criminal Justice 
(CCPCJ), the Conferences of the Parties to the United Nations Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), and the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption (UNCAC). 
The agency has its headquarters in Vienna, Austria, and 21 field offices. 
Part of the work of UNODC is to educate people around the world about the 
dangers of drug abuse and to strengthen international interventions against 
the production and trafficking of illicit drugs and drug-related crimes. To 
achieve these objectives, UNODC has launched a series of initiatives, 
including alternatives to the cultivation of illicit crops, the monitoring of illicit 
crops and the execution of projects against money laundering. The World 
Drug Report presented annually by the UNODC is a summary of the main 
elements of importance on drug policies that are applied worldwide. 
However, unlike the reports of the INCB, the report prepared by the UNODC 
does not judge the state of compliance of the States of their international 




                                                          
140 United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime, ´International Narcotics Control Board (INCB)  
<https://www.unodc.org/lpo-brazil/en/drogas/jife.html> accessed 19 July 2018 
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4.2 Strength of the regime through the difficulty to change it 
When States established the current IDCR it was quite clear that they 
wished the regime to last for a long time, considering the obstacles they 
implemented to change it. David Bewley-Taylor, who has been studying the 
drug control regime for a long time, considers that there are two types of 
regime change that can be made: modifications and amendments141. 
Amendments are changes in the articles of the conventions, while 
modifications are changes in the drug schedules the three conventions 
established. 
To make modifications in the regime is not as difficult as it may seem, and 
it can be considered as a minor change in the regime because a substance 
that was not under the surveillance system of the regime starts to be 
controlled, thus affecting, for example, the trafficking of the substance. 
Almost every year the CND makes modifications to the regime. The 1961 
and 1971 conventions have lists of controlled substances, while the 1988 
has tables. These lists and tables established how substances were going 
to be controlled accordingly to the level of risk they represent for society and 
public health. Modifications or changes on the lists of controlled substances 
of the 1961 and 1971 Conventions usually come as a recommendation from 
the WHO, after a group of experts of this organization sends the CND its 
conclusions of studies about groups of substances for further classification. 
A Member State or groups of Member States of the CND can also request 
the commission to change the status of a substance if the request is 
accompanied by proper studies. The only difference between the 
modifications process of the 1961 and 1971 conventions is that, while the 
first one requires a simple majority, the second one requires a two third 
majority. To introduce modifications in the 1988 convention is quite similar, 
but in this case, it is the INCB and not the WHO the one in charge of making 
the suggestions to the CND142.   
                                                          
141 David Bewley-Taylor, ´Challenging the UN drug control conventions: problems and 
possibilities´ (2013)  14(2) IJDP 171 
142 David Bewley-Taylor, ´Challenging the UN drug control conventions: problems and 
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Amendments are much more complicated than modifications, and require 
one State Party to formally request the modification of one of the 
conventions articles. The way to do it is not as different as in other types of 
conventions.  
“Parties can notify the Secretary-General of a proposal for an 
amendment, including the reasoning behind the move. The 
Secretary-General then communicates the proposed 
amendment and the reasons for it to the Parties and to the 
Council. It is then the ECOSOC's decision to either call a 
conference to consider the amendment, or ask the Parties if 
they accept the amendment. If no Party rejects the 
amendment within 18 months after circulation by the Council, 
the amendment will come into force”143. Nevertheless, and 
considering the strong defence that Member States such as 
the United States, China, Russia, Muslim Countries from 
Africa and Asia and some countries of the Latin American 
and the Caribbean region, make about the integrity of the 
three conventions, it is very difficult to believe that no country 
would present an objection or at least comments regarding a 
possible amendment.  
The only case when one of the conventions was effectively amended 
occurred in1972, after a conference convened in Geneva approved the text 
of a protocol that made several amendments to the 1961 convention.  
Although several things were changed and improved, in general terms it can 
be highlighted that issues such as the importance of treatment and 
rehabilitation for drug addicts and the importance of establishing demand 
prevention strategies were included144. It is important to notice that through 
this changes States started to understand that the IDCR should not only be 
                                                          
143 David Bewley-Taylor. ´Challenging the UN drug control conventions: problems and 
possibilities´ (2003) 14(2) IJDP 171 
144 United Nations, ´Commentary on the Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic 
Drugs, 1961´. (United Natios, 1972) 
<https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/organized_crime/Drug%20Convention/Commenta
ry_on_the_protocol_1961.pdf> accessed 18 March 2017. 
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focused on supply reduction through repressive strategies but also should 
include the importance of addressing the social and health aspects of the 
WDP.  
If the conventions are in fact so difficult to change, then it may seem that 
countries wanting to introduce variations in the regime might face a very 
difficult challenge. However, the evolution of the regime might not come 
from a change in the three conventions which, as it has been established, 
was considered for decades the cornerstone of the international drug control 
system, but from the extension of the cornerstone.  
The negotiations of the outcome document of UNGASS 2016 brought this 
debate to a next level. Countries such as Colombia, Portugal, Guatemala, 
Ecuador and the ones conforming the EU wished to mention that the three 
conventions and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights were the 
cornerstone of the regime, which was not accepted by most Member States 
of the CND. The main argument to reject this proposal was not against the 
importance of Human Rights while establishing strategies to deal with the 
WDP, but to prevent the possibility that States started to go beyond the 
scope of the three conventions arguing that their strategies were inside the 
scope of the Universal Declarations of Human Rights. Finally, States 
decided to keep agreed language reassuring the commitment that “that all 
aspects of demand reduction and related measures, supply reduction and 
related measures, and international cooperation are addressed in full 
conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations, international law and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights”.  
 
4.3 Penal provisions, sanctions and alternatives to imprisonment in 
the Three International Drug Control Conventions.  
As it has already been mentioned, the strongest argument from some States 
against the current international legal framework against drugs and 
especially against the Three International Drug Control Conventions is that 
they are based on a “punishable basis”. The countries willing to change or 
83 
 
review the three conventions established that the current strategies have 
been created to persecute the offenders, including the ones who need a 
special health care to “be cured” from addiction, and not to treat them to 
focus on the “human dimension” of the WDP. 
It is clear that countries agreed in 1961, 1971 and 1988 that drug related 
crimes and offenses should have consequences, even (and maybe 
specially) penal consequences. But these conventions are part of an 
evolution of the way States consider the WDP and were conceived as a 
framework for the Member States to apply the strategies they considered 
more convenient. The question that needs to be answered is if the three 
conventions do not allow Member States to implement strategies different 
to punishment, or if in reality Member States have focused too much in the 
theoretical “punishable basis” of the conventions without noticing that these 
present other possibilities. To understand this, an analysis of the penal 
provisions and dispositions is necessary to understand the different 
possibilities the three conventions give to Member States that are not 
necessarily imprisonment to all the actors involved in the crime chain.  
 
A.- Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 as amended by the 
1972 Protocol  
Article 36°  
Penal Provisions 
 a) Subject to its constitutional limitations, each Party shall adopt such 
measures as will ensure that cultivation, production, manufacture, 
extraction, preparation, possession, offering, offering for sale, distribution, 
purchase, sale, delivery on any terms whatsoever, brokerage, dispatch, 
dispatch in transit, transport, importation and exportation of drugs contrary 
to the provisions of this Convention, and any other action which in the 
opinion of such Party may be contrary to the provisions of this Convention, 
shall be punishable offences when committed intentionally, and that serious 
offences shall be liable to adequate punishment particularly by 
imprisonment or other penalties of deprivation of liberty. 
b) Notwithstanding the preceding subparagraph, when abusers of drugs 
have committed such offences, the Parties may provide, either as an 
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alternative to conviction or punishment or in addition to conviction or 
punishment, that such abusers shall undergo measures of treatment, 
education, after-care, rehabilitation and social reintegration in conformity 
with paragraph 1 of article 38. 
The Single Convention of 1961 is probably the “hardest” convention 
regarding punishment for drug related crimes offenders. There is still a 
debate regarding how far the term “possession” goes, because it could also 
be interpreted as possession for personal use. Nevertheless, according to 
the "Comments to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961" 
prepared by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in accordance with 
paragraph 1 of resolution 914 D (XXXIV)  of the ECOSOC of 3rd August 
1962, there is the view that the term "possession" in the context of 
paragraph 1 does not include possession for personal consumption. In any 
case, Parties not sharing that opinion do not need to consider possession 
for personal consumption as a "serious" offense punishable with 
imprisonment or other penalties of deprivation of liberty. 
Bearing this in mind, the possibility to establish alternatives to imprisonment 
for possession for personal consumption does not contradict the Single 
Convention of 1961, considering also that “consumption” is not listed in 
article 36 as a punishable offense. 
Regarding what can be understood as “adequate punishment”, and going 
back one more time to the comments made by the Secretary General, 
paragraph 1 from article 36 requires, in a general way, that if the offenses 
are serious, they must be punished "in an appropriate manner". The 
Plenipotentiary Conference which negotiated the Single Convention of 1961 
did not accept a proposal to demand "severe" punishment, because, among 
others, “the degree of severity of a penal sanction required in different 
countries to achieve its social purpose might differ widely; what could be an 
adequate penalty in one State might not be considered severe in another 
State”145. 
                                                          




However, it is considered that, to ensure that penalties in the fight against 
serious drug related offenses are "adequate", they must be severe enough 
to have the desired deterrent effect in every special condition of the country 
in which they are imposed. This idea is also implicit in the requirement that 
an "adequate" form of punishing "serious offences" should include 
“imprisonment or other penalties of deprivation of liberty".  For example, the 
mere imposition of fines would in no case constitute an "adequate" 
punishment for serious drug related offenses. 
Regarding the terminology “imprisonment”, in its broad sense, it includes all 
penalties of deprivation of liberty. The inclusion of "other penalties of 
deprivation of liberty" by the Plenipotentiary Conference seems to have 
made it clearer that not only internment in an institution that is technically a 
prison constitutes punishment "in an adequate form", but also in other 
places such as mandatory work fields or re-education facilities.  
B.- Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971  
Article 22°  
Penal Dispositions 
1. a) Subject to its constitutional limitations, each Party shall treat as a 
punishable offence, when committed intentionally, any action contrary to a 
law or regulation adopted in pursuance of its obligations under this 
Convention, and shall ensure that serious offences shall be liable to 
adequate punishment, particularly by imprisonment or other penalty of 
deprivation of liberty. 
The main purpose of Article 22 of the Convention of 1971 is to include in 
national legislation penalties that have an effective deterrent effect in 
relation to illicit drug trafficking offenses. It seeks for all forms of participation 
in such crimes to be established in national criminal law and that illicit 
traffickers cannot avoid trial and punishment for technical reasons of lack of 
local jurisdiction146. 
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The seriousness of an offense under the provisions of article 22 shall be 
decided mainly in the light of its potential to cause, directly or indirectly, 
damage to the health of persons other than the offender, in particular 
persons residing in countries other than that where the crime was 
committed. 
This article is intended to combat illicit drug trafficking and not to require the 
punishment of those who misuse any controlled substances. The only acts 
referred to in subparagraph (a) that should be treated as punishable 
offenses are those committed "intentionally". 
It is only required for serious offenses to be liable to adequate punishment. 
Sanctions must be adequate to achieve their social objectives, which is to 
produce the deterrent effect. In some cases, countries may need to 
establish different levels of severity. A sanction that is not severe enough in 
one country can be considered adequate or even too strict in another, but 
the penalty is only "adequate" within the meaning of subparagraph (a) if it 
includes imprisonment or other penalties of deprivation of liberty. 
 
Notwithstanding the preceding sub-paragraph, when abusers of 
psychotropic substances have committed such offences, the Parties may 
provide, either as an alternative to conviction or punishment or in addition 
to punishment, that such abusers undergo measures of treatment, 
education, aftercare, rehabilitation and social reintegration in conformity 
with paragraph 1 of article 20. 
This subparagraph establishes that state parties may only replace criminal 
sanctions for treatment measures in the case of persons who have misused 
psychotropic substances and not drugs controlled under the Single 
Convention. It can be understood that the substitution of criminal sanctions 
for treatment measures under paragraph (b) is justified only if it can 
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reasonably be expected that the abuser will not only be cured of his 
dependence, but that he will not commit again a serious felony.  
C.- United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs 
and Psychotropic Substances of 1988 
Article 3. 
 Offences and sanctions  
4. a) Each Party shall make the commission of the offences established in 
accordance with paragraph 1 of this article liable to sanctions which take 
into account the grave nature of these offences, such as imprisonment or 
other forms of deprivation of liberty, pecuniary sanctions and confiscation. 
According to the "Comments to the United Nations Convention against Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988”147, the 
relevant provisions of the 1961 and 1971 instruments specify that serious 
offenses should be punished properly, especially with imprisonment or other 
terms of deprivation of liberty. It is believed that the negotiators of the 1988 
Convention were determined to strengthen these provisions, beyond the 
scope of the earlier texts. The structure of article 4 gives priority to more 
severe penalties in subparagraph (a) and, as an exception, allows in 
subparagraph (c) less stringent sanctions in cases of minor infractions. 
The sanctions contained in this paragraph are not exclusive or necessarily 
cumulative. These sanctions, alone or in combination, are among those that 
could be applied. 
 
 b) The Parties may provide, in addition to conviction or punishment for an 
offence established in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article, that the 
offender shall undergo measures such as treatment, education, aftercare, 
rehabilitation or social reintegration. 
c) Notwithstanding the preceding subparagraphs, in appropriate cases of a 
minor nature, the Parties may provide, as alternatives to conviction or 
                                                          
147 United Nations, ´Commentary on the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 1988 (United Nations, 1988) 
<https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/organized_crime/Drug%20Convention/Commenta
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punishment, measures such as education, rehabilitation or social 
reintegration, as well as, when the offender is a drug abuser, treatment and 
aftercare. 
d) The Parties may provide, either as an alternative to conviction or 
punishment, or in addition to conviction or punishment of an offence 
established in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article, measures for the 
treatment, education, aftercare, rehabilitation or social reintegration of the 
offender. 
While the 1961 and 1971 Conventions contain provisions on additional and 
alternative measures to imprisonment for persons who abuse drugs, 
subparagraphs (b), (c) and (d) of the 1988 Convention extend the scope to 
those who have committed crimes related to drugs in general, whether or 
not they are addicts. 
They also introduce distinctions based on the seriousness of the offense: 
for serious offenses under article 3, paragraph 1 of the 1988 Convention, 
measures of treatment, education, among others, can only be applied in 
addition to the sanction or punishment. In case of minor offenses under 
article 3, paragraph 1, and also for offenses committed for personal 
consumption under article 3, paragraph 2, such measures may be applied 
as an alternative to sanction or punishment. 
The fact that subparagraphs (b), (c) and (d) do not limit the application of 
additional or alternative treatment and care measures only to drug abusers, 
seems to indicate that such measures may go beyond the context of the 
medical and social problems of addicts. Thus, these measures can be used 
in a broader context of general delinquent treatment measures designed to 
reduce the likelihood of recidivism. In practice, drug addicts are, however, 
the main target group for such measures in the context of drug-related 
crimes. 
Subparagraphs (b), (c) and (d) refer to prosecution and conviction as the 
stages in which additional or alternative measures may be available. It 
should be noted, however, that the link between the criminal justice system 
and the treatment system could also be used at other stages of the criminal 
process, including the stage of the judicial process or at the stage of 
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imprisonment such as transfer from a prison to a treatment institution or to 
a therapeutic community in certain circumstances. 
 
5. The Parties shall ensure that their courts and other competent 
authorities having jurisdiction can take into account factual circumstances 
which make the commission of the offences established in accordance 
with paragraph l of this article particularly serious, such as: 
a) The involvement in the offence of an organized criminal group to which 
the offender belongs; 
b) The involvement of the offender in other international organized criminal 
activities; 
c) The involvement of the offender in other illegal activities facilitated by 
commission of the offence;  
d) The use of violence or arms by the offender; 
e) The fact that the offender holds a public office and that the offence is 
connected with the office in question; 
f) The victimization or use of minors; 
g) The fact that the offence is committed in a penal institution or in an 
educational institution or social service facility or in their immediate vicinity 
or in other places to which school children and students resort for 
educational, sports and social activities; 
h) Prior conviction, particularly for similar offences, whether foreign or 
domestic, to the extent permitted under the domestic law of a Party. 
Although the previous instruments use the notion of "serious crimes", the 
circumstances which establish the seriousness of a crime are not identified. 
Paragraph 5 provides such guidance by presenting a non-exhaustive list of 
relevant factual circumstances. It is for the parties to ensure that their courts 
and other competent authorities (for example, special courts used by some 
States for drug-related offenses) can take such circumstances into account 
when pleading guilty. Of course, it must be understood that no special 
legislation is required if the courts or other authorities already have the 
practice of considering these circumstances, and this article was not 
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attempted to determine the effect that those circumstances would have on 
the sentence imposed. 
 
6. The Parties shall endeavour to ensure that any discretionary legal powers 
under their domestic law relating to the prosecution of persons for offences 
established in accordance with this article are exercised to maximize the 
effectiveness of law enforcement measures in respect of those offences and 
with due regard to the need to deter the commission of such offences. 
This paragraph seeks to give some flexibility to the strict application of 
Article 3 by accepting the possibility of granting discretionary powers to 
public prosecutorial authorities to facilitate a rational policy of prosecution, 
where concessions granted to persons occupying the lower echelons of 
organized crime organizations would allow investigative agencies to identify 
and prosecute those who occupy the upper strata. The fundamental aspect, 
however, is the need to “maximize the effectiveness of law enforcement 
measures in respect of those offences and with due regard to the need to 
deter the commission of such offences”. 
 
11. Nothing contained in this article shall affect the principle that the 
description of the offences to which it refers and of legal defences thereto is 
reserved to the domestic law of a Party and that such offences shall be 
prosecuted and punished in conformity with that law. 
This paragraph, like article 36, paragraph 4, of the 1961 Convention, was 
not conceived as an additional safeguard clause. It ensures that no 
provision of Article 3 is considered of automatic application. Although it 
requires the parties to typify the crimes, these and their sanctions will be 
part of the national legal system and will be used within the framework and 






Considerations on the application of article 3, paragraphs 4 to 11, of 
the 1988 Convention 
Paragraphs 4 to 11 are mostly designed to ensure that offenses of illicit 
trafficking, especially those established in paragraph 1, should receive 
proper attention from the judicial authorities and the public prosecutor of 
each state party. The drafting style used for this purpose gives the 
appropriate authorities of each State considerable flexibility for the exercise 
of their own judgment in determining how best to achieve the relevant 
objectives in the light of different legal, moral and cultural traditions. This 
inherent flexibility, in turn, is amplified in the provisions of article 24, which 
allows for stricter or more stringent measures than those provided by the 
Convention if deemed convenient or necessary for the prevention or 
suppression of illicit drug trafficking. This can be very useful, for example, 
when considering the list of aggravating factors contained in paragraph 5. 
 
4.3.1 General remarks 
As it has been established, the Three International Drug Control 
Conventions give enough flexibility to the Member States to apply strategies 
and methods as an alternative or complement of punishment, such as 
alternative to imprisonment. These possibilities are established specially for 
possession of drugs for personal consumption, for consumption and for non-
serious crimes committed by addicts.  
However, if the crime or offense committed is indeed serious and it has not 
been committed under the influence of narcotics, the three above mentioned 
international documents state that an adequate punishment is necessary, 
and any other alternative such as treatment, rehabilitation and re-education 
has to be applied together with imprisonment. The 1988 convention gives 
some orientation to Member States regarding what could be considered a 
serious crime or offense through a non-exhaustive list of aggravating 
circumstances. Thus, it is the responsibility of the parties to ensure that their 
courts and other competent authorities can consider the circumstances 
which give rise to serious crimes by declaring guilty. 
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Also, the fact that the 1988 Convention does not limit the application of 
additional or alternative treatment and care measures to drug abusers and 
addicts, even if they constitute the main target group of such measures, 
seems to indicate that these alternatives can go further of the context of the 
medical and social problems of drug addicts and can be seen in the broader 
context of delinquent treatment measures generally designed to reduce the 
likelihood of recidivism. 
Another important issue that has to be taken into account in order to 
demonstrate the flexibility of the Three International Drug Control 
Conventions is that most of the articles established that every strategy or 
method a State has to apply in accordance with the international framework 
is subject to constitutional limitations of the Members, which means that 
States are capable of establishing its own legal framework in order to 


















5. Review of the current positions regarding how to address the WDP 
 
Previous chapters we have sought to review the most outstanding aspects 
of the IDCR, as well as its long evolution to understand the reasons why 
today the regime is consigned in this way. Once this is done, it is opportune 
to explain the current controversy that exists around the regime, as well as 
the main and conflicting positions of the different States. This is precisely 
what justifies trying to determine how flexible the IDCR is in order to 
accommodate positions so distant from each other.148 
 
As the twentieth century closed, the drug issue appeared 
among the most paradoxical confronting the world 
community. Hardly a nation on earth could claim exemption 
from substance abuse. In addition to a public health problem 
possessing international dimensions, drugs posed a threat to 
national, social, cultural and economic security. However, 
the “drug wars” created casualties among a variety of 
innocent victims. Furthermore, pharmacological advances 
created unprecedented opportunities for relieving physical 
and psychological maladies. Demarcating and managing the 
boundaries between licit and illicit, ethical and unethical, 
profitable and marginal, moral and pragmatic, became 
increasingly problematic. Maneuvering for political, strategic, 
regulatory, and economic advantage occurred in an 
environment fraught with the sort of cultural friction, material 
interest, and dynamic tension between conflict and 
cooperation that have marked drug diplomacy since the 
beginning.149 
 
William McAllister summarizes in a very precise way the dichotomy in which 
the different States found themselves at the end of the 20th century. To what 
has been mentioned by this author's, it could be added the pressure of civil 
society in relation to the application of less restrictive drug policies. It is 
worth noting, again, the element of morality versus pragmatism, especially 
                                                          
148 For further information on the position of States at the 2016 Special Session of the General 
Assembly, including those regarding the 2009 Political Declaration, see the official records: A/S-
30/PV.1,  A/S-30/PV.2. A/S-30/PV.3. A/S-30/PV.4, A/S-30/PV.5, A/S-30/PV.6.  
<https://www.unodc.org/ungass2016/> accessed 17 November 2017 
149 William McAllister, “Drug Diplomacy in the twentieth century. An international Story”. 
(Routledge 2000) 240 
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understanding that the behaviour of the States in relation to the WDP is the 
result of an evolution that had this confrontation as important element. It is 
also worth highlighting, regarding ethical and moral terms, how the States 
changed their position in relation to the different interests that appeared, 
which means, States behave with pure pragmatism. For example, as 
indicated, during the negotiation of the 1971 convention, developed States 
sought to curb controls on substances produced in laboratories through the 
pharmaceutical industry. Today, however, the same States are pushing for 
more controls, mainly due to the public health problem caused by the new 
psychoactive substances. 
 
One example of this situation is the new attitude taken by the United 
Kingdom, a country that together with the United States fervently defended 
the lax controls for substances coming from laboratories. Nowadays, at the 
same time that they press for stronger controls, they promote that drug 
addicts, to alleviate the effects of their addiction, consume alternative 
substances that in many cases are granted by the same governments. 
Interestingly, the United Kingdom Pharmaceutical Industry is among the 
leading manufacturers of these substances. 
 
Regardless of the possible reasons that have led the States to support the 
positions they have today, what is relevant for the purposes of this thesis is 
that, at present, there is no consensus on how to address the WDP, 
fundamentally because of the results derived from the War on Drugs. During 
the historical review of the evolution of the IDCR it has been possible to 
appreciate the evolution that the current regime has had until its outlet in the 
so-called War on Drugs and which have been some of its results or lack of 
them. As a next step, it is necessary for the objectives of this research, to 
further analyse the current positions of the main international actors at a 
moment of breakdown of the IDCR and, particularly, the different positions 
that exist around the best strategies to be applied to combat the WDP. 
 
A key aspect to understand the different approaches that can exist in 
relation to the “best way” to tackle the WDP comes from the fact that there 
95 
 
are multiple factors that must be observed and addressed by States and 
International Organizations at the same time: demand reduction, supply 
reduction, harm reduction, international cooperation, human rights, among 
others. Drug trafficking and related crimes are characterized for having a 
great number of dimensions that must be addressed in a comprehensive 
way. One of the biggest issues that is making difficult for States to find a 
single-track approach is that they have been focusing only in some aspects 
of the problem, those that affect them the most. 
 
 
5.1 Particular interests of States reflected in the International 
Agreements on Drugs 
Considering that States have different priorities regarding the fight against 
the WDP, but also bearing in mind that international cooperation is essential 
to address this issue effectively, the international community had the 
challenge of reflecting all different priorities and strategies in documents that 
could be agreeable for every State. For example, in 2009 States agreed on 
the “Political Declaration and Plan of Action on International Cooperation 
towards an Integrated and Balanced Strategy to Counter the WDP”, 
adopted during the high-level segment of the fifty-second session of the 
Commission on Narcotic Drugs and by the General Assembly in its 
resolution 64/182”150. In this document, States committed themselves to 
promote a society free of drug abuse in the framework of the Three 
International Drug Control Conventions, recognizing, one more time, that 
these instruments constitute the cornerstone of the international drug 
control system. Bearing this in mind, States have been designing strategies 
and an entire plan of action towards the application of the traditional world 
drug policies: law enforcement, supply and demand reduction and the fight 
against other drug related crimes such as money laundering. 
In the 2009 Political Declaration, year 2019 was established as a target date 
for States to eliminate or reduce significantly and measurably: 
                                                          
150 United Nations General Assembly ´International cooperation against the WDP´ (18 December 
2009) UN Doc A/RES/64/82 
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(a) The illicit cultivation of opium poppy, coca bush and cannabis plant; 
(b) The illicit demand for narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances; and 
drug related health and social risks; 
(c) The illicit production, manufacture, marketing and distribution of, and 
trafficking in, psychotropic substances, including synthetic drugs; 
(d) The diversion of and illicit trafficking in precursors; 
(e) Money-laundering related to illicit drugs.  
Nevertheless, some countries, such as Canada, Mexico, Uruguay and 
Ecuador, supported by the EU and the civil society, started to question if it 
was possible, after many years of fighting the war against drugs, to “achieve 
a society free of drug abuse”, or if this was just a utopian idea. In the same 
line, these countries considered that the Three International Drug Control 
Conventions (the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 as amended 
by the 1972 Protocol; the Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971; 
and the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs 
and Psychotropic Substances of 1988) were not capable of dealing with 
what they called “evolving realities”, making reference to the growing 
importance of dealing with the social and health aspects of the WDP. So, 
they decided to question the role of the three conventions as the only 
cornerstone of the international drug control system. 
Considering all this, these countries started to question the entire drug 
control regime, basing their position in three main points: to achieve a 
society free of drug abuse is in fact a utopian goal; the IDCR has to be 
reviewed to recognize to focus mainly on the social and health aspects of 
the WDP; the law enforcement and punitive policies have failed. These 
actors are now claiming that it is time to build a new consensus on the WDP 
and especially on how to face it, considering Human Rights and more 
flexible laws as a basis of this consensus. Bearing this in mind, they stopped 
considering necessary to achieve the objectives established in the 2009 
Political Declaration.  
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This position is based on the fact that there are diverse complexities when 
it comes to addressing the WDP, mainly regarding the human impact that 
the policies that States have been implementing have. Bearing this in mind 
States questioning the regime consider that the current policies are not 
human based and balanced enough when it comes to addressing 
production, trafficking and consumption. Therefore, the policies are not 
fulfilling the mandate they should have: to promote the wellbeing of 
individuals around the world.  
It cannot be denied that statistics play in favour of this position. The UNODC 
World Drug Reports, since 2009, shows clearly that States are not closer of 
achieving the objectives established in the 2009 Political Declaration151. 
After 10 years, the illicit cultivation of opium poppy, coca bush and cannabis 
plant has not decreased; the illicit demand for narcotic drugs and 
psychotropic substances, as well as the drug related health and social risks 
are the same in some cases and have increased in others; the illicit 
production, manufacture, marketing and distribution of psychotropic 
substances, including synthetic drugs, has become one of the biggest 
health related problems specially in the developed countries; the diversion 
of and illicit trafficking in precursors continues to be a huge problem; and 
money laundering related to illicit drugs continues representing a very 
lucrative business for organized crime organizations.  
Starting from the vision that the international community has recognized the 
importance of having a multilateral approach when addressing the WDP, 
States questioning the IDCR pushed towards the organization of the 
UNGASS 2016, hoping that it would be an opportunity to make amendments 
and to establish new priorities in comparison to the objectives set up in 
2009. States agreed 113 operational recommendations on how to tackle the 
WDP in the UNGASS 2016 Outcome Document, divided in seven thematic 
chapters. One of the main achievements for the States questioning the 
current international drug control system is that they managed to divide the 
operational recommendations in more than the traditional three pillars 
                                                          
151 United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime, ´World Drug Report 2018´. (UNODC, 2018) 
<https://www.unodc.org/wdr2018/> accessed 1 February 2019 
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established in the 2009 Political Declaration, which were Supply Reduction, 
Demand Reduction and International cooperation. The seven thematic 
chapters of the UNGASS 2016 are the following: 
1. Demand reduction and related measures, including prevention and 
treatment, as well as other health-related issues; 
2. Ensuring the availability of and access to controlled substances 
exclusively for medical and scientific purposes, while preventing 
their diversion; 
3. Supply reduction and related measures; effective law enforcement; 
responses to drug related crime; and countering money laundering 
and promoting judicial cooperation; 
4. Cross-cutting issues: drugs and human rights, youth, children, 
women and communities; 
5. Cross-cutting issues in addressing and countering the WDP: 
evolving reality, trends and existing circumstances, emerging and 
persistent challenges and threats, including new psychoactive 
substances, in conformity with the Three International Drug Control 
Conventions and other relevant international instruments; 
6. Strengthening international cooperation based on the principle of 
common and shared responsibility; 
7. Alternative development; regional, interregional and international 
cooperation on development-oriented balanced drug control policy; 
addressing socioeconomic issues152. 
The entire current international debate can be traced back to the decision 
to convene UNGASS 2016 and the adoption of its outcome document. It is 
a fact that the document was agreed upon by all the participating States; 
but while the motivation of several countries was to replace the objectives 
agreed in 2009 with the document resulting from UNGASS 2016, the 
objective of the countries that defend the existing regime was to accelerate 
their fulfilment.  
How is it that a document that was accepted by all parties can cause so 
much controversy around its application? This can be answered due to the 
discourse that has been generated after its adoption. Countries that 
question the current international regime point out that the document 
resulting from UNGASS 2016 is the most recent and comprehensive 
                                                          
152 United Nations General Assembly ´Our joint commitment to effectively addressing and 
countering the world drug problem ´ (19 April 2016) UN Doc A/RES/ S-30/1 
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consensus and, therefore, it means the last milestone with respect to how 
the WDP should be addressed. In this regard, they point out that the 
international community should focus on compliance with the operational 
recommendations, which go beyond the 2009 objectives. On the other 
hand, the countries that defend the current regime point out that the 2009 
Political Declaration and the Document resulting from UNGASS 2016 are 
complementary and mutually reinforcing, so one cannot be applied 
independently from the other. This position is reinforced by the fact that the 
document resulting from the UNGASS 2016 recognizes the validity of the 
2009 Political Declaration.  
States questioning the regime indicate that the objectives of the 2009 
Political Declaration lost validity in 2019 because they were not fulfilled in 
the established target date, Therefor, they are indicating that the main 
reference document must be the one that resulted from UNGASS 2016, and 
that States should seek to apply their operational recommendations. 
However, the document resulting from UNGASS 2016 indicates in its 
preambular section the following:  “We reaffirm our commitment to 
implementing effectively the provisions set out in the Political Declaration 
and Plan of Action, mindful of the targets and goals set therein, as well as 
to addressing the general challenges and priorities for action identified in 
the Joint Ministerial Statement adopted at the high-level review in March 
2014"153.   
 
The same document, again in its preamble, indicates the following: We 
reaffirm the need to mobilize adequate resources to address and counter 
the WDP and call for enhancing assistance to developing countries, upon 
request, in effectively implementing the Political Declaration and Plan of 
Action and the operational recommendations contained in the present 
document. Was reaffirming the 2009 Political Declaration in the 2016 
UNGASS document only a strategy to achieve its approval? This seems to 
be the case, given that the countries that defend the 2016 UNGASS 




continue to deny the validity of the 5 objectives of the 2009 Political 
Declaration described above.     
 
 
5.2 Impairment of the role of CND, UNODC and INCB 
 
The parties trying to challenge the current IDCR are aiming to shift the 
policy-shaping and decision-making process on drug control to the UN 
General Assembly and to disseminate the drug-related issues between 
different UN entities responsible for health, human rights and development. 
They have tried to set the UNGASS 2016 outcome document follow-up 
policy framework by assigning specific tasks and mandates to the different 
UN bodies154, disregarding the central policy-making role of the CND as well 
as the prime responsibility for drug control matters of the UNODC and INCB, 
elements that have been recognized in several international documents155. 
By presenting drafts resolutions both in Vienna, Ney York and Geneva, they 
wanted to undertake all activities related to post-UNGASS matters, 
including revision of UNGASS recommendations and conducting a High-
Level Meeting in this regard.  
 
Another issue on this area was that the presentation of a draft resolution in 
Ney York which called on the Secretary General to strengthen cooperation 
among all relevant UN entities dealing with the WDP with the UNODC and 
INCB not even singled out as having prevalence over others. The proposal 
tried to assign the CND only a pure technical and subsidiary task that 
consisted in submitting a report on what was supposed to be a UNGASS 
follow up at the 73rd GA session in 2018, proposal that did not fly.  
 
The problem with this proposal was that the diffusion of the drug-related 
mandates between different UN bodies would impede the comprehensive 
and balanced approach to addressing the WDP that the CND oversees. For 
                                                          
154 Martin Jelsma, ` UNGASS 2016: Prospects for Treaty Reform and UN System-Wide Coherence 
on Drug Policy` (2017) 10(1) Journal of Drug Policy Analysis 1 
155 Ernesto Samper, `UNGASS 2016 y el nuevo paradigma sobre el problema mundial de las 
drogas` (2017) 29(2) Revista Desafìos 353 
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instance, WHO would have dealt with drug demand reduction issues in 
isolation from drug supply reduction issues. Development agenda would 
have been tackled separated from law-enforcement efforts to counter drug 
cultivation, production and trafficking. The only body that can provide a 
complex and balanced approach to all aspects of the WDP has been the 
CND, leading the coordination’s with other UN relevant organizations. 
 
 
5.3 Role of the European Union  
The EU, both in the negotiations of the UNGASS 2016 Outcome Document 
and the 2016 General Assembly Resolution entitled “International 
cooperation to address and counter the WDP”, has shown a middle point 
between the 2 extreme existing positions. Without wishing to break with the 
IDCR and respecting the documents that already have the consensus of the 
International Community, the EU has been advocating for the inclusion of 
more issues and topics related to Human Rights and Health care. On this 
regard, the EU has also been trying to include a new terminology called 
“harm reduction”, but they have failed in doing so because countries outside 
Europe argue that there is still not an agreed definition on what “harm 
reduction” is. 
Nevertheless, even though the EU shares the same opinion of Canada, 
Mexico, Uruguay, Ecuador, among others, regarding the importance of 
addressing the health and social issues of the WDP, they still consider the 
Three International Drug Control Conventions as the cornerstone of the 
International Drug Control System, although they assign a similar 
importance to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.   
Undoubtedly, the EU, promoted especially by Portugal, attaches greater 
importance to the document resulting from the UNGASS 2016 than to the 
Political Declaration of 2009 and its Plan of Action. However, the 
aforementioned European integration bloc has expressed in Vienna the 
importance of reaching consensus in order to bring the different positions 
closer, considering that the WDP contains different edges that each State 
102 
 
must address differently according to its own problems and national 
frameworks. In this regard, just as the problems of the EU are mainly 
focused on consumption and public health aspects related to the WDP, at 
the same time they cooperate with less developed countries in addressing 
the problem of production, for example through Alternative Development 
programs in Peru, Colombia and Thailand. 
 
5.4 Countries defending the current international drug control 
strategies 
The States defending the current international drug control strategies as 
well as the Three International Drug Control Conventions as the cornerstone 
of the international drug control system and the validity of the Political 
Declaration and its Plan of action are still a large majority. Among those 
countries, we can find the whole African Union, the Asian Group, several 
Latin American countries such as Peru, El Salvador, Argentina, Chile, 
countries from Western Europe, Russia, etc. These countries argue that the 
reason why the “War against Drugs” has not been won yet is because 
countries have not been applying the current strategies and the existing 
documents in an effective way. 
On the one hand, these likeminded countries do not deny that realities have 
been evolving since the Three International Drug Control Conventions were 
negotiated.  On the other hand, they consider that these documents give 
enough flexibility to the countries to adapt to these evolving realities and 
allow States to implement the conventions in different ways accordingly to 
their own realities. For example, even though some countries have very 
strong penalties for drug related crimes, the three conventions call upon 
States to implement penalties that are proportional to the crimes committed. 
The three conventions even recognize the possibility of establishing 
alternatives to imprisonment that include programs to help the people under 
the crime chain.  
Even though the countries wishing to change the way the international 
community is facing the WDP achieved to include many of their positions in 
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the UNGASS 2016 Outcome Document, they failed to undermine the 
validity of the three International Drug Control Conventions as the 
cornerstone of the International Drug Verification Regime as well as the 
Political Declaration and its Plan of Action. Nevertheless, some countries 
such as Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico, Uruguay, Ecuador, Portugal and 
some of the EU showed that they will not give up in trying to build a new 
paradigm on this regard. This way, they are showing the International 
Community how their behaviour is going to be towards 2019. 
 
It has to be mentioned that the UNGASS outcome document was not 
supposed to replace the 2009 Political Declaration but to support the 
implementation of the three pillars established in this document: demand 
reduction, supply reduction and international cooperation. Nevertheless, the 
Draft Proposal tried to make the CND to establish working groups on seven 
thematic areas corresponding to thematic chapters of UNGASS Outcome 
Document,156 which would have focus the work of the CND in the 
implementation of the UNGASS outcome document instead of in the 2009 
Political Declaration.  
So, summarizing, the position of the countries defending the current 
international strategy is that there is no need to break the system but to 
implement the existing tools in a positive way. These countries do not deny 
the importance of health and social related issues, human rights, etc., but 
they seek for a balance between these topics and law enforcement and 
supply and demand reduction. 
In that sense, the strategy to combat illicit drug trafficking has been based 
on a war against transnational organized crime that was financed from this 
illicit activity. This war has led to extremes such as military operations 
against small farmers of illicit crops, the chemical spraying of crops linked 
to the production of drugs, the imprisonment of users and small distributors 
and even the death penalty in some countries. All these strategies were 
allowed in the framework of the Three International Drug Control 
                                                          
156 United Nations General Assembly ´International cooperation against the WDP´ (18 December 
2009) UN Doc A/RES/64/82 
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Conventions, although there is no consensus regarding their success. 
Nevertheless, the three conventions do not say that States are forced to 
apply these punitive strategies. The three conventions give a huge 
framework of possibilities to the States based on the principle of respect to 
human right. Thus, States are allowed to apply alternatives to imprisonment 
instead of incarceration, the same as they can apply Alternative 
Development Programs instead of chemical spraying and military 
interventions against farmers. The global problem of drugs is so particular 
and changing that pointing out that the same type of strategy will work in all 
cases is unthinkable. 
Although the questionings that have been made to the regime have 
occurred mostly in the multilateral sphere, there are clearly examples that 
go beyond the political and academic debate that have been transferred to 
specific policies that mark a break with the regime. In this chapter, in a 
succinct way, an analysis of the main positions that have been discussed in 
relation to the regime has been presented. This situation of questioning has 
been amplified by the application of policies that break the IDCR, such as 
the legalization of the cannabis market for recreational purposes. This 
situation will be analysed in greater depth in the following chapters. Once 
the characteristics of the IDCR have been established, as well as the 
different positions that exist around the main documents that contain the 
commitments assumed by the States, concrete study cases will be 
presented in this thesis that demonstrate the current crisis in which the 
regime finds itself, to elucidate the real flexibility of the regime. These cases 
will serve to understand if the IDCR flexibility is the real problem or if in fact 









6. Bolivia: withdrawal and re-accession to the Single Convention of 
1961 
The case of Bolivia has become a very interesting example of how a State 
found a way to go around one of the Three International Drug Control 
Conventions in order to be able to make a reservation many years after the 
country obliged itself to all the articles of the 1961 Single Convention. Bolivia 
never intended to break with the system but to bring to it one special social 
condition that became important at the beginning of this century, which was 
the social vindication of the Bolivian indigenous people. Although it could be 
argued that Bolivia “cheated” on the international law of treaties and on the 
Single Convention of 1961, at the end the country found a way out of this 
problem which allowed it to remain in the system but with a huge difference 
in comparison to other countries.  
In 2011, Bolivia denounced and then re-acceded with reservations to the 
1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs amended by the 1972 Protocol. 
The reservation was aimed at allowing coca leaf chewing and traditional 
consumption in Bolivia, as well ar allowing the cultivation and trade of coca 
for these purposes, which is explicitly prohibited in the said convention. This 
situation raised a series of objections and criticisms about the validity of the 
procedure followed by Bolivia and especially about the validity of the 
reservation, considering that some pointed out that the reservation went 
against the objectives and purposes of the convention. However, the 
reservation was allowed by the CND based on the non-objection of a large 
number of States Parties and also because of some of the provisions of the 
1961 Convention itself. 
It should be noticed that Bolivia never had the intention to break with the 
IDCR but to try to insert into it some very particular provisions that would 
allow Bolivian citizens to continue with an activity that they have been 
developing since centuries. Bolivia, like other countries in the Andes such 
as Peru, Colombia and Ecuador, has a significant practice of traditional and 
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cultural use of coca leaves157, which includes chewing or "akulliku". This 
tradition dates back at least 5000 years. 
The population of Bolivia is composed of various indigenous groups. The 
census carried out in 2012 indicated that 41% of the population identifies 
itself as indigenous, mainly Quechua or Aymara, while in 2001 this figure 
reached more than 60%. It is precisely the Aymara and Quechua 
communities that practice the most the chewing of coca leaves for traditional 
reasons, although its use for other purposes such as "altitude sickness" has 
become more and more widespread. 
The Single Convention of 1961 establishes, in the first paragraph of article 
49, that a “party may at the time of signature, ratification or accession 
reserve the right to permit temporarily different activities such as Coca Leaf 
chewing”. Nevertheless, it also establishes that  
 
“the activities mentioned in paragraph 1 may be authorized only 
to the extent that they were traditional in the territories in respect 
of which the reservation is made, and were there permitted on 1 
January 1961”. Finally, same article establishes that “Coca leaf 
chewing must be abolished within twenty-five years from the 
coming into force of the Convention”. Article 26 of the convention 
establishes that “The Parties shall so far as possible enforce the 
uprooting of all coca bushes which grow wild. They shall destroy 
the coca bushes if illegally cultivated”, while also states that “If a 
Party permits the cultivation of the coca bush, it shall apply 
thereto and to coca leaves the system of controls as provided in 
article 23 respecting the control of the opium poppy”. In that line, 
article 23 establishes that a “party that permits the cultivation of 
the opium poppy for the production of opium shall establish, if it 
has not already done so, and maintain, one or more government 
agencies”   
 
to carry out the following functions: 
 
 The Agency shall designate the areas in which, and the plots 
of land on which, cultivation of the opium poppy for the 
purpose of producing opium shall be permitted. 
 Only cultivators licensed by the Agency shall be authorized 
to engage in such cultivation. 
                                                          
157 Joyce Wyels, ´The cocoa crux: it has a long history of traditional and medicinal uses, and the 
backing of Bolivia's head of state, but can coca exist without cocaine?´ (2006) 58 (6), Americas 8 
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 Each license shall specify the extent of the land on which the 
cultivation is permitted. 
 All cultivators of the opium poppy shall be required to deliver 
their total crops of opium to the Agency. The Agency shall 
purchase and take physical possession of such crops as 
soon as possible, but not later than four months after the end 
of the harvest. 
 The Agency shall, in respect of opium, have the exclusive 
right of importing, exporting, wholesale trading and 
maintaining stocks other than those held by manufacturers 
of opium alkaloids, medicinal opium or opium preparations. 
Parties need not extend this exclusive right to medicinal 
opium and opium preparations. 
 
Bolivia deposited its adherence instrument to the 1961 Single Convention 
on September 23, 1976, without any reservations. It should be noticed that 
Bolivia did so during the military dictatorship of Hugo Banzer, who is 
remembered for applying very restrictive policies against civil rights. 
Therefore, it is understandable that he did not put into consideration the 
rights of indigenous people while entering the IDCR.  After his government, 
and until 2005, Bolivia never showed any sign that the country was not trying 
to comply with the provisions established in article 49 of the convention. It 
is only from that year, after the arrival of President Evo Morales to power, 
that Bolivia changed its discourse around its drug policies. President 
Morales, one of the main leaders of associations of coca leaf producers, 
sought to reclaim the traditional use of the coca leaf and its various licit uses. 
Likewise, his Government has adopted various measures aimed at ensuring 
that the coca leaf is no longer subject to international control. It should be 
remembered that the coca leaf is listed on Schedule I of the 1961 Single 
Convention together with cocaine, heroin and other drugs and substances 
liable to abuse or that could be converted into narcotics158. 
 
According to Sven Pfeiffer, “in practice, the national (Bolivian) drug policy 
(from Bolivia) shifted its focus from the eradication of illicit coca crops, to the 
promotion of the legal coca market, including by increasing the area of licit 
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coca crop cultivation and the implementation of alternative development 
projects in cooperation with coca farmers159. In this line, and according to 
INCB: 
 
Since 2006, the Government of the Plurinational State of 
Bolivia has taken a number of steps towards removing coca 
leaf from international control. In September 2006, the 
President of the Plurinational State of Bolivia addressed the 
General Assembly at its sixty-first session, calling on the 
international community to support his position to remove 
coca leaf from international control. On 9 January 2007, the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Plurinational State of Bolivia 
addressed a letter to the Director-General of WHO 
requesting that Organization to take the measures necessary 
to implement a process of validation of the medical uses of 
coca leaf and their contribution to, as part of traditional 
medicine, public health in the Andean subregion. On 8 March 
2008, in response to the launching of the report of the Board 
for 2007, the Permanent Mission of the Plurinational State of 
Bolivia to the United Nations forwarded a note to the 
Secretary-General on the position of the Government on the 
issue of coca leaf. During the high-level segment of the fifty-
second session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, held 
in Vienna in March 2009, the President of the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia addressed the delegates, arguing for the 
removal of coca leaf from the IDCR and stating that the 
agreement to include coca leaf in Schedule I of the 1961 
Convention had been a historical error and claiming that the 
agreement had been based on a study that was “neither 
serious nor scientific”.160 
 
A key component of the change of the Bolivian position in the international 
spectrum in relation to the coca leaf was its change of constitution in 2009. 
The new Bolivian constitution, in force until today, indicates in article 384 
that the State protects the original and ancestral use of coca leaf as cultural 
heritage, indicating that it is a renewable resource part of the country's 
biodiversity and that represents a factor of social cohesion. 
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6.1 Bolivian proposal to amend the Single Convention 
 
As it has already been mentioned in this research, one of the biggest 
strengths of the current IDCR is that it is very difficult to change. After its 
constitution was approved, Bolivia notified the Secretary General of the 
United Nations, as depositary of the 1961 Convention, an application for an 
amendment related to the chewing of coca leaf161. Specifically, the proposal 
requested the elimination of subsection 1c and subsection 2e of article 49, 
which, as has already been mentioned, refers to the prohibition of the use 
of the coca leaf. In this way, Bolivia sought to eliminate the temporary 
element regarding allowing the chewing of coca leaves162. It is important to 
notice that Bolivia never intended to change the international control status 
of cocaine163. 
 
However, the amendment was challenged by 18 States Parties to the 
Convention, mainly from the Group of Eastern European States and Others 
(WEOG), as well as from Asia. The argument behind the opposition mainly 
focused on the fact that the amendment would affect the object and purpose 
of the 1961 convention and would generate a negative political precedent 
in the fight against drugs, as well as a precedent that would affect the 
international legal structure of the anti-drug system164. 
 
Bolivia's arguments stated that there was no scientific evidence proved that 
coca leaves chewing was harmful to health or that it created addiction. 
Although Bolivia recognized that the three conventions constitute the 
cornerstone of the international regime against the WDP, it also considered 
that the 1961 Convention did not take into account the rights of indigenous 
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peoples or their sociocultural practices, emphasizing that these rights were 
recognized in other international instruments of the United Nations such as 
the declaration of the United Nations on the Rights of indigenous People, 
the Convention on Protection and Promotion of the diversity of cultural 
expressions of UNESCO, and also in United Nations Convention against 
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988. Bolivia 
also argued that people who chew coca leaf based on ancestral practices 
should not be considered as criminals that violate international norm; that 
that the coca leaf is not addictive; and that its consumption in its natural form 
does not cause harm to human beings165. 
 
It should be noted, as it was pointed out in the theoretical framework of this 
research, that Bolivia's first attempt to change the international regime was 
directly related to an attempt to broaden the cornerstone of the IDCR, as 
nowadays are doing countries like Uruguay, Canada, Mexico and the 
members of the EU. In this regard, by noting that there are other documents 
beyond the three conventions that should be considered, Bolivia sought to 
justify its attempt to amend the Convention, which was rejected precisely by 
those countries that today seek to include other reference documents, such 
as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as instruments of reference 
to apply drug policies. 
 
The Bolivian case is also a very good example of how foreign policy is 
directly related to domestic structures and processes. Bolivia was promoting 
a change in the IDCR based on variations in its own domestic and national 
situation. Bolivia's new constitution represents the main element that 
motivates its foreign policy, seeking to align international law with domestic 
law to comply with the will of its people. Bolivia wanted to present a change 
in the internal circumstances of the country, suggesting the existence of a 
reality that had to be taken into account. 
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6.2 Withdrawal and re-accession of Bolivia to the Single Convention 
 
After the proposed amendment failed, on June 29, 2011, Bolivia deposited 
with the Secretary General of the United Nations an instrument of 
withdrawal from the Single Convention of 1961. Article 46, sub item 2 of the 
convention reads as follows: The denunciation, if received by the Secretary-
General on or before the first day of July in any year, shall take effect on the 
first day of January in the succeeding year, and, if received after the first 
day of July, shall take effect as if it had been received on or before the first 
day of July in the succeeding year. So, according to the terms established 
by the Convention itself, the denunciation took effect for Bolivia on January 
1, 2012. 
 
However, on December 29, 2011, Bolivia submitted to the Secretary 
General of the United Nations an instrument of accession to the Single 
Convention of 1961, which contained a reservation. This situation generated 
discomfort on various other countries and international actors, given that it 
could be understood that this was a way of evading the obligations acquired 
previously as part of the 1961 convention. This was also seen as an evasion 
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which states that 
reservations must be made when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or 
acceding to treaty. 
 
The reservation made by Bolivia reads as follows: 
 
The Plurinational State of Bolivia reserves the right to allow 
in its territory: traditional coca leaf chewing; the consumption 
and use of the coca leaf in its natural state for cultural and 
medicinal purposes, such as its use in infusions; and also the 
cultivation, trade and possession of the coca leaf to the 
extent necessary for these licit purposes. 
 
At the same time, the Plurinational State of Bolivia will 
continue to take all necessary measures to control the 
cultivation of coca in order to prevent its abuse and the illicit 
production of the narcotic drugs which may be extracted from 
the leaf166. 
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In accordance with the Bolivian argument presented in its instrument of 
accession, that country submitted its reservation in accordance with article 
50, paragraph 3 of the 1961 Convention, indicating that its accession was 
subject to the authorization of the reservation. This paragraph reads as 
follows:  
 
A State which desires to become a Party but wishes to be 
authorized to make reservations other than those made in 
accordance with paragraph 2 of this article or with article 49 
may inform the Secretary-General of such intention. Unless 
by the end of twelve months after the date of the Secretary-
General’s communication of the reservation concerned, this 
reservation has been objected to by one third of the States 
that have ratified or acceded to this Convention before the 
end of that period, it shall be deemed to be permitted, it being 
understood, however, that States which have objected to the 
reservation need not assume towards the reserving State 
any legal obligation under this Convention which is affected 
by the reservation. 
 
According to this article and bearing in mind that the Bolivian reservation 
referred to an article on which, in principle, the reservations were not directly 
authorized, the Secretary General of the United Nations established a 
deadline for filing objections on January 10, 2013. As stated in the 1961 
Convention, for the reservation to be authorized, it was required the number 
of objections to be less than one third of the number of States parties, which 
at that time was 61. Considering that there were only 15 States that objected 
the Bolivian reservation (Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Israel, 
Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Portugal, Russia, Sweden, the United 
Kingdom and the United States), it was finally authorized. The re-accession 
of Bolivia became effective on January 11, 2013, with the aforementioned 
reservation and, pursuant to Article 41.2 of the Single Convention of 1961, 
entered into force again for Bolivia on February 10, 2013. 
 
It should be noted that Bolivia oriented its international efforts towards a 
campaign to obtain the support of the international community to achieve its 
re-accession with a reservation, so that it would not be challenged by the 
States Parties. Among its main arguments during this period, Bolivia 
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indicated that the text of the 1961 Convention would not be affected and 
that its reservation would not affect other parts of the Convention. 
 
The countries that presented their objection to the reservation established 
by Bolivia had arguments of different types. In general terms, with regard to 
the formal aspects, all considered that, in practice, Bolivia was establishing 
a reservation to a treaty that it had already ratified, which was contrary to 
international law167. In this regard, they indicated that Bolivia intended to 
avoid well-established norms and mechanisms. While no one doubted 
Bolivia's right to denounce the 1961 Single Convention based on Article 50, 
they pointed out that said article should not be used to carry out a re-
accession process, which could generate a very dangerous precedent for 
the future not only of the IDCR control but of any multilateral instrument 
subscribed by the States.  
 
Other arguments were directed to indicate that the action of Bolivia went 
against the principle of "good faith" that should guide the action of the States 
on the basis of Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
considering it was aimed at avoiding obligations that the country had already 
assumed in relation to Article 49 of the Single Convention of 1961. It should 
be noted that Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
contains one of the fundamental aspects of agreements between States: 
the principle by Pacta Sunt Servanda. The mentioned article reads as 
follows: Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be 
performed by them in good faith.  
 
In that same line, the INCB, in its role as watchdog of the international drug 
control system, argued against the procedure followed by Bolivia. In a press 
release issued in 2011 INCB stated the following: 
 
 
The Board is of the opinion that while this step by Bolivia may 
be in line with the letter of the Convention, such action is 
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contrary to the Convention's spirit. The international 
community should not accept any approach whereby 
Governments use the mechanism of denunciation and re-
accession with reservation, in order to free themselves from 
the obligation to implement certain treaty provisions. Such 
approach would undermine the integrity of the global drug 
control system, undoing the good work of Governments over 
many years to achieve the aims and objectives of the drug 
control conventions, including the prevention of drug abuse 
which is devastating the lives of millions of people. 
 
The international drug control conventions are the corner 
stone of international efforts to prevent the illicit production, 
manufacture, traffic in and abuse of drugs while at the same 
time ensuring that licit drugs are available for medical and 
scientific purposes. The almost universal adherence to these 
conventions is testimony to Governments' trust in the 
international drug control system and a pre-requisite for the 
treaties' effectiveness to prevent drug trafficking and 
abuse168. 
 
The case of Bolivia shows that the Single Convention of 1961, despite the 
flexibility it may have in establishing different strategies aimed at fighting the 
WDP, contained a limitation that was extremely problematic for a member 
State. In that sense, it could be said that it was too restrictive for the Bolivian 
interest to vindicate the traditional use of the coca leaf. Although Bolivia had 
already committed to the application of Article 49 in its entirety, it did so in a 
context that was very different from the one in 2009 in which President 
Morales took the decision to first withdraw and later re-accede the 
Convention. 
 
This may lead to the conclusion that while the conventions, in general terms, 
continue to be the main reference document in the fight against the WDP, 
they have the limitation of not being able to adapt to certain aspects such 
as the social demands made in this case by Bolivia. While it is true that to 
this day there has been no other similar case at the international level, a 
clear precedent has been established that could lead other coca leaf-
producing countries in the Andean region, or opium-producing countries in 
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Asia, to follow a similar path, although none have indicated so far their 
interest in doing so. 
 
 
6.3 Validity of the reservation 
 
As it has already been said, International theory establishes that 
reservations are only allowed when they do not go against the main 
objective of the treaty. Several States argued that the Bolivian reservation 
could be put under this category, thus, it shouldn´t have been accepted. But 
can practice overcome this theory? At the end, there has to be someone to 
decide if a reservation does or does not go against the objective of a treaty. 
In the case of the 1961 Single Convention, it was the right of the Member 
States to make this decision169.  
 
There are three reasons that could have convinced States not to oppose 
the Bolivian reservation. Firstly, it could be said that many States Parties to 
the 1961 Single Convention really believed that the reservation made by 
Bolivia did not go against the main objective of the treaty. Probably this 
applied to those States producing large amounts of poppy and coca leaf.  
 
Secondly, the diplomatic efforts made by Bolivia payed off by convincing 
States to allow the Bolivian Government to continue with its strategy 
although they believed that the reservation was against the main objective 
of the treaty. The third reason, which probably was the main one, is that the 
majority of countries simply did not care about the reservation made by 
Bolivia or did not have enough resources to deal with something that was 
clearly not a priority for them. As Michael Wood established,  
 
“When a state or international organization is formulating a 
reservation or a declaration, close attention will (one hopes) 
be paid to the matter. But unless they are parties to one of 
the relatively rare cases involving reservations (or 
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interpretative declarations) that come before international 
courts and tribunals, most States seem not to concern 
themselves much with reservations and declarations made 
by others. This can be seen in their failure to react to 
reservations or declarations that may in some cases 
seriously threaten a multilateral treaty regime. There are, no 
doubt, many reasons for this. One must surely be that 
increasingly hard-pressed foreign ministries, including their 
lawyers, simply do not have the resources to devote to what 
can be a time-consuming and difficult matter. This seems to 
be the case for States, large and small”170.  
 
It should be noted that most States presenting objections against the 
reservation made by Bolivia were either States with huge interests in 
avoiding Bolivia to keep producing “legal” coca leaf, such as cocaine 
destination countries, or States with big delegations at the UN which are 
actually capable of handling a great amount of issues at the same time. 
 
But even though the 15 countries objecting the reservation made by Bolivia 
either had direct interests in the matter or had enough people taking care of 
this issue, it is interesting to notice that they failed to convince other 
countries to follow their steps. Countries such as the United States, Russia, 
United Kingdom, among others, have the capability to bring States on board 
only with a phone call. A very good example of this situation is the resolution 
of the United Nations General Assembly which calls for lifting the US 
embargo against Cuba, which is approved every year. For many years, the 
US was able to convince States such as Marshall Islands, Federated States 
of Micronesia and Palau to either vote against or in abstention to the 
resolution. Bearing this in mind, it is interesting to notice that this was not 
the case in terms of establishing objections to the Bolivian reservation. 
Probably one of the reasons for this lack of diplomatic campaign was that 
the 15 countries opposing the reservation needed to do it because of 
political principles, but at the end knew that it was much better to have 
Bolivia on board even with the reservation. 
 
 
                                                          
































7. Portugal: a history of success inside the framework of the Three 
International Drug Control Conventions 
The approval by the Government of the “National Drug 
Strategy” which is now being published, is a clear sign of 
maturity in the political intervention regarding the complex 
problem of drugs and drug addiction. 
The principles, objectives and strategic options that should 
guide the action to be taken over the next few years have now 
been accurately defined. This document is, therefore, a 
historic turning point in the structuring of a global policy faced 
with the problem of drugs and drug addiction on different 
fronts: from prevention to the fight against drugs and money 
laundering, from treatment to the social reintegration of drug 
addicts, from harm reduction to training and research.171 
The case of the way in which Portugal has decided to face the problem of 
drugs is probably one of the most interesting to analyse, since it contains 
many of the elements that motivate this investigation. On the one hand, the 
Government of Portugal has been one of the most critical with respect to 
the existing regime, being one of the most radical countries in this regard 
within the EU172. Likewise, Portugal is one of the main proponents of the 
need to focus only on the document resulting from UNGASS 2016, leaving 
aside previous documents such as the Political Declaration of 2009. In this 
sense, Portugal, in the framework of the UN, has been for the need to 
balance drug policies towards a human rights and public health based 
approach173. In its declarations in the framework of the CND, Portugal has 
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been arguing that problems such as supply and demand will continue to 
exist and, therefore, drug strategies and policies should focus primarily on 
the human aspect of the problem, which refers to social and health related 
issues. 
Notwithstanding all this, the Portuguese Government established in 1999 
the National Strategy for The Fight Against Drugs (NSFAD), which has can 
be recognized as innovative, effective (taking into consideration the issues 
Portugal wanted to tackle), and framed within the scope of the Three 
International Drug Control Conventions, although the final goals of this 
strategy are not the ones the international community has been trying to 
tackle since the establishment of the regime.  
The policies established by Portugal to tackle its drug problem are described 
in three strategic documents: the above mentioned NSFAD established in 
1999; the National Plan Against Drugs and Drug Addiction 2005-12; and 
National Plan for the Reduction of Addictive Behaviours and Dependencies 
2013-20174. 
It could not be clearly stated if the interest of Portugal at the time of 
elaborating its national strategy was to generate a change in the framework 
of the IDCR, but undoubtedly, as will be explained later, it caused an 
evolution of the regime within the framework of the existing documents. The 
Portuguese strategy was questioned by different actors, especially by the 
INCB. However, at the end, as it will be explained, the Board had to 
reinterpret the way in which it understood various aspects of the 3 
international conventions, especially regarding the decriminalization of 
consumption, given that different States considered that the application of 
measures like the Portuguese could be beneficial. Also, even the States that 
decided to maintain restrictive measures in relation to consumption did not 
argue about a possible violation by Portugal of the three conventions. While 
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it is true that the conventions prohibit decriminalization of consumption, a 
reinterpretation of the respective articles was necessary to make the regime 
more flexible to allow these new strategies. To better understand this 
process, it is necessary to briefly analyse the emergence of Portuguese 
strategies and policies. 
 
7.1 Brief evolution summary of the Portuguese Drug Control Regime 
To understand the way in how Portugal came to establish in 1999 a different 
strategy from everything that had been tried before, in is important to 
consider the evolution of the drug control regime in that country. It could be 
said that Portugal always had a much more permissive system than other 
European partners. Although consumption has been criminalized for many 
years, the punishments were not considerable. As stated by Ricardo 
Gonçalves, during the first half of the twentieth century, in which 
prohibitionist regimes proliferated all around the world, the problem of drug 
consumption in Portugal was minimal and limited to a social elite not 
associated with organized crime175. The Portuguese laws to control the 
issue of drugs were limited to their commercialization and to control the 
profits related to drug trafficking in the Portuguese colonies in Timor and 
Macau176. So, even though in 1961 Portugal was one of the signatory States 
of the Single Convention, its ratification only came 10 years later. 
However, the authoritarian regime of Marcelo das Neves Alves Caetano 
(1968-1974), who replaced the former dictator Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, 
sought to implant a social heterodoxy and traditionalism to relaunch the 
“Portuguese essence”177, modified this relatively permissive regime. Apart 
from ratifying the Single Convention of 1961, the Portuguese regime joined 
the most radical countries such as the United States, China and Russia in 
defending the importance of fighting against the consumption of narcotics 
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due to “moral reasons178”.However, it should be noted that this change in 
the Portuguese view of the WDP may have been excessively alarmist and 
populist, given that there is no information proving that drug consumption in 
Portugal became a social problem at that time179. In other words, and using 
some elements from the cognitive theories of regime changes, the 
variations came due to ideological variations of the leaders, but not due to 
a modification of the internal social situation. 
Finally, at the beginning of the 1980s, the most important change occurred 
in Portugal in terms of the understanding of the drug problem. After an 
internal debate involving politicians, experts from different national 
instances and representatives of civil society, Portugal began to consider 
drug addiction as a disease, which implied the need for “harm reduction” 
and social control. This began to shape what would be its national drug 
strategy starting in 1999. So, even though Portugal did not decriminalize 
consumption, the penalties applied for it were, as stated by Ricardo 
Gonçalves, “symbolic”, which finally gave the opportunity for the crimes to 
be discarded. However, what persisted from the previous regime is that 
Portugal continued to persecute all the people involved in drug trafficking, 
for whom the penalties continued to be harsh180. 
After this change on mentality, in 1995 the Parliament of Portugal created a 
Committee for the Assessment of Drug Addiction, Consumption and Traffic, 
that started a debate regarding the future of drug control policies as well as 
the future of the cooperation on drug related issues. Considering the 
importance and social conscience that this debate generated in Portugal, 
the Government decided to establish a Committee of specialists and 
scientists with the task of presenting a strategy proposal for its approval by 
the Government. The report of this group, as well as the result of the public 
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debate which involved national organizations, the private sector and the civil 
society, gave birth to the NSFAD181. 
The national strategy of Portugal, as expected, was mainly focused on 
addressing aspects related to drug use and addiction, given that this was 
Portugal’s main problem related to narcotics abuse. However, Portugal 
abandoned the traditional measures related to criminal prosecution of 
consumption and micro-marketing, mainly to address social and public 
health aspects of the problem. 
The six objectives established in the Portuguese National Strategy against 
Drugs are the following182: 
I. To contribute to an appropriate and efficient international and 
European strategy for the World Drug Problem, as regards 
demand and supply reduction and which includes the fight 
against illicit trafficking and money laundering. 
 
II. To provide Portuguese society with better information about the 
phenomenon of drugs and drug addiction, as well as the 
dangers of particular drugs, from a preventive perspective; 
 
III. To reduce the use of drugs, especially among younger members 
of the population; 
 
IV. To guarantee the necessary resources for treatment and social 
reintegration of drug addicts; 
V. To protect public health and the security of people and property. 
VI. To repress illicit traffic of drugs and money laundering. 
In these priorities, as can be seen, the traditional objectives of the 
international community such as the elimination of supply and demand 
are not met. As has been pointed out, Portugal's priorities show that 
there is a complete refocusing of the WDP to address it as a social and 
public health issue. However, this does not mean that Portugal has 
stopped fighting illicit trafficking. 
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Portugal is the closest nation in Europe to the World’s 
primary producer and exporter of cocaine (Colombia). In 
addition, there are historical links between Portugal and 
other Latin American countries that facilitate the 
development of drug trafficking networks. Trafficking in 
and through Portugal is therefore significant, not only for 
the Portuguese, but also for the European drug problem. 
Since the introduction of the new strategy, there have 
been considerable increases in the amount of drugs 
seized. There were increases of more than 100% in the 
amount of heroin, cocaine, cannabis and ecstasy seized 
between the four years 1995-1999 and the 2000-2004 
period, even though the number of seizures decreased. 
This could indicate that the Portuguese authorities have 
successfully refocused their supply reduction efforts on 
large-scale operations, rather than street level deals 
involving small amounts of drugs183.  
It should be borne in mind that Portuguese policies did not focus solely on 
the public health aspect. From a social point of view, Portugal stopped 
pursuing micro-merchants, considering that many of them were also victims 
of the problem. Its focus on reducing supply focused on large traffickers. 
 
7.2 International response to the Portuguese strategy 
Even though nowadays institutions such as the INCB no longer point to 
Portugal indicating that their strategy is in violation of the 3 international 
conventions, when they began to be implemented it caused great 
international concern. INCB considered that the risks that Portugal was 
undertaking were extremely high and that it could cause a different effect 
from the one desired. In other words, the Board considered that these 
policies could lead to an increase in the abuse of narcotics. INCB even sent 
a Mission to Portugal trying to persuade the Government not to implement 
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measures such as decriminalization of possession and consumption of 
drugs, considering this could send a wrong message to other countries.  
INCB stated in its 1999 report that “In April 1999, a draft law was approved 
in Portugal stipulating that drug users will face fines rather than jail 
sentences. Under the new law, the abuse and possession of drugs for 
personal use will no longer be criminal offences but only administrative 
offences.  
“As the Board has stated repeatedly, this is not in line with 
the international drug control treaties which require that drug 
use be limited to medical and scientific purposes and that 
States parties make drug possession a criminal offence. It 
should be noted that the exercise of criminal jurisdiction is 
discretionary and Governments may provide offenders with 
alternatives to conviction and punishment.”184185 
As can be seen, the INCB clearly stated that, in accordance with the three 
drug control conventions, States are obliged to establish that the possession 
of drugs is a criminal offense. This, as indicated in the quoted INCB report, 
is based on what is established in article 3, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the 1988 
Convention. Paragraph 1, in its numeral iii, indicates that the signatory 
States of the Convention should establish as a criminal offense the 
possession or purchase and sale of psychoactive substances. However, 
this should happen only when it is related to the provisions of numeral i, 
which refers to  
“production, manufacture, extraction; preparation, offering, 
offering for sale, distribution, sale, delivery on any terms 
whatsoever, brokerage, dispatch, dispatch in transit, 
transport, importation or exportation of any narcotic drug or 
any psychotropic substance contrary to the provisions of the 
1961 Convention, the 1961 Convention as amended or the 
1971 Convention”.  
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The argument presented by INCB gets stronger considering paragraph 2 of 
article 3 of the 1988 convention. This article establishes that Parties to the 
convention  
“subject to its constitutional principles and the basic concepts 
of its legal system, shall adopt such measures as may be 
necessary to establish as a criminal offence under its 
domestic law, when committed intentionally, the possession, 
purchase or cultivation of narcotic drugs or psychotropic 
substances for personal consumption contrary to the 
provisions of the 1961 Convention, the 1961 Convention as 
amended or the 1971 Convention.” 
The question that arose in this sense is if Portugal's new strategy was 
against this article.  
Portugal for many years, especially after adhering to the conventions, 
typified consumption as a crime, although the penalties were extremely 
low186. This responded to a particular way of understanding the problem of 
drug consumption at a particular point in time. Subsequently, the internal 
law of Portugal changed, and as has been pointed out, consumption 
became an administrative fault. The provisions of paragraph 2 of article 3 of 
the 1988 Convention are subject, as established in the same paragraph, to 
the constitutional principles and the basic concepts of the legal system of 
each State. In that sense, Portugal has repeatedly argued that drug use and 
addiction is considered as a disease, and as such, its constitution and legal 
system prevent it from being criminalized. This is a vision shared by many 
States, both those that defend traditional strategies and those that seek 
alterations in the IDCR187. 
 
 
                                                          
186 Ricardo Gonçalves, Ana Lourenço and Sofia Nogueira da Silva, ´A social cost perspective in the 
wake of the Portuguese strategy for the fight against drugs´ (2015) 26(2) IJDP 200 
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7.3 Impact of the Portuguese Policies in the IDCR 
Bearing this in mind and considering the report of the INCB published the 
very next year, it can be concluded that the Board noted that they went too 
far by accusing Portugal of going against what it is allowed in the framework 
of the three conventions. In the year 2000 report, INCB stated only that “The 
parliament of Portugal decided in July 2000 that penal sanctions would no 
longer apply to the illicit use, possession and acquisition for personal use of 
all drugs. Instead, those offences would be subject to administrative 
sanctions, such as fines, or other limitations of rights, such as the 
suspension of driving privileges.188” In that sense, the accusations that this 
regulation did not met what was established in the conventions stopped. 
This change of position can also be explained by the Mission sent by INCB 
to Portugal on 2000. The Government of Portugal, after the report issued in 
1999, was very interested in discussing the new strategy with the INCB, 
especially regarding the changes in the scope of sanctions for possession 
and acquisition of drugs for personal use.  
What happened between Portugal and the INCB shows loopholes contained 
in the international narcotics control regime, especially when the regime's 
"watchdog" overrides its mandate and its work. As mentioned, it is the task 
of INCB to ensure that all States comply with the provisions of the Three 
International Drug Control Conventions. However, determining if a strategy 
is framed within the powers that States have to implement the conventions 
results in a grey line that must be defined, especially when, as in the case 
of Portugal, INCB reconsidered its position. This leads us to think more 
about a structural problem and lack of flexibility not of the Conventions but 
of the INCB itself. This institution has been so accustomed to promoting 
coercive strategies that, when observing an innovative model that had not 
been applied before by any member state and that aimed to focus more on 
                                                          
188 International Narcotics Control Board, ´INCB Report 2000´ (International Narcotics Control 
Board, 2001) 65 
<https://www.incb.org/documents/Publications/AnnualReports/AR2000/AR_2000_Chapter_III_E




social problems derived from illicit drug trafficking, its first conclusion was 
that this strategy had to be against the three conventions.  
In this sense, and after the visit to Portugal through which the Government 
had the opportunity to present to the Board the scope of its new strategy, 
the INCB, in its report of the year 2000, pointed out that “by adopting the 
new national drug strategy, the Government of Portugal has embarked on 
a wideranging review of drug-related legislation. The Board will continue to 
monitor the developments in that area. The Board expects that new 
legislation will be fully in line with the international drug control treaties”189. 
One of the main impacts - beyond the fact that the INCB has ceased to 
indicate that countries that decriminalize the consumption and possession 
of small amounts of narcotics are outside the framework of the three 
conventions - is the fact that agencies of the system of the United Nations 
have begun to give recommendations promoting these policies. For 
example, WHO, in its Consolidated guidelines on HIV prevention, diagnosis, 
treatment and care for key populations, makes a general call to rethink 
policies in relation to the criminalization of drug use, considering a public 
health perspective and the impact of restrictive policies on the transmission 
of diseases such as HIV using syringes190.  
In the case of the WHO, this recommendation can be understood 
considering that its mandate is related to health issues. However, the most 
enigmatic case is the Joint United Nations Statement on Ending 
Discrimination in Health Care Settings, which, although it continues to 
address fundamentally health aspects, was launched by all entities of the 
United Nations system and points the importance of considering policies 
that decriminalize drug consumption. The pertinent article of the statement 
reads like this: 
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Reviewing and strengthening laws to prohibit discrimination 
in the provision and distribution of health care services, as 
well as in relation to education and employment in the health 
sector. Laws and policies must respect the principles of 
autonomy in health care decision-making; guarantee free 
and informed consent, privacy and confidentiality; prohibit 
mandatory HIV testing; prohibit screening procedures that 
are not of benefit to the individual or the public; and ban 
involuntary treatment and mandatory third-party 
authorization and notification requirements. All stakeholders 
should support the clear dissemination, implementation, and 
monitoring of adherence to such laws and regulations and 
their translation into policies and practice. 
Reviewing and repealing punitive laws that have been 
proven to have negative health outcomes and that counter 
established public health evidence. These include laws that 
criminalize or otherwise prohibit gender expression, same 
sex conduct, adultery and other sexual behaviours between 
consenting adults; adult consensual sex work; drug use or 
possession of drugs for personal use; sexual and 
reproductive health care services, including information; and 
overly broad criminalization of HIV non-disclosure, exposure 
or transmission.  
Reviewing, strengthening, implementing and monitoring 
health professional policies, regulations, standards, working 
conditions and ethics, for the prohibition of discrimination on 
all grounds in connection to health care settings191. 
It is true that in all the text quoted of the Joint Statement there is only one 
specific mention to the drug issue, to the importance of considering the 
decriminalization of consumption and that all this is immersed in a broader 
framework that speaks of the importance of non-discrimination in health 
matters. However, and despite being brief, this mention implies a great turn 
in relation to the subject, and has been used by several States to continue 
with similar policies to the ones applied by Portugal. At the same time, it 
places the INCB in an extremely complicated position, given that the Board, 
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in case it maintains its opposition to decriminalizing policies, would be going 
against appeals made by other United Nations Organizations. 
 
7.4 Portuguese actions through a theoretical view 
As it has already been said, it cannot be definitively stated whether Portugal 
had an intention to achieve changes in the international regime or the 
Government was just thinking about strategies that could benefit their own 
population. Undoubtedly, the Portuguese Government argued that it 
needed to address a specific situation through new policies, which 
subsequently led to a partial redefinition of the regime, given that INCB had 
to accept the reinterpretation made by Portugal in relation to 
decriminalization of drug use. And this occurred mainly because Portugal 
got international support and similar measures to stop persecuting the drug 
user and to begin to apply to these users a prevention and public health 
approach were applied worldwide. 
However, considering cognitive theories of regime changes, it should be 
noted that in Portugal and in the other countries that decided to 
decriminalize consumption occurred a change of ideology, values and 
beliefs in relation to the abuse of narcotics. As already noted, cognitive 
approaches are particularly important in explaining the substantive content 
of the rules and why they evolve. Cognitive approaches are therefore 
particularly important in explaining the substantive content of regime rules 
and why they evolve. By elevating the importance of actor learning, 
cognitive theories have a dynamic other theoretical approaches lack192. In 
this specific case, we are faced with a fact in which the norms of the regime 
were not modified, but the way of understanding them evolved. In that 
sense, Portugal  tried to prove the INCB, and in a certain way the 
International Community, that it was necessary to understand the 3 
international conventions in a more flexible manner, which was successful 
at the end. 
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On the other hand, through a functional approach, the regime, according to 
the understanding of Portugal, was clearly not being effective, so it needed 
to apply new policies that eventually ended up modifying it193. Per the school 
of structuralist thinking, changes in the regime occur when it stops working 
for all or some of its members. In that sense, it has been observed that 
several States understood that a specific aspect of the regime did not seem 
to be working, so they looked for ways to escape from the scope of the 
articles of the three conventions that forced States to penalize consumption. 
These articles, nevertheless, are still part of the conventions. So, at least in 
instrumental terms, the regime remains invariable. However, the fact that 
the INCB no longer points out and blames the States that have 
decriminalized consumption shows that the regime has changed, even 
though a large part of the international community continues to apply 
policies that punish consumers. 
Regarding a strategic and game-theoretic approach, it doesn’t result entirely 
useful for analysing the evolution of the regime as a result of the new 
policies promoted by Portugal. As indicated in the theoretical framework, 
this approach seeks to analyse the interaction and cooperation between the 
different States, which shapes the regime194. That is, it is more efficient to 
understand the emergence or rupture of the regime, but not so much to 
understand why it is that the regimes change. The Portuguese strategy has 
an important focus on international cooperation. However, the policies that 
were considered "revolutionary" or outside the legal framework of the 
regime such as the decriminalization of consumption did not imply 
interaction with other States. While the INCB maintained a follow-up to 
these policies and the elaboration of the strategy, Portugal finally focused 
on its internal situation and how it would approach, almost alone, the 
problem of consumption within its borders. 
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Finally, the structuralist school focuses primarily on the situation and 
international conditions to understand change within the regimes. In the 
case presented in this chapter, it should be noted that Portugal did not act 
based on a new specific situation at the international level. Said State, as 
indicated above, responded to an internal situation and to a different way of 
wanting to address the problem of drug use. However, structuralism does 
help to understand the impact of these national policies undertaken by 
Portugal that led to the evolution of the IDCR. Portugal, intentionally or not, 
fostered an international situation that caused several States to start 
implementing similar policies. In view of this, the INCB had to give in and 
accept that these policies could be reinterpreted to fit into the IDCR. 
Otherwise, the INCB would have had to continue defending a position within 
the regime that was unsustainable, given that despite all the warnings given, 
these decriminalization policies caused a positive impact among various 
members of the international community. 
The previous paragraphs could lead to the conclusion that the regime is as 
flexible as what the States that are part of it, allow it to be. Effectively, the 
INCB is the institution in charge of ensuring that States comply with the most 
strictly opposable provisions of the 3 international conventions. However, 
when the disobedience is generalized, the Board must re-evaluate its 
position in order not to lose legitimacy as the "guardian" of the regime. 
Portugal's disobedience became an accepted strategy given that it proved 
to be successful and attractive to a significant number of Member States. At 
the same time, these policies ceased to be questioned not only by the INCB, 
but also by States that maintain punitive policies against consumers, thus 
recognizing that the Conventions are flexible even in those cases where 
before it seemed that they were not. However, this flexibility has a limit, and 
it is within those limits that States can implement new strategies. These 
limits are demonstrated, for example, with regard to the legalization of 





8. Uruguay, Canada and United States: new strategies breaking the 
International Drug Control Regime 
 
The legalization of non-medical use of cannabis 
contravenes the international drug control treaties. 
Universal and full implementation of the treaties is put at 
serious risk because States parties, such as Canada and 
Uruguay (as well as states in the United States), have 
legalized cannabis for non-medical use. The actions of 
those countries and state jurisdictions undermine the 
treaties. They may also encourage other States parties to 
follow their example and use it as a justification for doing 
so195. 
In the previous chapters, two emblematic cases have been analysed in 
which the Three International Drug Control Conventions were sufficiently 
broad and flexible to accommodate emerging needs of the States. Although 
in the case of Bolivia a significant number of States, especially world 
powers, protested against the action taken by this south American 
Government, and that in the case of Portugal the INCB repeatedly pointed 
out that the Portuguese State's policies contravened the conventions, finally 
both countries managed to assert their position without being internationally 
blamed for contravening their international commitments. In the Portuguese 
case, as we observed, this was clearly due to the strength and momentum 
that the Government put in to show that the three conventions were being 
respected. Because of this, several countries passed policies to 
decriminalize the possession and consumption of controlled substances for 
recreational purposes. 
The cases that will be presented in this chapter are related not only to the 
decriminalization but also to the legalization of consumption of cannabis for 
recreational purposes, which is expressly prohibited by the Single 
Convention of 1961, not leaving any space for reinterpretations as it 
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happened in the case of Portugal with the decriminalization of consumption. 
The Single Convention of 1961 states, in its article 49, the following:  
A Party may at the time of signature, ratification or accession 
reserve the right to permit temporarily in any one of its 
territories the use of cannabis, cannabis resin, extracts and 
tinctures of cannabis for non-medical purposes.  
Nevertheless, the same article establishes that  
“the reservations under paragraph 1 shall be subject to the 
following restrictions: The use of cannabis for other than 
medical and scientific purposes must be discontinued as 
soon as possible but in any case within twenty-five years 
from the coming into force of this Convention as provided in 
paragraph 1 of article 41196.  
It is also worth mentioning that the Single Convention, in its articles 23 and 
28, mandates States to crate specialized agencies to control the legal 
cultivation, which is limited to very specific purposes. Although article 23 
only mentions the cultivation of Poppy, article 28 establishes that “if a Party 
permits the cultivation of the cannabis plant for the production of cannabis 
or cannabis resin, it shall apply thereto the system of controls as provided 
in article 23 respecting the control of the opium poppy”197. So, by reading 
these articles it becomes clear that one of the main objectives of the Single 
Convention is to eliminate the use of cannabis for non-medical purposes.  
Another relevant issue to highlight about the international control of 
Cannabis is that the CND agreed to put this substance into the Schedules I 
and IV of the 1961 Single Convention, which means that, per the 
international regime, cannabis is particularly liable to be abused and to 
produce harmful effects, and such liability is not offset by substantial 
therapeutic advantages. It is debatable whether in fact not enough medical 
uses of cannabis are known to make a reclassification of this substance, 
especially considering that in recent years several countries have begun 
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processes of adaptation of their domestic legislation with cooperation from 
the INCB to allow the medicinal use of cannabis. Medical use is allowed by 
the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 as amended by the 1972 
Protocol, provided several conditions are met198. So, nowadays the 
presence of cannabis in Schedule IV is what could generate more 
controversy, considering that it contains the list of substances that should 
be controlled the most.  
The debate regarding the reclassification of cannabis has taken place both 
internationally and nationally. The case of the United States may be one of 
the most emblematic, considering that this country has long led the War on 
Drugs. Since 2016, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has been 
considering the possibility of rethinking its position in relation to the 
classification of cannabis199. Although not much has changed in recent 
years, this agency has been promoting further research on this substance. 
And this is a fundamental issue in relation to the reclassification of cannabis. 
Since different representatives of the medical community have indicated 
that a reclassification should take place200, many studies are being 
conducted regarding its possible side effects. The WHO, the leading 
international medical authority, is currently in the process of reviewing the 
therapeutic usefulness of cannabis as well as its abuse and dependence 
liability, public health and social harm potential, and has recommended to 
the CND a reclassification of cannabis and some of its derivates. The full 
result of its review will become known in due course201. Nevertheless, and 
following the spirit of the Single Convention of 1961, it is also clear that 
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despite any discussion about the reclassification of cannabis, it should 
remain as a controlled substance and forbidden for recreative purposes. 
In the case of the United States, cannabis is classified in schedule I of 
controlled substances. It should be noted that this country has its own 
classification of substances, which differs in various aspects of the 
classification created by the three conventions. Schedule I of the United 
States is a kind of fusion between the schedules I and IV of the Single 
Convention of 1961, since it covers highly addictive substances without 
relevant known medical use. 
 
However, and despite the internal and national debates that exist regarding 
the need or not to reclassify cannabis in the lists of substances controlled 
by the 1961 Convention, at present cannabis continues under a strict regime 
of international control, therefore, its use for purposes other than medical or 
scientific purposes is strictly prohibited. Also, there are differentiated 
positions in relation to the motivations for which some countries would 
consider allowing recreational use of cannabis. Motives have been raised 
related to security, fight against the black market, public health, human 
rights, among others. However, there is no evidence so far, beyond 
theoretical approaches, that give justifications to States to violate the three 
conventions to test innovative strategies of this type. 
 
8.1 United States of America: Compliance or non-compliance? 
President of the International Narcotics Control Board 
(INCB), Raymond Yans, has voiced grave concern about the 
outcome of recent referenda in the United States of America 
that would allow the non-medical use of cannabis by adults 
in the states of Colorado and Washington, and in some cities 
in the states of Michigan and Vermont.  Mr. Yans stated that 
“these developments are in violation of the international drug 
control treaties and pose a great threat to public health and 
the well-being of society far beyond those states”.    
Noting that studies have shown that the abuse of cannabis 
can cause cognitive problems as well as contribute to mental 
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disorders, the INCB President said: “Legalization of cannabis 
within these states would send wrong and confusing signals 
to youth and society in general, giving the false impression 
that drug abuse might be considered normal and even, most 
disturbingly, safe. Such a development could result in the 
expansion of drug abuse, especially among young people, 
and we must remember that all young people have a right to 
be protected from drug abuse and drug dependency.”    
The limiting of the use of cannabis to medical and scientific 
purposes is laid out in the 1961 Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs, which was agreed to by 185 States, who by 
consensus decided to place cannabis under control and limit 
its use to medical purposes.  “Since the adoption of this 
Convention, very potent new forms of cannabis have 
appeared on the illicit market, and technological advances 
have been used to increase the content of the most ‘active 
ingredient’, so to speak, in cannabis, tetrahydrocannabinol 
(THC).  The cannabis on the illicit market today is much more 
dangerous than that seen in the 60s and 70s,” stressed the 
President of INCB (…).  In this regard, Mr. Yans stressed that 
national laws, policies and practices in drug abuse 
prevention and control should be fully aligned with the 
conventions.  He further emphasized that States Parties 
have an obligation under the Conventions to ensure their full 
compliance with the conventions within their entire territory, 
including federated states and/or provinces.  
Mr. Yans recognized the commitment of the Government of 
the United States to resolve the contradiction between the 
federal and state levels in the implementation of that 
country’s obligations under the drug control conventions.  
The INCB President requested the Government of the United 
States to take the necessary measures to ensure full 
compliance with the international drug control treaties within 
the entire territory of the United States, in order to protect the 
health and well-being of its citizens202. 
This was the position adopted by the INCB in 2012 after the decision taken 
by several states of the United States to legalize cannabis for recreational 
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purposes. The case of the United States is particularly difficult to analyse, 
considering that the internal situation of many states is not consistent with 
the federal position at the international level203. Recreational consumption 
of marijuana for recreational purposes is legal in California, Alaska, 
Colorado, Maine, Massachusetts, Nevada, Michigan and Oregon, 
Washington State and Vermont. Additionally, other states such as New York 
are considering the adoption of similar measures. Likewise, more than 30 
States have already approved the use of marijuana for medical purposes 
which, although not prohibited by the international drug control conventions, 
is not universal within the country. 
However, at the federal level, cannabis use for recreational purposes is still 
prohibited204, which automatically makes the legalization of cannabis illegal 
also in the states that have legalized it. Even though the Federal 
Government has taken a lax attitude towards these states, leaving them to 
legislate on the matter without major intervention, the federal law enforcers 
could continue acting against any person or business related to the 
purchase and sale of cannabis for recreational purposes. This puts the 
United States in a position of theoretical international compliance with the 
three International Drug Control Conventions, given that, regardless of what 
happens in the individual states mentioned, in the country as a whole the 
use of cannabis for purposes other than medical and scientific remains 
prohibited. 
Notwithstanding the declaration of the INCB made in 2012 that condemned 
the approval in several States of the recreational use of marijuana, it is 
noteworthy that the Board, in subsequent reports, avoids mentioning the 
subject in a large measure. In 2012, the Board noted that it had received a 
commitment from the Federal Government to resolve the contradiction 
between the federal and state levels of the country's implementation under 
the drug control conventions. However, since that year the number of states 
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that have approved these measures has grown instead of decrease. INCB, 
in its annual report for 2017, only mentions that the Board continued to 
monitor the developments in the United States regarding the control of 
cannabis, including the initiatives taken at the level of the country’s 
constituent states to legalize cannabis for non-medical purposes through 
ballot initiatives”. It also states that “the United States saw increased 
domestic cultivation of cannabis leading to an overall increase in its 
availability”205.  
In view of this, the IDCR shows a clear flaw, given that, as mentioned, at 
the international level, the United States advocates for respect of the Three 
International Drug Control Conventions206 and at the federal level complies 
with the provisions contained therein, although nationally the situation is 
clearly evolving in a different way. 
 
8.1.2 Motivations for Cannabis legalization 
It is important to understand, in the case of the United States, the reasons 
why some States pursued the legalization of cannabis for recreational 
purposes. Motives like those of Uruguay and Canada related to public 
health and human rights have been argued. However, it can also be noted 
that the actions of the different states respond to the fact that, according to 
surveys conducted, 62% of the American population agrees with the 
legalization of cannabis, highlighting that 72% of young populations share 
their support for this initiative207. The implementation of popular measures 
                                                          
205 International Narcotic Control Board, ´IINCB Report 2017. (International Narcotic Control 
Board, 2018) Articles 187 and 488. <https://www.incb.org/incb/en/publications/annual-
reports/annual-report-2017.html> accessed 22 November 2018 
206 Michael Botticelli, ´Remarks to the Plenary Session of the 59th UN Commission on Narcotic 
Drugs´(Speech Delivered in the 59th Session of the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs, Vienna, 
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207 Hannah Hartig and Abigail Geiger, ´ About six-in-ten Americans support marijuana legalization´ 
(Facttank,  8 October 2018) <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/10/08/americans-
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is directly related to the popularity of politicians and benefits them in future 
elections. 
To the evident popular support that exists within the United States in relation 
to the legalization of cannabis for recreational and medical purposes, we 
must add the importance in financial terms that this measure represents. 
Per CNN208, and citing Tom Adams, director of BDS Analytics209, the legal 
cannabis industry obtained 9 billion dollars in sales in 2017, and that figure 
was expected to increase to 11,000 million in 2018 and 21,000 million by 
2021. Also, approximately 120,000 people work in the legal marijuana 
industry, and it is expected that by 2021 that number will reach 290,000 
people210. It is not surprising that there are both public and private interests 
interested in controlling the legal cannabis market in expansion, which are 
those that could use lobbies to obtain favourable legislation in this matter. 
Control of the market in terms of public health is also one of the reasons 
argued by many States legalizing cannabis. Each State decides what is 
most convenient and which limits it wants to impose on the cannabis 
industry. In general terms, states regulate from the seed of the crops to the 
sale of the dose. They do tests on the plants, examine the laboratories, 
establish regulations on substances, hygiene, places where cannabis is 
sold, etc. Each dose is labelled with the product information, which is also 
an advantage for consumers because people know what they are 
consuming, while in states where it is not regulated they have no idea what 
they will get. The argument is that consumers in states where marijuana is 
legalized can make less risky decisions and decide better. 
Another key aspect raised by the defenders of the legalization of cannabis 
in the United States is related to the crisis of opioids abuse and the 
                                                          
208 Aaron Smith, ´ The U.S. legal marijuana industry is booming´ (CNN, 31 January 2018) 
<https://money.cnn.com/2018/01/31/news/marijuana-state-of-the-union/index.html> accessed 
22 February 2018 
209 BDS Analytics produces the leading cannabis industry market trends reports, analyses and 
cannabis consumer research. <https://bdsanalytics.com/> 
210 Aaron Smith, ´La Industria de la Marihuana Legal en los Estados Unidos está en auge´.(CNN, 1 
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appearance and proliferation of new psychoactive substances211. In that 
sense, Hannah Hetzer, policy manager of the International Drug Policy 
Alliance, argues the following: 
“Something very interesting is that we have begun to see that 
in the states where medical and recreational marijuana was 
legalized, there was a reduction of overdose due to opioid 
(pain medication) consumption of 25 percent and 23 percent 
fewer hospitalizations for this reason. Marijuana could be used 
as a substitute for chronic pain and the consumption of other 
drugs, although it is a hypothesis we continue to study”212. 
Considering this, and although there is not enough data yet to support this 
hypothesis, there are many who argue that cannabis could be a much less 
harmful substance that could work as a replacement for the abuse of 
substances that are creating a considerable social problem in the United 
States. 
 
8.1.3 General considerations 
As has been explained, the legalization of cannabis for recreational 
purposes in some territories of the United States does not respond to a 
federal State policy. In that sense, we cannot speak, for the moment, of an 
interest of the Government to affect the IDCR through internal measures 
that go against the commitments of the country at the international level. 
Each of the states that has taken measures aimed at legalization have done 
so for independent reasons such as the popularity of the measure, aspects 
of public health, economic motivations considering the profitability of the 
business, the control of the market to avoid the crimes related to the illegal 
traffic of cannabis, among others. 
The INCB, for its part, has criticized the measures adopted by certain States 
of the country, requesting the Federal Government to work to eliminate the 
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contradictions existing at national and international level. However, it has 
not stated openly that the Federal Government is not fulfilling its 
commitments related to the three conventions. Notwithstanding the present 
situation that is occurring with the INCB, it is to be noted that international 
law does not allow a country to justify itself in the laws of one or several of 
its states to breach an international commitment, as demonstrated, for 
example, in the case of the LaGrand brothers, which confronted Germany 
and the United States213. 
This situation could lead one to think that, without having sought it, the 
United States has managed to adapt to a changing reality within its country, 
which is the legalization of cannabis for recreational purposes, continuing 
within the normative framework of the three conventions.  
However, this is an untenable situation over time, given that the more states 
continue with cannabis legalization policies, the harder it will be for the 
Federal Government to continue with this dichotomy in its speech. At the 
same time, should the number of states that have legalized the recreational 
use of cannabis grow, they could promote a change within federal policy, 
which would put the country in contempt of the 1961 Convention. 
 
8.2 Canada and its decision of non-compliance 
On the occasion of the entry into force of Bill C-45 which 
legalizes cannabis for non-medical purposes in Canada, 
the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) reiterates 
its regret at the adoption of this measure by the Government 
of Canada. 
                                                          
213 Yoshiyuki Lee-Iwamoto, ́  The Repercussions of the LaGrand Judgment: Recent ICJ Jurisprudence 
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The LaGrand case concerns two brothers of German nationality who were sentenced to death in 
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The legalization by Canada of cannabis for non-medical 
purposes is incompatible with the legal obligations 
incumbent on States Parties under the international drug 
control framework and is a violation of fundamental 
provisions of the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic 
Drugs, as amended by the 1972 Protocol, according to 
which State Parties have undertaken to limit the production, 
manufacture, export, import, distribution of, trade in, use 
and possession of drugs exclusively to medical and 
scientific purposes. 
Despite its statements to the contrary, INCB maintains that 
by moving forward with the legalization of cannabis for non-
medical purposes in disregard of its legal obligations and 
diplomatic commitments, the Government of Canada has 
contributed to weakening the international legal drug control 
framework and undermining the rules-based international 
order. 
Speaking on behalf of the Board, President Viroj Sumyai 
said: “While the Board is concerned about the impact of 
cannabis legalization in Canada on the international 
consensus embodied in the three United Nations drug 
control conventions and the related commitments made by 
the international community at the special session of the 
General Assembly in 2016, it is also deeply concerned 
about the public health impact of these policy choices on 
the health and welfare of Canadians, particularly youth.” 
The Board will remain engaged with the Government of 
Canada on this serious issue and will examine the matter 
at its 123rd session scheduled to take place from 30 
October to 16 November 2018214. 
The message given by the INCB regarding the legalization of cannabis for 
recreational purposes is extremely strong. Canada, despite all the notices 
given by the Board, decided to go against its international commitments 
assumed in the framework of the three conventions. Regardless of the 
motivations put forward by Canada, which will soon be analysed, it is 
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evident that, from a functional theory point of view, the restrictive regime 
against cannabis use is considered not to be efficient any more for Canada, 
which has led to internal changes that are having an enormous international 
repercussion. 
It is not an objective of this research to analyse the possible effectiveness 
or not of the policies undertaken by Canada in relation to the approach of 
the WDP. The time elapsed is very limited to be able to reach a conclusion 
about it. What it is sought to be determined is whether Canada could not 
have taken advantage of the flexibility of the three conventions before 
approving measures that flagrantly violated said instruments. 
The Canadian Cannabis Act215 seeks to control the production, distribution, 
sale and possession of cannabis in the country. Per the law that was 
approved, the Act seeks to keep cannabis out of the hands of youth; keep 
profits out of the pockets of criminals; protect public health and safety by 
allowing adults access to legal cannabis. 
According to the law, 
subject to provincial or territorial restrictions, adults who are 
18 years of age or older are legally able to: 
 possess up to 30 grams of legal cannabis, dried or equivalent 
in non-dried form in public 
 share up to 30 grams of legal cannabis with other adults 
 buy dried or fresh cannabis and cannabis oil from a 
provincially-licensed retailer  
 in provinces and territories without a regulated retail 
framework, individuals are able to purchase cannabis 
online from federally-licensed producers 
 grow, from licensed seed or seedlings, up to 4 cannabis 
plants per residence for personal use  
 make cannabis products, such as food and drinks, at home 
as long as organic solvents are not used to create 
concentrated products216 
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The issue of public health and human rights has had great relevance in 
relation to the decision of Canada to legalize cannabis for recreational use, 
violating in this way their commitments in relation to the three conventions. 
The theory behind this situation is that the control of the market by the 
Government will make sure that these narcotics are used responsibly.  
Supporters of legalization believe that a regulated market will 
offer a greater level of protection to vulnerable groups than the 
currently unregulated markets of today. One of the key 
benefits of legalization, believes is that it allows appropriate 
controls to be put in place over the price, availability (location, 
times of opening and age restrictions) It is precisely because 
drugs pose risks that they need to be appropriately regulated, 
especially for non-adults217. 
However, it is arguable to say that these acts alone will really suffice for 
public health not to be affected and for young people to have no access to 
cannabis. In countries where cannabis continues to be illegal, young 
people and children have access to this drug. Even in Canada, when 
restrictions were still enforced, vulnerable populations could buy cannabis 
on the black market. Legalization does not necessarily imply the 
disappearance of the black market. On the flip side, it is currently illegal to 
sell alcohol and tobacco to under 18s and under 16s respectively. Few 
would disagree though that today it is relatively easy for under-age children 
to purchase or gain access to these products at present from places like 
controlled licensed off sales218. 
As indicated above, this thesis does not seek to establish the possible 
effectiveness of the legalization of cannabis for recreational use. However, 
it is necessary to determine if the three conventions contain the necessary 
elements that allow to fight against the very threats that Canada is seeking 
to combat through the legalization of cannabis. As far as the fight against 
organized crime is concerned, simply turning the legal business into illegal 
does not mean that organized criminal groups will leave the business. 
There are even independent investigations that claim that several of the 
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main investors in the legal cannabis business are related to mafias and 
the black market.  
Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s primary objective 
when he moved to legalize recreational marijuana nationwide 
was to bring down the criminal organizations linked to black 
market pot commerce. But a recent report from the Canadian 
Broadcasting Corporation (CBC News) shows that some of 
the largest cannabis producers in the northern nation have 
mafia ties and connections to drug trafficking operations. It’s 
the first sign of how legalization could struggle to castrate the 
criminal underworld because there are still too many 
vulnerabilities allowing it to seep in through the cracks. 
(…) There is no denying that Canada still has a flourishing 
black market for cannabis, and it probably will for a while. For 
now, the majority of the problem stems from the shortage of 
legal weed the country has endured since day one. But 
Stephen Schneider, a criminologist at Saint Mary’s University, 
said last week that even after the shortage is remedied the 
black market will continue to thrive due to price and privacy 
concerns219. 
One of the main argued reasons for the legalization of cannabis, as we have 
seen, is that the black market would disappear. However, if there is a ban 
on consumption in certain sectors of society, the black market will continue. 
In that sense, children under 18 years will continue to demand cannabis, 
which can now be aquired not only through the black market controlled by 
the mafias but also by those who meet the requirements to access the legal 
market. Would it be wrong to think that an 18-year-old would deny sharing 
his cannabis with friends of 17 or 16 years? The answer is quite logical. 
On the other hand, a liberalization of consumption through legalization 
policies could also increase situations of violence. Alan Steel points out that, 
despite what has been pointed out by the defenders of legalization, many 
acts of violence, including murders, occur under the influence of drugs220. 
Similarly, an increase in the consumption of cannabis derived from the 
legalization of commercialization could also lead to public safety hazards if, 
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for example, people drive vehicles under the influence of marijuana or other 
drugs, as is already happening today with alcohol. It could be clearly argued 
that the legalization or control of the cannabis market would not necessarily 
increase consumption or the fact that people act negatively under its 
influence, but no data has been presented that would lead one to believe 
that legalization would prevent this from happening. 
Naturally, the legalization of cannabis in Canada is accompanied by an 
implementation plan through laws and regulations, all of which are easily 
accessible to the public221. And this implementation plan is accompanied by 
educational campaigns for prevention and awareness so that people, 
especially young people, understand the risks they incur when they 
consume cannabis. However, such campaigns do not really mean an 
innovation in relation to old Canadian policies related to cannabis use. 
Prevention and awareness have been present for decades. Similarly, there 
are similar campaigns related to the consumption of tobacco and alcohol, 
legal drugs, as well as drugs that continue to be illegal, such as new 
psychoactive substances, whose use has been growing exponentially in 
North America. 
These educational campaigns, which are presented as an integral part of 
the Canadian implementation plan for legalization of cannabis, are fully 
aligned with the regulatory framework of the three conventions, so, if 
considered "innovative", it would be within the normative framework of the 
IDCR. 
It has been argued many times that cannabis is less harmful than many 
drugs that were legal, such as alcohol and tobacco Following that point of 
view, there shouldn’t be any real reason why this drug should be illegal. 
Whether said affirmation is true or not, the States of the United Nations 
system agreed that cannabis would be used only for medical or scientific 
purposes. States cannot be selective when deciding which international 
                                                          
221 Government of Canada, ´Cannabis laws and regulations´ <https://www.canada.ca/en/health-




obligations to respect and which not. If Canada considered legalizing 
cannabis either for reasons of struggle against organized crime, public 
health, or simply due to financial considerations and to attract the vote of 
young populations, they could have acted in the same way as Bolivia, first 
trying to perform an amendment to the 1961 Convention or simply 
withdrawing from the convention and entering again with a reservation. As 
has been seen in detail in this thesis, Bolivia had already set a precedent in 
this regard, and Canada could have acted in a similar way so as not to be 
singled out and blamed openly not only by the INCB but by other members 
of the international community.  
 
8.3 Uruguay as a pioneer in cannabis legalization 
In December 2013, the Senate of Uruguay approved new 
legislation, previously approved by the lower legislative 
chamber, that allows the State to assume control over and 
regulate activities related to the importation, production, 
storage, sale or distribution of cannabis or its derivatives, or 
the acquisition of any title related thereto, under certain 
terms and conditions, for the purpose of nonmedical use. 
The regulations governing the implementation of this law 
were fleshed out in a presidential decree in May 2014. 
Sales of cannabis to consumers were delayed, however, 
owing to difficulties in implementing the law.  
Such sales are expected to start in 2015. The Board notes 
that this legislation is contrary to the provisions of the 
international drug control conventions, specifically article 4, 
paragraph (c), and article 36 of the 1961 Convention as 
amended by the 1972 Protocol and article 3, paragraph (1) 
(a), of the 1988 Convention.222 
 
In December 2013, Uruguay enacted a law to establish a legally regulated 
cannabis market. Although similar markets for cannabis had already been 
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established in several US states, no other country had legalized cannabis 
for both medical and non-medical use at the national level223. Officially, the 
government's plans were mainly motivated by concerns about crime, 
insecurity and public protection - with the logic that a legal cannabis market 
would overcome most of the activity currently carried out by organized crime 
groups and, consequently, the rates of violence would be reduced224. It is 
noteworthy that Uruguay's cannabis law follows the line of the countries 
historical approach to drug policy. Even during the dictatorship of 1973-
1985, the country was far from the highly punitive approaches of the "War 
on Drugs" that were being implemented in several other countries225. 
Although the dictatorship maintained strict condemnations for drug 
trafficking, in 1974 it decriminalized the possession of a minimum quantity 
of illicit substances, destined exclusively for personal consumption226. It was 
never exactly clarified what constituted that minimum quantity, which gave 
wide discretion to the judges in their interpretation. Throughout the years, 
the fact that Uruguayans could possess cannabis under the law, but could 
not legally acquire it, was constantly highlighted by civil society groups that 
put pressure in favour of legal forms of access to drugs. 
Bearing this in mind, the legislators of Frente Amplio (FA), the ruling party 
in Uruguay, decided at the beginning of the decade of 2010 to consider a 
bill that would legalize domestic cultivation of up to eight plants and 
possession of up to 25 grams of cannabis. Given this initiative, former 
president José Mujica took control of the situation and in June 2012 his 
government published a 15-point document entitled "Strategy for life and 
coexistence," which proposed the regulated and controlled legalization of 
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cannabis. Unlike the bill of Parliament to authorize the domestic cultivation 
of cannabis, President Mujica's proposal was to create a State monopoly on 
the production and distribution of cannabis227. 
Finally, Mujica's proposal and the measure that was already under 
discussion within the Uruguayan parliament were presented in a second bill 
before the Congress that allowed domestic cultivation, as well as the 
commercial sale and the "cannabis clubs" that allowed the consumers to 
grow in groups with State authorization. The bill was approved in the House 
of Representatives in July 2013, approved by the Senate in December and 
enacted into law on December 20, 2013. 
Per the National Drugs Board of Uruguay, the country applies its right to 
deploy an innovative experience while others defend the relevance of 
continuing to insist with repeatedly failed policies. The Board also points out 
that it is a political and cultural experience whose real impact on the life of 
Uruguayan society can be measured and appreciated in the medium term. 
Although it is an experience that is already being evaluated, the 
measurement and assessment of its impact requires a time not less than 4 
or 5 years228. 
Specifically, the cannabis law in Uruguay contains the following goals: 
1. Reduce violence linked to drugs through the elimination of 
black market cannabis. 
2. Promote public health through education and prevention 
campaigns. 
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3 Eliminate the legal paradox that allowed possession but 
blocked access to cannabis for consumers.229 230 
However, the INCB has a different position around the idea of public health 
that Uruguay seeks to defend. The Board, following the approval of the 
cannabis regulation law in that country, noted that  
"The Board is very concerned that the draft legislation 
currently being considered in Uruguay would, if adopted, 
legalize production, sale and cannabis for The President of 
INCB, Raymond Yans, stated that "this would be in 
contravention of the 1961 Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 
which has been adopted by 186 countries, including 
Uruguay." Mr. Yans added that "cannabis is controlled due 
to its dependence-producing potential "and that" the current 
development in Uruguay, if pursued, would have serious 
repercussions for public health, particularly for youth, and 
would be in violation of the United Nations international 
drug control treaties."231 
It should be noted that, unlike Canada, the cannabis legalization policy did 
not have majority popular support232. It was a State policy promoted by the 
Government. For this reason, public health motivations, as well as those 
related to security and safety, may be more credible than those appealed 
by the North American country. However, it has not been possible to 
determine, considering the existing literature and the results so far of the 
policies undertaken, if Uruguay carried out the necessary studies to ensure 
that the legalization of cannabis would have a positive effect on the health 
of the population, especially of consumers, as well as on safety and security. 
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8.3.1 Controversy regarding the results of the policy 
As noted, the Uruguayan authorities indicated that they would need a period 
of 4 to 5 years to be able to measure the effectiveness of this revolutionary 
policy. However, after that period, there are no clear studies by the 
Government that demonstrate either the success or failure of the measure. 
The national entity created to monitor and control cannabis in the country is 
the Cannabis Regulation and Control Institute. However, this entity does not 
seem to have received sufficient funds to be able to fulfil its mandate, and 
private investigations or conducted by the Government have not had the 
necessary funding either. 
“When funding is needed for research in Uruguay, scientists 
look to the Agencia Nacional de Investigación e Innovación 
(National Agency of Investigation and Innovation) which 
has a budget of $44 million. But the grants are highly 
competitive, and even if investigators meet all of the 
requirements, they can’t be assured they will get money for 
their proposals. Garcia said a proposal he submitted last 
year was deemed “excellent” by the agency, but “we didn’t 
get the financing, for lack of funds.” For the project, García 
proposed to chemically profile two cannabis sativa varieties 
as well as optimize the cannabinoid extraction process”233. 
 
Although it has not been possible to obtain reliable information regarding 
the impact on public health of the legalization of cannabis234, it is important 
to consider if there is information related to the impact on safety and drug 
trafficking. Despite the fact that, as has been pointed out, it is not the 
motivation of this thesis to establish the effectiveness of the policies that are 
not framed in the Three International Drug Control Conventions, it is to be 
noted that there is data that would demonstrate that Uruguay faces an 
increase in homicides linked to disputes between drug traffickers as a result 
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of the legalization of cannabis. Indeed, these policies have produced a 
decrease in part of the illicit drug market, which generates tensions over the 
control of the illicit points of sale, according to the research of Marcos 
Baudean, a researcher at the private University ORT, who monitors the 
impact of the law in the public security of the country235. 
It is estimated that the cannabis consumer market involves about 40 million 
dollars (about 34.5 million euros) per year in Uruguay, of which ten million 
have already passed into the legal sector of the economy. As Baudean 
points out, when so much money passes in such a short time to the legal 
market, someone must have been affected, and this is coinciding with a 
clear increase in disputes located in certain areas, generally in poor 
peripheral neighbourhoods of Montevideo, where drug trafficking has been 
installed236.  
In general terms, it does not appear that the liberalization of consumption in 
Uruguay has increased the consumption of marijuana in the country, which 
can be considered a point in favour of the measure. In Uruguay, there are 
four official records of drug use made in the last two decades. The National 
Household Surveys on Drug Consumption were conducted in 2001, 2006, 
2011 and 2014 by the Uruguayan Drugs Observatory237. Together, these 
surveys show a sustained increase in the consumption of psychoactive 
substances during the 2000s in Uruguay. As of 2017, the figures show a 
slight growth in cannabis consumption in Uruguay, following the trend 
described. However, other drugs such as cocaine, which continue to be in 
a restrictive regime, also suffered an increase in consumption. In this sense, 
and contrary to what the detractors of the measure adopted by Uruguay 
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pointed out, there is no concrete data that demonstrate that a regulated 
market will increase drug consumption. 
However, this simple fact does not represent a justification for Uruguay to 
violate its international commitments. Being able to demonstrate that the 
policy of legalizing cannabis yielded results that demonstrated an 
improvement in the quality of life, in public safety, in security, etc., could 
have been accompanied by a declaration that Uruguay was fulfilling its 
commitments related to the respect and improvement of the human rights 
of its citizens. However, this situation has not occurred. Even though, unlike 
in Canada, the philanthropic motivations of the Uruguayan government are 
more credible, so far, no evidence has been presented showing that 
Uruguay was in the need to abandon the three conventions as if these 
instruments were no longer providing an adequate legal framework to 
address comprehensively the drug issue in the country. 
 
8.4 General remarks 
The Netherlands was the first country in the world to generate a regulated 
cannabis market in the late 70s by not prosecuting its purchase in some 
establishments (coffee shops) and allowing the cultivation of plants at home. 
According to the European Monitoring Center for Drugs and Drug Addiction, 
in 2017 this country showed a level of cannabis use in the last year of 8.7% 
in the population between 15 and 64 years, a figure higher than the 
European average but lower than prohibitionist countries such as France 
(11.1%), Spain (9.5%), Czech Republic (9.4%) or Italy (9.2%)238. 
For its part, within the American continent, the cradle of the War on Drugs, 
there is also a diversity of situations. In the northern hemisphere, the United 
States continues to be the largest consumer of cannabis in the world. Per 
the United Nations World Drug Report (2017), 16.5% of the US population 
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between 15 and 64 years of age reported having used cannabis in the last 
year, compared to 14.7% of Canadians. In the southern hemisphere, the 
proportion of Chileans who report having consumed in the last year 
increased from 11.3% in 2014 to 14.5% in 2016, while in Uruguay this figure 
increased from 9.3% in 2014 to 15,4% in 2017239. In short, per the same 
measuring instrument as the general prevalence surveys, the world 
experience indicates that neither the legal prohibition nor the regulation 
regimes guarantee a higher or lower level of consumption. Therefore, it 
cannot be argued that any of the strategies is more successful in terms of 
demand control. 
If a country wishes to construct a legal domestic cannabis 
market, it has two choices which would stay within current 
international law. One is the path taken by Bolivia with 
respect to legalizing its domestic market in coca leaves: to 
denounce the relevant treaty or treaties, and re-accede with 
a reservation concerning cannabis (…) The other path is to 
legalize cannabis in its weaker forms. The cannabis which 
is controlled under the 1961 Convention is defined as the 
flowering or fruiting tops of the cannabis plant (excluding 
the seeds and leaves when not accompanied by the tops) 
from which the resin has not been extracted, by whatever 
name they may be designated240. 
The Three International Drug Control Conventions offer a wide range of 
possibilities for States to apply different drug control strategies. For 
example, while Peru and Thailand have obtained great results through 
alternative development programs to control illicit crops, other countries 
have preferred to implement harsh strategies of forced eradication. Two 
strategies of crops control very different from each other, but both framed in 
the three conventions. Regarding consumption, Portugal demonstrated that 
there was a way to reinterpret the conventions in such a way that highly 
innovative strategies could be applied that marked a before and after in the 
matter of drug control, but still without breaking (although stretching) the 
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normative framework. And if any strategy to be applied could not be 
introduced in the normative framework of the three conventions, Bolivia, a 
small Andean country, had already set an important precedent in relation to 
the importance of staying within the normative framework of the IDCR, 
having withdrawn and then re-acceding the Single Convention of 1961 with 
a reservation. 
Considering what has been pointed out, and with the examples mentioned 
above, there is no real reason that justifies why Canada and Uruguay, and 
to a certain extent the United States, have initiated drug control strategies 
that represent a violation of their international commitments in matters of 
drug control. Again, it is not the intention of this thesis to judge the 
effectiveness or not of the policies undertaken by these countries, although 
the subject of public health and the fight against organized crime, as 
indicated above, do not seem to have much support. However, the most 
logical step would have been to follow the path taken by Portugal to look for 
strategies framed in the relevant international instruments on the subject, to 
have withdrawn from the conventions, or simply to bring to international 
debate the need to review the cannabis control regime, which, although it 
would involve a long and arduous work of politics and diplomacy, would not 
imply an open contempt for the commitments assumed voluntarily. 
The Three International Drug Control Conventions have the ultimate goal of 
the welfare and health of humanity. The provisions of these instruments, 
supplemented by other agreements such as the United Nations Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) or the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), offer a sufficiently broad legal 
framework to address aspects of health, safety, human rights, among 
others, related to the World Drug Problem. The countries that have opted 
for the legalization of cannabis for recreational purposes have gone against 






This thesis has sought to address the current situation of the International 
Drug Control Regime to understand how the three International Drug 
Control Conventions may or may not adapt to the new needs and realities 
of the States. As it was observed during the historical review of this 
research, the different international drug control regimes have been adapted 
over the centuries to the different interests of the governments, 
fundamentally of the dominant powers, which have often imposed their own 
vision of the regimes. It has been observed, for example, how during the 
Opium War economy and trade were two of the main motivations that led 
the British Empire to impose its interests on China, even though opium 
consumption in Great Britain was forbidden for a long time. In the same way, 
we find that economic interests might still be behind the motivations of 
different countries to legalize cannabis for recreational purposes.  
It is remarkable to note that since the Opium War, moral and public health 
aspects have already been established as an excuse to seek to apply 
different policies on drugs. The specific case refers to the Chinese Empire, 
which sought to prohibit the consumption of opium in that country, arguing 
the damage it did to its population, even though this justification was also 
used to hide the economic and commercial issues that China had related to 
general trade with the United Kingdom.  
The Opium War and its consequences determined the way in which drug 
policies would be established worldwide until new interests and new actors 
(and new drugs) appeared. An example of this is how the United States and 
companies from that country were frequent consumers of cocaine and 
products made from coca leaf. Nevertheless, after society began noting the 
negative effects of drug addiction, "politicians, religious leaders, 
pharmacists, doctors, and journalists spoke out for tighter controls on drug 
use"241.  
                                                          




Thus, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the moral and public health 
arguments related to the drug problem began to be stronger than economic 
interests, even though the United Kingdom and the Royal Commission on 
Opium continued to defend their right to market and profit from this product. 
However, the current regime began to take shape precisely at the time when 
people´s concerns, whether religious or otherwise, took precedence over 
economic interests. The Single Convention of 1961, that gives formal and 
legal initiation to the current IDCR, starts by saying that the parties were 
concerned about the health and welfare of mankind. However, economic 
interests were never completely set aside, as was observed during the 
negotiation of the Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971. The 
regime of strict control of cannabis, opium and coca leaf of 1961 was 
promoted by the developed countries that wanted to establish greater 
security measures on the crops that were found mainly in the developing 
countries. However, the 1971 convention faced strong lobbying from 
pharmaceutical companies in developed countries, which feared that 
control measures that had not been included in the 1961 convention would 
result in economic losses.  
 
9.1 The War on Drugs does not imply the failure of the regime nor the 
necessity to change it 
The War on Drugs undertaken and financed by the United States and 
supported at the time by many international actors, is based mainly on 
stipulations of the three International Drug Control Conventions. That is, 
these instruments gave a legal framework to the repressive policies 
undertaken throughout the decades of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. The 
result of these policies, as has already been seen in this thesis, did not bring 
the international community closer to solve the World Drug Problem 
compared to 1961. However, this situation cannot serve as a justification for 
questioning the whole regime, considering that the punitive and even 
repressive aspects of drug policies are only part of the provisions of the 
conventions, which also consider others such as prevention, public health 
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and the general welfare of humanity. War on Drugs did not comprehensively 
consider all possibilities provided by the conventions. 
There is no doubt that the IDCR allows restrictive and punitive policies. 
However, it also has allowed policies that are considered innovative, such 
as alternatives to incarceration, social reintegration, palliative treatments, 
the decriminalization of consumption, the reduction of harm, among others. 
For example, the three conventions do not forbid the death penalty for drug 
related crimes, which is one of the main criticisms of actors such as the EU, 
but the conventions also do not oblige States to apply it. These instruments 
simply state that punishments must be proportionate to the crime, granting 
sufficient flexibility to the States to determine what a proportional response 
means. 
The reason why many of these non-restrictive or non-punitive policies are 
considered innovative is simply because States have not implemented them 
so far, but not because they were not included within the normative 
framework of the three conventions. If one starts from the fact that the 
objective of the international drug control regime continues to be the welfare 
of humanity, then definitely the three conventions continue to provide 
sufficient margin for States to develop different strategies. The 
decriminalization of possession, acquisition and cultivation for personal use 
works reasonably conveniently within the limits of the three conventions. 
Harm reduction services, including drug consumption rooms, also work 
legitimately within the framework of the regime. All these are strategies used 
in recent years by those States that prioritize the social and public health 
aspects of the WDP and have produced positive results. It is possible to 
provide health and social support instead of imposing a punishment on 
people involved in minor drug offenses related to personal use or socio-
economic needs. Likewise, the conventions allow but do not oblige the 





9.2 The International Drug Control Regime allows new responses and 
developments towards addressing the World Drug Problem 
Especially since 2000, some State Parties have taken advantage of the 
flexibility of the regime, reinterpreting the provisions of the three 
conventions, to apply even more innovative strategies in relation to their 
own interests. And they have done it without the need to break with the 
regime, despite having been close many times. When the conventions were 
negotiated and established, the idea of harm reduction programs, such as 
those related to intravenous drug use in which the State grants drug addicts 
alternative substances to control addiction, was not imaginable. Today, 
many countries of Western Europe and Oceania have been applying them 
in direct coordination with the INCB. The regime has also been liberalized 
around the possession and personal cultivation of controlled substances 
such as cannabis, even though the INCB still resists to accept these trends 
since they can lead to the establishment of a controlled market. In other 
cases, State policies have interpreted the limits of the treaties even more 
loosely, for example through the introduction of drug consumption rooms 
developed by European countries such as Germany to control the spread 
of diseases by injectable drugs, providing syringes financed by the 
Government. 
There is a high range of possibilities for Member States, and most of these 
possibilities are not mandatory. As we have seen throughout this thesis, 
those provisions that are mandatory for States are really limited to very 
specific areas, such as ensuring that controlled substances and their 
precursors are used only for medical and scientific purposes, avoiding its 
deviation. In this same line, the IDCR seeks to ensure enough availability of 
these controlled substances for medical purposes, for which the INCB plays 





9.3 The International Drug Control Regime based on the three 
Conventions, provides flexibility regarding to its implementation, 
whenever limited  
As it was explained in chapter 3 of this thesis, the flexibility of a regime has 
limits, which are determined by the fundamental principles and norms that 
are at the core of the international regime, around which the expectations 
of the actors converge and that determine which practices will be 
considered legitimate and acceptable. If the practice is consistent with the 
fundamental core of principles and norms, then it can be considered within 
acceptable limits. If, on the contrary, a practice does not completely follow 
the main principles and norms but there is space for reinterpretation, it can 
be considered that States are making use of the margins of flexibility of the 
international regime. In this case, however, both the limits and the margins 
of flexibility of an established regime must be determined in each specific 
case, considering the practice a State wants to apply. This way, the practice 
can only be considered as a deviation or can lead to rupture, when the limits 
of flexibility of an international regime are crossed. 
Considering the different case studies that have been analysed in this 
thesis, and per Constanza Sánchez Avilés, in her PhD thesis on the drug 
control regime in Spain, it can be noted that within the limits of flexibility of 
the regime, there are different political options that suppose a deviation, 
meaning that they do not imply a level of adherence and total fulfilments of 
the regime but neither a total rupture of their limits of flexibility. These 
deviations can be tolerated or objected by the institutions responsible for 
monitoring compliance with the regime, but States can justify their location 
within the margins of flexibility based on arguments related to ambiguity, 
capacity and adaptation to changing conditions. Therefore, depending on 
the degree of adherence to the principles and norms of the fundamental 
nucleus of the regime, Constanza Sánchez Avilés differentiates between 
three types of policies and practices: 1) those that comply with the 
acceptable level, whose adherence to the core is out of the question (in the 
case of the IDCR, INCB and CND would be the entities in charge of 
determining what is acceptable inside the regime); 2) those that deviate, 
161 
 
whose degree of adherence to the core is questioned but that move within 
the generally accepted margins of flexibility of the regime; and 3) policies 
and practices that do not comply with this fundamental core, which go 
beyond the regime's limits of flexibility and which, therefore, are not 
acceptable242. 
On the other hand, following Constanza Sánchez Avilés remarks in relation 
to the impact that State practices and policies may have on the stability or 
on prospects of change of an international regime, and taking into account 
the degree of acceptance or disagreement shown by the members of the 
regime and the institutions responsible for monitoring compliance, we will 
find policies and practices that can be qualified as: 1) those that strengthen 
the international regime, located within the acceptable limits of adherence 
and therefore promoted and accepted by the members and bodies 
responsible for monitoring compliance; 2) those that erode the regime, 
criticized and questioned within it, which in turn are divided into two types: 
mild eroding, including those that imply a questioned deviation although, in 
general, admitted by the institutions of the regime; and serious eroding, 
given that they represent a deviation strongly objected by members and 
institutions, but solidly justified by national decision-makers; and, finally, 3) 
those which go beyond the limits of flexibility of the regime and, therefore, 
are inadmissible by the agencies in charge of monitoring compliance, 
although sometimes the States try to justify their location within the margins 
of regime flexibility. 
The flexibility provided by the three conventions and the International Drug 
Control Regime is facing currently serious and unprecedented challenges 
since its formal establishment in 1961, one of them clearly related to the fact 
that there is no space for free or controlled market for cannabis or other 
drugs for recreational purposes. It is no longer just an adaptation and 
reinterpretation of the three International Drug Control Conventions, but a 
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direct attempt by certain States notably to break with what is stipulated in 
the legally binding documents. 
 
9.4 The flexibility of the three conventions is continuously put into 
practice  
Throughout this thesis, it has been sought to determine how flexible the 
three International Drug Control Conventions are considering the different 
responses State Parties want to give to the WDP. It has not been necessary 
to carry out an in-depth analysis of those countries that apply policies that 
strengthen the current IDCR, considering that the number of States that 
seek to limit the use of narcotic drugs for medical and scientific purposes 
continues to be a majority, applying a high range of possibilities allowed by 
the three conventions to do so. In this line, States apply restrictive 
measures, such as deprivation of liberty, or more permissive measures in 
relation to the demand and consumption, considering the wide freedom that 
the three conventions give for it. The analysis carried out in this thesis on 
the alternatives to incarceration clearly demonstrated that the three 
conventions require States to implement measures aimed at controlling 
drug related crimes, allowing them to determine which acts are considered 
crimes or not according to domestic legislation, as well as to determine 
which responses are proportional to the crimes committed. Consumption 
might be a crime in some States and not in others, both circumstances being 
allowed by the conventions. 
 
9.4.1 Flexibility facing tough cases 
The cases of Bolivia, the United States, Uruguay and Canada are probably 
the most direct examples of eroding policies, that is, those that do not fit 
within the core of the regime nor can they move within the margins of 
flexibility of it. The great difference shown in these cases is the way in which 




As has been shown in this thesis, Bolivia set a precedent within the IDCR 
by having withdrawn from the Single Convention of 1961 with the sole 
objective of returning to that instrument with a reservation that would allow 
the country to continue with the cultivation of coca leaf for traditional 
purposes. Indeed, Bolivia took a high risk, given that there was a possibility 
that the States parties to the regime would not accept this reservation, which 
would have left Bolivia outside a regime that did not want to leave. However, 
due to diplomatic work, or simply due to lack of interest from other States 
parties, the Bolivian reservation was accepted. The consequences of this 
act should not be understood only in relation to the cultivation of the coca 
leaf; the Bolivian example served to establish further flexibility even beyond 
the perceived limits of former flexibility of the IDCR. 
The example established by Bolivia clearly indicates that, when a country 
does not wish to continue complying with certain provisions of the three 
international conventions, there is a way forward. It is not necessary to 
violate the conventions to establish innovative strategies. In this sense, if 
there are countries that wish to apply measures such as the legalization of 
cannabis for recreational purposes, they should denounce the 1961 
convention to seek re-entry with a reservation. However, as it is seen today, 
this has not happened. The United States, on the one hand, excuses itself 
arguing that its federal policy continues to be in accordance with the 
provisions of the three conventions, although some states, increasingly, are 
opting to allow the recreational commercialization of cannabis. Canada and 
Uruguay, for their part, do not directly refer to a violation of the three 
conventions, although this is evident, but they argue that their policies are 
in line with their commitments on human rights and security that must be 
provided to their populations. 
This situation generates a problem within the IDCR. If the Bolivian State, 
landlocked country in the middle of the Andes could follow the established 
procedures to generate a situation that allows it to go against essential 
provisions of the three conventions, there is no reason or justification for 
Canada and Uruguay for not following the same path. And, as has been 
pointed out, this situation generated by Bolivia is part of the current flexibility 
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of the regime that did not exist two decades ago but which nowadays, due 
to the established precedent, generates a new opportunity. 
Naturally, the example set by Bolivia has limits, and cannot become a tool 
used by a considerable number of parties, since that would undermine the 
integrity of the regime. The Bolivian case can be considered as part of the 
flexibility of the regime if only a minority of States decide to act this way. 
While the international community continues to believe that cannabis should 
not be used for recreational purposes, it can be said that the regime is 
increasingly believed by a growing number of States to be flexible enough 
to accommodate new needs. However, should other States decide to apply 
measures like those of Canada, Uruguay and the United States, the regime 
would face a larger crisis. 
This leads to question whether the countries wishing to legalize drugs for 
recreational purposes are concerned about maintaining the integrity of the 
IDCR. Regrettably, due to specific issues of the regime that were already 
explained, the only consequence that has occurred regarding the violation 
of the international drug control system is the blaming and shaming by the 
INCB and other States parties. Although a different path could have followed 
such as the establishment of a reservation, at present the message that 
Canada, Uruguay and to some extent the United States are giving is that 
the IDCR can be violated with impunity. It should be noted that if these 
countries consider that the current regime is not effective, they should 
promote a broad dialogue within the CND and the United Nations that 
includes the possibility of reforming international conventions, especially in 
relation to cannabis. However, this has not happened, at least not officially. 
But as has been defended throughout this research work, the IDCR is 
constantly evolving. And the perceptions, interests and needs of States 
have also evolved. What must be asked is if the regime has really evolved 
to a breaking point, and which are the real motivations of those States that 
are willing to break it. For example, there is a growing perception that the 
interventions of drug users should be done by physical and mental health 
professionals instead of drug enforcers. The repressive laws have not had 
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the desired effect during the so-called War on Drugs, and the voices 
advocating for drugs to be treated more as a public health problem than as 
a security problem are growing. New and innovative strategies that many 
countries are defending increasingly point to decriminalization.  
It is at this point that a clear difference must be made, since the 
decriminalization of consumption is not the same as the decriminalization of 
drugs. While, as demonstrated in the Portuguese case, the 
decriminalization of consumption can enter within the flexibility of the three 
conventions that this thesis defends, the decriminalization of drugs or a 
specific drug goes against the international commitments established in the 
three conventions. Interestingly, the strategies promoted by Portugal that 
do fit within the IDCR have shown very positive results and have brought 
Portugal closer to winning its own "War on Drugs", if we understand this 
term in a broader sense and not only in the establishment of punitive 
measures. On the other hand, the "innovative" strategies undertaken by 
Uruguay, some states of the United States and by Canada, do not yield 
positive results at least in the short term, as the INCB has been pointing out. 
While it is true that it is still early to make an adequate analysis of the 
consequences of these policies, what remains clear is that all the 
possibilities offered by the IDCR have not yet been exhausted before using 
strategies that go against the regime. 
The case of Portugal, presented in this thesis, shows that there is space to 
reinterpret the conventions and the regime, without having to break with it. 
Portugal defended for a long time the logic of the policies that it wanted to 
apply and embarked on a long process of dialogue with the INCB that 
culminated in a transcendental change in terms of how to understand the 
IDCR, not only for the "watchdog" but also by all the members of the regime. 
Portugal showed that quite liberal policies on consumption could coexist 
worldwide in the IDCR with highly restrictive policies applied in other 
countries, which demonstrates, once again, the flexibility of the regime.  
The path taken by Portugal, like Bolivia, was not easy, and those countries 
had to face great resistance at the international level to continue maintaining 
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its policies, which at the time could have been classified as against the 
provisions of the conventions. However, the Portuguese strategy modified, 
in a certain way, the way of understanding the core of the regime, and it was 
demonstrated that these policies could go hand in hand with the objectives 
established in international conventions, given that essential elements such 
as the prohibition on marketing, tight control of production and limiting the 
use of narcotic drugs for medical and scientific use continued to be applied. 
The IDCR is not perfect, and it is necessary for the Member States to 
constantly discuss it. It is the reason why the CND meets once a year in 
Vienna. However, the regime, so far, has not proven to be obsolete; on the 
contrary, the three international conventions have managed to survive for 
so long because they have demonstrated a capacity to adapt to new needs 
of the States. That is, they have been flexible enough to accommodate new 
strategies. And when it seemed that such flexibility was not enough, as in 
the Portuguese or Bolivian case, ways were found to accommodate national 
interests. However, it is recognized that many of the objectives established 
by the IDCR, such as achieving a drug-free society, eliminating demand, 
offering, money laundering linked to drug offenses, eliminating trafficking in 
precursors, among others, can be considered utopic, especially because 
since the establishment of the 1961 single convention they have not made 
much progress.  
Nevertheless, the IDCR should be understood as a set of norms that should 
guide the actions of the States toward a common objective in the matter of 
drugs, whether these objectives are feasible or not. It is worrisome that 
some years ago, States were committed to eliminating drug abuse, while 
today they are willing to tolerate them and even to organize very lucrative 
businesses around them, such as the controlled cannabis market. The 
current drug control regime has evolved and will continue to evolve, this is 
also part of its flexibility. However, a serious discussion must clearly be 
organized in relation to the future of the regime, given the flagrant violations 






 Bancroft A, ´Drugs, intoxication and society´ (Polity Press 
2009)Garat G, El camino: Como se reguló el Cannabis en Uruguay 
según sus actores políticos y sociales. (Junta Nacional de Drogas 
and Friedrich Ebert Foundation 2015)   
 Beare M, Critical reflections on transnational organized crime, 
money laundering and corruption (University of Toronto Press 
Incorporated 2003) 
 Chase D, Ending the War on Drugs: a solution for America. (Bridge 
Works 1998) 
 Chepesiuk R, The War on Drugs: An International Encyclopedia. 
(ABC-CLIO 1999). 
 Courtwright D, Dark Paradise: A history of Opiate Addiction in 
America. (Harvard University Press 1982). 
 De Greiff P (ed). ´Drugs and the Limits of Liberalism. Moral and 
Legal Issues. (Cornell University Press 1999) 
 Dikötter F, Laaman L and Xun Z, Narcotic Culture, A History of 
Drugs in China (Hurst and Company 2004) 
 Garcia J, Cocaine. (Salem Press Encyclopedia of Health 2015)  
 Gelber H, Opium, soldiers and evangelicals Britain's 1840-42 war 
with China, and its aftermath. (Palgrave Macmillan 2004) 
 Gifford D, Hoggarth P and Flores A, Carnival and coca leaf: some 
traditions of the Peruvian Quechua Ayllu (Scottish Academic Press 
1976) 
 Gootenberg P, Cocaine: Global Histories (Routledge, 1999) 
 Hanson G, Venturelli P and Fleckenstein A, Drugs and Society. (12 
edn, Jones & Bartlett Learning 2015) 
 Hillermann U, Asian Empire and British Knowledge. (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2009) 
 Keohane R and Nye J, Power and interdependence. (Little Brown 
1977) 
 Knutsen T, A history of international relations theory (3rd edn, 
Manchester University Press 2016) 
 Krasner S, International Regimes. (Cornell University Press 1983) 
 Kydd A, International relations theory: the game-theoretic approach. 
(Cambridge University Press 2015) 
 Mallea P, The War on Drugs: A failed experiment. (Dundurn 2014) 




 Morgan W, Drugs in America: a social History” (Syracuse University 
Press 1981) 
 Olson D, Nixon's War on Drugs: The Daddy Rabbit of Frauds. 
(Strategic Book Publishing & Rights Agency 2013) 
 Pemnny Green, Drugs, Trafficking and Criminal Policy: The 
Scapegoat Strategy (Waterside Press 1998) 
 Reichel P and Albanese J (eds): Handbook of Transnational Crime 
and Justice. Edited by REICHEL, Philip and ALBANESE, Jay 
(SAGE 2014) 
 Rudy D and Orcutt J (eds), Drugs, alcohol, and social problems 
(Rowman & Littlefield 2003) 
 Sanello F and Hans T, Opium Wars: The addiction of One Empire 
and the Corruption of Another. (Sourcebooks, 2002) 
 Sharp E, The Dilemma of Drug Policy in the United States. (Harper 
Collins College Publishers 1994) 
 Smith P (ed), El combate a las Drogas en América (Fondo de 
Cultura Económica 1993) 
 Stevens W, Desafíos para América Latina. (Aguilar Editorial 1999) 
 Stokke O, Disaggregating International Regimes: A New Approach 
to Evaluation and Comparison (MIT Press 2012) 
 Walz K, Theory of International Politics (Addison-Wesley 1979) 
 Zalewski M, Smith Sand Booth K, International theory: positivism 
and beyond (Cambridge University Press 1996) 
 Zhang Y,  Second Opium War. (Salem Press Encyclopedia 2013) 




 Ahmad Qureshi W, ´The Manufacturing and Trafficking of Narcotics: 
An Overview of Global Laws´ (2016) 50 (4) JMLR 813 
 Arp B, ´Denunciation Followed by Re-Accession with Reservations 
to a Treaty: A Critical Appraisal of Contemporary State 
Practice´(2014) 61(2), NILR 141 
 Ayuso Quiñones L. ´La guerra contra las drogas, guerra contra los 
pobres: Aspectos Socioeconómicos de la Políticas Pública´. (2006) 
75 (4) Revista Jurídica Universidad de Puerto Rico 1411 
 Bagley B, ´The evolution of drug trafficking and organized crime in 
Latin America´ (2013) 71 SPP 99 
 Bewley-Taylor D, ´Challenging the UN drug control conventions: 
problems and possibilities´ (2013)  14(2) IJDP 171 
169 
 
 Boister N, ´Commentary on the United Nations Convention against 
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances UN 
Publication´ (2001) 50(2) ICLQ 466 
 Boister N, ´Waltzing on the Vienna Consensus on Drug Control: 
Tensions in the International System for the Control of Drugs´ 
(2016) 29(2) LJIL 389 
 Boyle A, ´Some Reflections on the Relationship of Treaties and Soft 
Law´ (1999)  48(4) BIICL 902 
 Candice Bowling C and Glantz S, ´Conflict of Interest Provisions in 
State Laws Governing Medical and Adult Use Cannabis´ (2019) 
109 (3) AJPH 423 
 Chan P, ´China's Approaches to International Law since the Opium 
War´. (2014) 27(4) LJIL 859 
 Collins J, ´Losing UNGASS? Lessons from civil society, past and 
present (2017)  17(2) DAT 88 
 Corkill D, ´Aspects of Portugal's economic development during the 
late Estado Novo´ (2003) 2(1) PJSS 61 
 Coomber R, McElrath K, Measham F and Moore K. ´Key Concepts 
in Drugs and Society´ (SAGE 2013) 
 Cruz J, Boidi M and Queirolo R, ´The status of support for cannabis 
regulation in Uruguay 4 years after reform: Evidence from public 
opinion surveys´ (2018) 37 DAR 429 
 Da Agra C, ´Requiem pour la guerre à la drogue: L’expérimentation 
portugaise de décriminalisation´(2009) 33(1) Déviance et Société 
27 
 Denney A, ´Judge: DEA, Not Courts, May Be Better Forum to 
Challenge Cannabis Policy´(2018)  259(31) NYLJ 1 
 Dias M and  de Vargas D. ´Harm Reduction: an alternative to the 
failure of the War on Drugs´. (2015)  20(1) Cogitare Enfermagem 
205 
 Donnelly J, ´International Human Rights: A Regime Analysis. (1986) 
40(3) International Organization 599 
 Dupont A, ´Transnational Crime, Drugs, and Security in East Asia´ 
(1999) 39(3) Asian Survey 433 
 Evans M, Helland R and Klick J, ´The Developmental Effect of 
States Alcohol prohibitions at the turn of the twentieth century´ 
(2016) 54(2) Economic Inquiry 762 
 Feige C and Miron J, ´The opium wars, opium legalization and 
opium consumption in China´. (2014) 15(12) AEL 911 
 Ghiabi M, `Spirit and being: interdisciplinary reflections on drugs 
across history and politics` (2018) 39(2) TWQ 207 
170 
 
 Goldmann M, ´We Need to Cut Off the Head of the King: Past, 
Present, and Future Approaches to International Soft Law´ (2012) 
25(2) LJIL 335 
 Gonçalves R,  Lourenço A and Nogueira da Silva S, ´A social cost 
perspective in the wake of the Portuguese strategy for the fight 
against drugs´ (2015) 26(2) IJDP 200 
 Haggard S and Simmons B, ´Theories of international regimes´ 
(1987) 41(3) International Organization 491 
 Jelsma, Martin, `UNGASS 2016: Prospects for Treaty Reform and 
UN System-Wide Coherence on Drug Policy` (2017) 10(1) Journal 
of Drug Policy Analysis 1 
 Krasner S, `Structural causes and regime consequences: Regimes 
as intervening variables` (2012) 20(42) Revista de Sociologia e 
Politica 93 
 Lee-Iwamoto Y, ´The Repercussions of the LaGrand Judgment: 
Recent ICJ Jurisprudence of Provisional Measures´ (2012) 55 JYIL 
237  
 Moore L and Elkavich A, ´Who's Using and Who's Doing Time: 
Incarceration, the War on Drugs, and Public Health´. (2016) 98(5) 
AJPH 176  
 Nickerson J,  Pettus K and Wheeler K, `Access to controlled 
medicines for anesthesia and surgical care in low-income countries: 
a narrative review of international drug control systems and 
policies` (2017) 64(3) Canadian Journal of Anesthesia 296   
 Hasenclever A, Mayer P and Rittberge V, ´Integrating Theories of 
International Regimes´ (2000)  26(1) RIS 3 
 Hasenclever A, Mayer P and Rittberge V, `Interests, Power, 
Knowledge: The Study of International Regimes` (1996) 40(2) 
Mershon International Studies Review 177 
 Kinfelman P, ´The second Casualty of War: Civil Liberties and The 
War on Drugs´ (1992) 66(4) SCLR 1389 
 Paoli L, Greenfield V and Reuter P. ´Change is Possible: The 
History of the IDCR and Implications for Future Policymaking´. 
(2012) 47(8-9) SUM 923 
 Pascual F and Sánchez C, ´Uso y mal uso de los fármacos 
opioides para el tratamiento del dolor´ (2019) 19 (1) HaA 31 
 Pfeiffer S, ´Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the IDCR: The Case 
of Traditional Coca Leaf Chewing´ (2013) 5(1) GJIL 287 
 Redford A and Powell B, ´Dynamics of Intervention in the War on 
Drugs: The Buildup to the Harrison Act of 1914´.(2016)  20(4) 
Independent Review 509 
 Richards J, ´Opium and the British Indian Empire: The Royal 
Commission of 1895´. (2002)  36(2) MAS 378 
171 
 
 Ridel B, ´I'd like to make a reservation: Bolivian coca control and 
why the United Nations should amend the Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs (2017) 49 (3) GWILR 711 
 Room R, ´Legalizing a market for cannabis for pleasure: Colorado, 
Washington, Uruguay and beyond´ (2014) 109 (3) Addiction 345 
 Samper E, `UNGASS 2016 y el nuevo paradigma sobre el 
problema mundial de las drogas` (2017) 29(2) Revista Desafìos 
353 
 Shaffer G and Pollack M, ´Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, 
Complements, and Antagonists in International Governance´ (2009) 
94(3) MLR 706 
 Steel A, ´Regaining control: a critique of drug legalisation policies´ 
(2006) 6(1) DAT 19 
 Sweeney R, ´Unrealistic expectations: the federal government’s 
unachievable mandate for state cannabis regulation’ (2018) 94(4), 
WLR 2175 
 Telleria Escobar L, ´Bolivia y la despenalización de la hoja de coca 
como estrategia de cambio´ (2013) 13 RLES 95 
 Thoumi F, ´The IDCR’s straight jacket: are there any policy 
options?´ (2010) 13(1) TIOC 76 
 Witton J and O´Reilly J, ´News and Notes: Bolivia to withdraw from 
UN Single Convention´(2011) 106(19), Addiction 1877. 
 Wood M, ´Institutional Aspects of the Guide to Practice on 
Reservations´(2013) 24(4) EJIL 1099 
 Wright H, ´The International Opium Commission´. (2012) 3(3) AJIL 
648 
 Wyels J, ´The cocoa crux: it has a long history of traditional and 
medicinal uses, and the backing of Bolivia's head of state, but can 
coca exist without cocaine?´ (2006) 58 (6), Americas 8 
 Zitt R, ´Should I stay or should I go? Why Bolivian tactics and U.S. 
'flexibility' undermine the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs´ 
(2016) 42(1), BJIL 525 
 
Websites 
 Adams M, ´Does Canada's Cannabis Industry Have Mafia Ties?´ 
(Forbes, 5 November 2018). 
<https://www.forbes.com/sites/mikeadams/2018/11/05/does-
canadas-cannabis-industry-have-mafia-ties/#30ca99d37c66> 
accessed 11 March 2019 
 Armentano P, ´American Academy of Pediatrics Calls For 




calls-for-rescheduling-cannabis/ Accessed 10 January 2019 
 Beers R and Taylor F, ´Narco-Terror: The Worldwide Connection 
between Drugs and Terror.´ (U.S. Department of State 13 March 
2002) <https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/inl/rls/rm/8743.htm> accessed 
17 December 2017 
 Braun m, ´Drug Trafficking and Middle Eastern Terrorist Groups: A 
Growing Nexus´. (The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 
July 25 2008) <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-
analysis/view/drug-trafficking-and-middle-eastern-terrorist-groups-a-
growing-nexus> accessed 18 June 2018 
 Calderón F, ´Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime´.(Harvard 
International Review 8 September 2015) 
<http://hir.harvard.edu/article/?a=11786> accessed 23 March 2018 
 Cara G, ´Cuatro años de marihuana regulada en Uruguay: 
Aproximación al monitoreo y evaluación´ (Friedrich Ebert 
Founbdation, December 2017). <http://library.fes.de/pdf-
files/bueros/uruguay/14523.pdf> accessed 10 February 2019. 
 Coyne C and Hall A, ´Four Decades and Counting: The Continued 
Failure of the War on Drugs´. (Cato Institute, 12 April 2017) 
<https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/four-decades-
counting-continued-failure-war-drugs> accessed 23 April 2018 
 El Espectador, ´Santos insiste en la necesidad de replantear la 
guerra contra las drogas´. (El Espectador Bogota, 24 April 2018) 
https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/politica/santos-insiste-en-la-
necesidad-de-replantear-la-guerra-contra-las-drogas-articulo-
751866 accessed 7 November 2018 
 Hartig H and Geiger A, ´ About six-in-ten Americans support 
marijuana legalization´ (Facttank,  8 October 2018) 
<http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/10/08/americans-
support-marijuana-legalization/> accessed 1 December 2018. 
 Henderson A, ´The Outcome of UNGASS 2016: Perpetuating 
Failure´ Michigan State University College of Law (April 2016) 
<https://www.msuilr.org/msuilr-legalforum-
blogs/?tag=Alex+Henderson> accessed 28 February 2018 
 Hughes C and Stevens A,  ´The effect of decriminalization of Drug 
Use in Portugal´ (The Beckley Foundation 2007) 
<https://kar.kent.ac.uk/13325/1/BFDPP_BP_14_EffectsOfDecrimina
lisation_EN.pdf.pdf> accessed 7 April 2018 
 International Narcotics Control Board, ´Promoting the consistent 
application of the international drug control treaties´  
<https://www.incb.org/incb/es/treaty-compliance/index.html>  
accessed 21 October 2018 
 Jelsma M, ´El retiro de la prohibición de la masticación de la coca: 
Propuesta de Bolivia para modificar la Convención Única de 1961 
173 
 
(Transnational Institute, 6 July 2009) 
<https://www.tni.org/es/publicacion/el-retiro-de-la-prohibicion-de-la-
masticacion-de-la-coca-0> accessed 24 February 2017 
 Lee Anderson J, ´The Afterlife of Pablo Escobar´. (The New Yorker 
5 March 2018). 
<https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/03/05/the-afterlife-of-
pablo-escobar > accessed 23 November 2018 
 Martinez M, ´La legalización de la marihuana eleva la violencia 
entre narcotraficantes en Uruguay´ (El País: Madrid, 10 August 
2018) 
<https://elpais.com/internacional/2018/08/09/actualidad/153382732
4_546108.html> accessed 12 January 2019.  
 Musto C y Robaina G, ´Evolución del consumo de cannabis en 
Uruguay y mercados regulados´ (Monitor Cannabis, 2018) 
<http://monitorcannabis.uy/evolucion-del-consumo-de-cannabis-en-
uruguay-y-mercados-regulados/> accessed 18 November 2018 
 Olivieri L, ´What Have We Learned From the First Nation to 
Legalize Cannabis? Not Enough´ (Cannabis Wire, 6 July 2018) 
<https://cannabiswire.com/2018/07/06/what-have-we-learned-from-
the-first-nation-to-legalize-cannabis-not-enough/ accessed 19 
November 2018>. 
 Planas R, ´Legalizing weed is ‘a security issue’, says Uruguayan 
president” (The Huffington Post, New York, 21 August 2014) 21 de 
agosto de 2014. http://www. huffingtonpost.com/2014/08/21/mujica-
weed-security-_n_5698413.html accessed 12 January 2019 
 Semana, ´Entrevista con Hannah Hetzer´ (Semana, 18 April 2018) 
<https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/beneficios-de-la-
legalizacion-de-la-marihuana-en-estados-unidos/564069> 
accessed: 23 May 2018 
 Smith A, ´La Industria de la Marihuana Legal en los Estados Unidos 
está en auge´.(CNN, 1 February 2018) 
<https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2018/02/01/marihuana-legal-estados-
unidos-industria-auge/> accessed 2 March 2018 
 Smith A, ´ The U.S. legal marijuana industry is booming´ (CNN, 31 
January 2018) 
<https://money.cnn.com/2018/01/31/news/marijuana-state-of-the-
union/index.html> accessed 22 February 2018 
 The American Presidency Project, ´President Richard Nixon 
Statement About the Drug Abuse office and Treatment Act of 
1972´. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3782 accessed 29 
March 2008 
 The Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), ‘Ley de cannabis 
uruguaya: pionera de un nuevo paradigma” (The Washington Office 
174 
 
on Latin America (WOLA), 2018) <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2018/03/GS_06142018_Cannabis-
Uruguay_Spanish.pdf> accessed 15 December 2018. 
 United Nations Economic and Social Council, ´About Ecosoc´ 
<http://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/about/> accessed 19 July 2018 
 United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime, ´International Narcotics 
Control Board (INCB) <https://www.unodc.org/lpo-
brazil/en/drogas/jife.html> accessed 19 July 2018 
 World Health Organization, ´Consolidated guidelines on HIV 
prevention, diagnosis, treatment and care for key 
populations´(World Health Organization, 2014) 
<http://www.who.int/hiv/pub/guidelines/keypopulations/en/> 
accessed 15 April 2018 
 World Health Organization, ´Joint United Nations statement on 
ending discrimination in health care settings´ (27 June 2017) 
<http://www.who.int/en/news-room/detail/27-06-2017-joint-united-
nations-statement-on-ending-discrimination-in-health-care-settings> 




Treaties, resolutions and official International Documents 
 Commission on Narcotic Drugs ´Strengthening of the principle of 
common and shared responsibility as the basis for guiding 
international action in combating the World Drug Problem with a 
comprehensive and balanced approach´(15 March 201) CND Doc 
56/9 
 Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances of 1988 (adopted 20 December 1988) 
 Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971 (adopted 21 
February 1971) 
 Economic and Social Council ´Establishment of a Commission on 
Narcotic Drugs´ (16 FEB 1946) ECOSOC Doc 9/I 
 Economic and Social Council, ´Proposal of amendments by Bolivia 
to article 49, paragraphs 1 (c) and 2 (e)´ (8 August 1975) Ecosoc 
doc E/2019/78 
 Human Rights Council ´ Contribution to the Implementation of the 
Joint Commitment to Effectively Addressing and Countering the 
World Drug Problem with Regard to Human Rights´ (23 March 
2018) HRC doc A/HRC/37/L.41 
 International Opium Convention. (adopted 19 February 1925) 
175 
 
 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, as amended by the 
1972 Protocol (adopted 25 March 1961) 
 United Nations General Assembly ´International cooperation to 
address and counter the World Drug Problem´ (22 Jan 2019) UN 
Doc A/RES/73/192 
 United Nations General Assembly ´Our joint commitment to 
effectively addressing and countering the World Drug Problem ´ (19 
April 2016) UN Doc A/RES/ S-30/1 
 United Nations, ´Reservation made by Bolivia to the 1961 Single 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs´ 
<https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtd




 Congress of Uruguay, ´Marihuana y sus Derivados; Control y 
Regulación del Estado de la Importación. Producción, Adquisición, 




distribucion/> accessed 18 November 2019 
 Department of Justice of Canada, ´Cannabis Legalization and 
Regulation´ (2018) <https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/cj-jp/cannabis/> 
accessed 22 December 2018 
 Government of Canada, ´Cannabis laws and regulations´ 
<https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/services/drugs-
medication/cannabis/laws-regulations.html> accessed 22 
November 2018. 
 Government of Canada, ´Canadian Act respecting cannabis and to 
amend the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, the Criminal 
Code and other Acts´ <(2018) https://laws-
lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/C-24.5/page-1.html> accessed 22 
October 2018 
 Government of Portugal, ´National Drug Strategy´ (Government of 
Portugal, 1999) 
<http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/system/files/att_119431_EN_Portu
gal%20Drug%20strategy%201999.pdf> accessed 4 April 2018.  
 Senate of Canada Special Committee on Illegal Drugs. Cannabis: 






e.htm#_ftn69> accessed 23 January 2018. 
 United States Mission to the United Nations, Global Call to Action 
on the World Drug Problem (24 September  2018) 




 European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, 
´Portugal Country Drug Report 2017´ (European Monitoring Centre 
for Drugs and Drug Addiction, 2013) 
<http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/system/files/publications/4508/TD0
116918ENN.pdf> accessed 5 April 2018 
 International Narcotics Control Board, ´Contribution of the INCB to 
the high-level review of the implementation by Member States of 
the Political Declaration and Plan of Action on International 
Cooperation towards an Integrated and Balanced Strategy to 
Counter the World Drug Problem´(International Narcotics Control 
Board) 
<https://www.incb.org/documents/Publications/ePublication/E-
Publication_E_FINAL.pdf>  accessed 21 October 2018 
 International Narcotics Control Board, ´INCB Report 1999´ 
(International Narcotics Control Board, 2000) 56 
<https://www.incb.org/documents/Publications/AnnualReports/AR1
999/AR_1999_E.pdf> accessed 10 April 2018 
 International Narcotics Control Board, ´INCB Report 2000´ 
(International Narcotics Control Board, 2001) 65 
<https://www.incb.org/documents/Publications/AnnualReports/AR2
000/AR_2000_Chapter_III_Europe.pdf> accessed 10 April 2018 
 International Narcotics Control Board, ´INCB Report 2011´ 
(International Narcotics Control Board, 2012) 
<https://www.incb.org/documents/Publications/AnnualReports/AR2
011/AR_2011_English.pdf> Accessed 12 January 2017 
 International Narcotics Control Board, ´INCB Report 2014´ 
(International Narcotics Control Board, 2015) 56 < 
https://www.incb.org/incb/en/publications/annual-reports/annual-
report-2014.html> accessed 10 April 2018 
 International Narcotics Control Board, ´INCB Report 2016. 
(International Narcotics Control Board, 2016) 
<https://www.incb.org/documents/Publications/AnnualReports/AR2
016/English/AR2016_E_ebook.pdf> accessed 22 November 2017 
177 
 
 International Narcotic Control Board, ´IINCB Report 2017. 
(International Narcotic Control Board, 2018). 
<https://www.incb.org/incb/en/publications/annual-reports/annual-
report-2017.html> accessed 22 November 2018 
 International Narcotics Control Board, ´The Therapeutic us of 
Cannabis´ (International Narcotics Control Board, 2017) 
<https://www.incb.org/documents/News/Alerts/Alert_on_Control_of
_Narcotic_Drugs_June_2017.pdf> accessed 19 November 2018 
 International Narcotics Control Board, ´INCB Report 2018´ 
(International Narcotics Control Board, 2019) 11 < 
https://www.incb.org/incb/en/publications/annual-reports/annual-
report-2018.html> accessed 10 February 2019 
 International Narcotics Control Board, `Shared responsibility in 
international drug control` (International Narcotics Control Board, 
2012) 
<https://www.incb.org/documents/Publications/AnnualReports/AR2
012/AR_2012_E_Chapter_I.pdf> accessed 27 July 2018 
 LSE Expert Group on the Economics of Drug Policy, ´Ending the 
Drug Wars´ (LSE Expert Group on the Economics of Drug Policy, 
2014)  
<http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/56706/1/Ending_the%20_drug_wars.pdf> 
accessed 9 December 2017 
 United Nations, ´Commentary on the Protocol Amending the Single 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961´. (United Natios, 1972) 
<https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/organized_crime/Drug
%20Convention/Commentary_on_the_protocol_1961.pdf> 
accessed 18 March 2017. 
 United Nations, ´Commentary on the Single Convention on Narcotic 
Drugs, 1961´ (United Nations, 1962) 
<https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/organized_crime/Drug
%20Convention/Commentary_on_the_single_convention_1961.pdf
> accessed 18 March 2017 
 United Nations, `Commentary on the Convention on Psychotropic 
Substances of 1971` (United Nations, 1971) 
<https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/organized_crime/Drug
%20Convention/Commentary_on_the_Convention_1971.pdf> 
accessed 25 March 2017> 
 United Nations, ´Commentary on the United Nations Convention 
against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 
1988 (United Nations, 1988) 
<https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/organized_crime/Drug
%20Convention/Commentary_on_the_united_nations_convention_
1988_E.pdf> accessed 18 March 2017 
 United Nations General Assembly, ´Official Records of the 2016 
Special Session of the General Assembly´ (United Nations, 2016) 
178 
 
<https://www.unodc.org/ungass2016/> accessed 17 November 
2017 
 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, ´The Globalization of 
Crime: a Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assesment´. 
(UNODC, 2010) <https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-
analysis/tocta/TOCTA_Report_2010_low_res.pdf> accessed 11 
January 2017 
 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. ´Chronology: 100 years 
of drug control´ (UNODC, 2008) 
<https://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr/WDR_2008/timeline_E_PR
INT.pdf> accessed 18 March 2017 
 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, ´Comisión de 
Estupefacientes´. (UNODC, 2013) 
https://www.unodc.org/documents/hlr/Leaflets/CND/13-
87553_flyerA5_Ebook.pdf accesses 30 June 2018 
 United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime, ´World Drug Report 
2018´. (UNODC, 2018) <https://www.unodc.org/wdr2018/> 
accessed 1 February 2019 
 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the Peruvian 
National Commission on Life And Development without Drugs 
(DEVIDA), ´Desempeño Comercial de las Empresas Promovidas 
por el Desarrollo Alternativo Perú. (UNODC and DEVIDA, 2012) 
<https://www.unodc.org/documents/peruandecuador/noticias/Notici
as2013/Julio/Presentacion_FINAL_FT_Empresas_2013_2606.pdf> 
accessed 12 March 2017 
 
Speeches 
 Araújo F, ´ Opening Statement of the Portuguese Secretary of State 
Assistant and of Health´ (Statement delivered at the 59th Session 
of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, Vienna, 14 March 2016 
<https://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CND/CND_Sessi
ons/CND_59/Statements_14_March_PM/04_Portugal.pdf> 
accessed 5 April 2018 
 Araújo F, ´Opening Statement of the Portuguese Secretary of State 
Assistant and of Health´ (Speech delivered at the 60th Session of 
the Commission on Narcotic Drugs,  Vienna, 13 March 2017) 
<http://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CND/CND_Sessio
ns/CND_60/Statements/13_14March/Portugal.pdf>. accessed 4 
April 2018 
 Botticelli M, ´Remarks to the Plenary Session of the 59th UN 
Commission on Narcotic Drugs´(Speech Delivered in the 59th 
179 
 
Session of the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs, Vienna, 14th 
March 2016)  
 Guterres A. (Message delivered by the United Nations General 
Secretary Antonio Guterres on the International Day against Drug 
Abuse and Illicit Trafficking, New York, 26 June 2017) 
 
Others 
 Perez E, ´Validez de la reserva de Bolivia a la Convención Única 
de 1961 sobre estupefacientes enmendada por el protocolo de 
1972”  (Master tesis, Academia Diplomática del Perú 2016) 
 Sánchez Avilés A, ´ El régimen internacional de control  de drogas: 
formación, evolución e interacción con las políticas  nacionales El 
caso de la política de drogas en España´(PhD tesis, Universitat 
Pompeu Fabra 2014)  
 International Narcotic Control Board ´ International Narcotics 
Control Board Regrets Bolivia's Denunciation of the Single 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs ´ (5 July 2011) Press Release 
UNIS/NAR/1114 
 International Narcotic Control Board ´INCB is concerned about draft 
cannabis legislation in Uruguay´ (19 November 2013) Press 
Release UNIS/NAR/1186 
<https://www.incb.org/documents/Publications/PressRelease/PR20
13/press_release_191113e.pdf> accessed 15 December 2018 
 International Narcotic Control Board, ´Statement by the 
International Narcotics Control Board on the entry into force of Bill 
C-45 legalising cannabis for non-medical purposes in Canada´. (17 
October 2018)  <https://www.incb.org/incb/en/news/press-
releases/2018/statement-by-the-international-narcotics-control-
board-on-the-entry-into-force-of-bill-c-45-legalising-cannabis-for-
non-medical-purposes-in-canada.html> accessed 21 October 2018 
 International Narcotic Control Board, ´INCB President voices 
concern about the outcome of recent referenda about non-medical 
use of cannabis in the United States in a number of states´ 
<https://www.incb.org/documents/Publications/PressRelease/PR20
12/press_release_151112.pdf>  accessed 17 December 2018 
 
 
